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Exploring Competition and Bargaining among Interest GroupLobbyists in Washington

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 October 2005

Thomas T. Holyoke
Affiliation:
Centennial Center Visiting Scholar and California State University, Fresno

Extract

In 1997, lobbyists for the Independent Insurance Agents of America,under pressure from then Senate Banking Committee Chair AlfonseD'Amato (R-NY), threw in the towel and agreed to negotiate withtheir long time enemies, the banking and Wall Street investmentindustries, on new laws structuring the financial industry for the21st century. Their compromise removed a majorlegislative barrier to facilitating the emergence of large, one-stopshopping financial corporations. More surprisingly, the ConsumerFederation of America and other public interest groups also startedbargaining over the shape of the consumer protection laws governingthese new institutions. Getting something through bargaining, theybelieved, was better than letting the financial industry write theselaws themselves. Not all consumer groups participated in thesenegotiations or gave support to the final bill; there were just notenough consumer protection provisions included to please theirideologically motivated members. Nor did every banking and insuranceagent organization support the final deal, largely because theirmembers felt threatened by the prospect of an industry dominated bya few financial behemoths. Yet the final interest group coalitionthat drove the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 across President BillClinton's desk was truly surprising in its ideological breadth.

Type
Association News
Copyright
© 2005 The American Political Science Association

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