In late summer of 2008, there were clear objective signs of a weakening economy. Industrial production was negative (−1.5 in August), inflation was creeping up (+5.4 in August), the unemployment rate was rising (6.1% in September). Housing starts were at a near-record low, with mortgages getting hard to come by, and hard to pay for. Consumer sentiment, as measured in public opinion surveys, was dropping to levels not seen since the 1980s. But there was no talk of an “economic crisis,” and reported conditions still did not qualify officially as a “recession.” The disintegration of Wall Street financial giants, which began in September, quickly accelerated the scale of the perceived, and actual, decline. “At that point,” as Campbell (2009, 13–14) puts it, “the economy was in crisis, perhaps teetering on the brink [of] a deep recession or even a depression,” with the stock market experiencing about a 25% drop in value over one month. By October 3, a $700 billion Economic Stabilization Act had passed through Congress, and was signed by President Bush. Despite this unprecedented emergency measure, the stock market continued to tumble. During the 2008 presidential campaign, at least one voter saw the electoral relevance of these economic struggles. Francine Caruso wanted a president who would “fix the economy.” Francine, an administrative assistant who lost her job, couldn't sell her home, and watched her husband postpone retirement, declared that Obama and McCain “need to stop knocking each other and tell us what they can do for us” (Amon 2008). Our overarching question, in this collection of articles, is how other voters linked the economy to their 2008 candidate choice.