Hostname: page-component-745bb68f8f-l4dxg Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2025-02-10T17:00:38.475Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Douglass North’s Theory of Politics

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 January 2019

Margaret Levi Open the ORCID record for Margaret Levi [Opens in a new window]  and
Barry R. Weingast
Margaret Levi
Affiliation:
Stanford University
Barry R. Weingast
Affiliation:
Stanford University
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Douglass C. North, co-winner of the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics in 1993, became a major leader in historical and comparative political science and in the study of institutions more generally. His work proved particularly relevant for those interested in questions of state building, state variation, development, and long-term secular change.

Type
Article
Information
PS: Political Science & Politics , Volume 52 , Issue 2 , April 2019 , pp. 213 - 217
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 2019 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

REFERENCES

Brennan, Geoffrey, and Buchanan, James M.. 1980. The Power to Tax: Analytical Foundations of a Fiscal Constitution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Davis, Lance E., and North, Douglass C.. 1971. Institutional Change and American Economic Growth. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Denzau, Arthur T., and North, Douglass C.. 1994. “Shared Mental Models: Ideologies and Institutions.” Kyklos 47 (1): 3–31.10.1111/j.1467-6435.1994.tb02246.xCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ekelund, Robert B., and Tollison, Robert D.. 1981. Mercantilism as a Rent-Seeking Society: Economic Regulation in Historical Perspective. First Edition. College Station: Texas A&M University Press.Google Scholar
Friedman, Milton. 1977. “Adam Smith’s Relevance for Today.” Challenge 20 (1): 6–12.10.1080/05775132.1977.11470294CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kennedy, Gavin. 2017. An Authentic Account of Adam Smith. London and New York: Palgrave Macmillan.10.1007/978-3-319-63802-7CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Levi, Margaret. 1981. “The Predatory Theory of Rule.” Politics & Society 10 (4): 431–65.10.1177/003232928101000403CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Levi, Margaret. 1988. Of Rule and Revenue. Berkeley: University of California Press.Google Scholar
Liu, Glory M. 2017. “Inventing the Invisible Hand: Adam Smith in American Thought and Politics, 1780–Present.” Stanford, CA: Stanford University, PhD Dissertation.Google Scholar
Moe, Terry. 2005. “Power and Political Institutions.” Perspectives on Politics 3 (2): 219–33.10.1017/S1537592705050176CrossRefGoogle Scholar
North, Douglass C. 1961. The Economic Growth of the United States, 1790–1860. New York: W.W. Norton.Google Scholar
North, Douglass C. 1981. Structure and Change in Economic History. New York: W.W. Norton.Google Scholar
North, Douglass C. 1990. Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance. New York: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
North, Douglass C. 1995. “Five Propositions about Institutional Change.” In Explaining Social Institutions, eds. Knight, Jack and Sened, Itai, 15–26. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.Google Scholar
North, Douglass C. [1993] 1996. “Economic Performance Through Time.” In Empirical Studies in Institutional Change, eds. Alston, L. J., Eggertsson, T., and North, D. C., 342–56. New York: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
North, Douglass C. 2005. Understanding the Process of Economic Change. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
North, Douglass C., and Thomas, Robert Paul. 1973. The Rise and Decline of the Western World. New York: Cambridge University Press.10.1017/CBO9780511819438CrossRefGoogle Scholar
North, Douglass C., Wallis, John, and Weingast, Barry R.. 2009. Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History. New York: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
North, Douglass C., and Weingast, Barry R.. 1989. “Constitutions and Commitment.” Journal of Economic History 49 (4): 803–32.10.1017/S0022050700009451CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pincus, Steven C. A., and Robinson, James. 2014. “What Really Happened During the Glorious Revolution?” In Institutions, Property Rights and Growth: The Legacy of Douglass North, ed. Galieni, S. and Sened, I., 192-222. New York: Cambridge University Press.10.1017/CBO9781107300361.011CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Samuelson, Paul. 1948. Economics: An Introductory Analysis. New York: McGraw-Hill.Google Scholar
Smith, Adam. [1776] 1976. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund.Google Scholar
Stigler, George. 1970. “The Optimum Enforcement of the Laws.” Journal of Political Economy 70: 526–36.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tullock, Gordon. 1986. The Economics of Wealth and Poverty. Brighton, England: Wheatsheaf Books.Google Scholar
Wallis, John Joseph. 2016. “The New Economic History and Beyond: The Scholarship of Douglass C. North.” Journal of Economic History 76 (3): 937–47.10.1017/S0022050716000851CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wallis, John Joseph, and North, Douglass C.. 1986. “Measuring the Transaction Sector in the American Economy, 1870–1970.” In Long-Term Factors in American Economic Growth, Studies in Income and Wealth, vol. 51, eds. Engerman, Stanley and Gallman, Robert, 95–162. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Wittman, Donald. 2006. Economic Foundations of Law and Organization. New York: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar