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Buchanan and the Constitutional Bases of Political Decision Making

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 November 2022

Vincent Ostrom
Vincent Ostrom*
Affiliation:
Indiana University
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Abstract

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Information
PS: Political Science & Politics , Volume 20 , Issue 2 , Spring 1987 , pp. 242 - 246
Copyright
Copyright © The American Political Science Association 1987

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References

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