Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 September 2013
In the constitutional referendum held on October 26, 1992, Canadian voters said “No” to a constitutional package, the “Charlottetown Accord,” contrived explicitly to win pan-regional support. Instead, it evoked pan-regional opposition.
The package Canadians rejected was formidably complex. It became so by a decade's accretion of elements, each calculated to appeal to, or to offset concessions to, groups excluded at an earlier stage—Quebec, the western provinces, and aboriginal peoples. Negotiators hoped that by 1992 they had finally found an equilibrium, a logroll sufficiently inclusive to survive referral to the people. Instead they seem to have gotten the logic of the logroll upside down: they may have overestimated both how much each group wanted what it got and how intensely some groups opposed key concessions to others.
Quebec. At the heart of the package were proposals contrived to induce the political class of Quebec to acquiesce in the political settlement embodied in the Constitution Act, 1982. Although the government and legislature of Quebec had rejected the 1982 settlement, no one contested that it applied to the province. But many agreed, on grounds of either justice or expediency, that the pill had to be made less bitter. The first attempt to bring Quebec on side was the Meech Lake Accord, struck in 1987 and buried in 1990. The failure of this attempt was the immediate background to the 1992 events.
This paper was written while the author was a Skelton-Clark Fellow and Visiting Professor at Queen's University. Queen's has been unstinting in its hospitality and support and is the perfect place to study the state of the federation. Comments and advice from Ronald Watts, Tom Courchene, John Whyte, Doug Brown, and Keith Banting have been especially valuable. I am also grateful for advice from audiences at the University of Michigan and the University of Toronto.
Observations on the campaign in the second part of the paper are based mainly on preliminary analyses of the referendum waves of the 1992-93 Canadian Election Study, for which the author is Principal Investigator. Co-investigators are Andre Blais, Henry E. Brady, Joseph Fletcher, Elisabeth Gidengil, and Neil Nevitte. Their contribution to this paper goes far beyond advice. Funding for the study has come from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, the National Science Foundation, and from our various universities.
None of the foregoing bears any responsibility for weaknesses in the paper. In return for allowing me to grab this headline, my co-investigators are free to hold me up to ridicule as these preliminary thoughts get turned into a fully co-authored book over the coming year.