Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 September 2013
The Reagan-Bush Administration vigorously pursued a “Reagan Doctrine” of aiding anti-communist freedom fighters worldwide, in no place with more controversy than toward the anti-US Sandinista Government of Nicaragua. Why, then, would the new presidency of George Bush quickly have agreed to defer asking Congress for military aid to the Contras, have agreed to send only humanitarian aid instead, and have agreed to permit four separate congressional committees each to determine whether any aid at all should be continued? Unravelling this odd turn of events can help us better to understand the under-rated influence of public opinion on American foreign policy.
Most of us assume the public usually to follow presidential leadership when it comes to foreign affairs. Indeed, though very few truths are undisputed when political scientists discuss Americans' opinions on questions of public importance, one accepted inference—borne out by much scientifically-verified evidence—is the “rally ‘round the flag” syndrome. The syndrome is simple: presidential popularity in public opinion polls rises when a president acts decisively toward an international crisis. These changes in Americans' stated opinions have been measured in international crises for several decades.
“Rallies” occur only when special “crisis” conditions are met. These crisis situations usually involve threats to America which are (1) remote from the everyday experience of Americans, and (2) involve threats about which the president personally informs the public, usually over the dramatically effective medium of television, and (3) involve decisive—and usually military—response at the president's direction.