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Louis Fisher on Congress and the Budget: Institutional Responsibility and Other Taboos

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 June 2013

Jasmine Farrier
Jasmine Farrier*
Affiliation:
University of Louisville
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Extract

The serial fiscal policy and budgeting woes of the United States over the last three decades have been compounded by a bipartisan evasion of institutional responsibility by elected leaders. Long before “sequestration” and “fiscal cliffs,” Louis Fisher argued that presidents and members of the House and Senate undermined constitutional power balance and the spirit of budgeting law. A variety of ill-conceived process “reforms” further damaged the separation of powers system. As a scholar, Fisher uses an institutional lens to explore budget concepts that are rare in political science, such as capacity, accountability, and duty. And as a public intellectual, Fisher's relevance has been secured by his repeatedly broaching these scholarly and political taboos.

Type
Symposium: Law and (Disciplinary) Order: A Dialogue about Louis Fisher, Constitutionalism, and Political Science
Information
PS: Political Science & Politics , Volume 46 , Issue 3 , July 2013 , pp. 510 - 514
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 2013 

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