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Judicial Review and Constitutional Maintenance: John Marshall, Hans Kelsen, and the Popular Will

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 June 2013

Nikolai G. Wenzel
Nikolai G. Wenzel*
Affiliation:
Florida Gulf Coast University
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Abstract

Constitutional restraints on government are tricky and evanescent; government failure (a lapse into anarchy or leviathan) has historically been the norm, and constitutional success an infrequent exception. To shed light on constitutional maintenance, this article examines the concept of constitutional review by studying three competing systems: the American/Marshall system of judicial review; the Commonwealth/Westminster model of parliamentary sovereignty; and the Kelsen compromise between the two. Each system's strengths and weaknesses are assessed, as constitutional framers navigate the treacherous waters between the Scylla of parliamentary tyranny and Charybdis of gouvernement des juges. In the end, neither extreme is perfect, but lessons are drawn from each of the three models.

Type
Features
Information
PS: Political Science & Politics , Volume 46 , Issue 3 , July 2013 , pp. 591 - 598
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 2013 

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