If I, in some final reckoning, were asked to state my view of the essential impact of the proposed Wildavsky constitution, I should say that it transfers the debate from the substantive to the procedural. I would say that it abstracts, mystifies, and confuses what was originally a rather clear cut disagreement within the Association. (For a more specific critique of the provisions of the Wildavsky draft see Dankwart A. Rustow, this issue.)

The original disagreement and the one that is still with us may be viewed as a difference of opinion as to certain boundaries: the boundaries between science and politics, science and policy, the Association and the government and/or the regime norms. Those engaged in this disagreement tend to cluster around two positions. One position, that has been called the “establishment” position, tends to draw the older and more established behavioral scholars. For their part they view the boundaries as being rather well established, and since workable, it is felt that they should be maintained. An opposing position, generally attracting younger scholars and some “traditionalists,” has developed around the Caucus for a New Political Science. In its search for what might roughly be called more “relevance,” it sees the “establishment” position as part of the given status quo. According to this position the boundaries are arbitrary, somewhat hypocritically maintained and supportive of a regime that is considered, if not absolutely evil, certainly ill advised as to its priorities. In a word, the distinction between science and politics is surely arbitrary, probably false, and maybe specious.