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Congressional–Executive Balance in an Era of Congressional Dysfunction

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 July 2016

David E. Price
David E. Price*
Affiliation:
US House of Representatives
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Abstract

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Type
Politics Symposium: The Transformed Congressional Experience
Information
PS: Political Science & Politics , Volume 49 , Issue 3 , July 2016 , pp. 485 - 489
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 2016 

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References

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