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Business Involvement in Campaign Finance: Factors Influencing the Decision to Form a Corporate PAC

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 November 2022

Gary J. Andres*
Affiliation:
Prudential-Bache Securities

Extract

When Justin Dart, Chairman of Dart Industries, said in 1978, “talking with politicians is a fine thing, but with a little money they hear you better,” his colleagues apparently concurred. As Figure 1 indicates, subsequent to several congressional. Federal Election Commission and Supreme Court decisions which clarified some ambiguity concerning their legality, the surge in corporate PAC growth was extremely impressive. The advent of the growth in corporate PACs represented a fundamental shift in the way business money is funneled into electoral politics. Prior to the 1970s, business executives contributed to politicians in an unsystematic, ad hoc manner. Traditionally, corporate executives got together and bankrolled candidates of their choice with little pressure or need to disclose the recipients of their largess.

Gone are those days when the so-called “corporate bag-men” would pass out envelopes filled with cash on the 17th green of some exclusive country club. Today, computerized records of congressmen's roll-call votes and lists of potential PAC contributors have replaced the nine iron as an effective corporate political tool.

Type
Business and Politics
Copyright
Copyright © The American Political Science Association 1985

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