1. See Dickstein, Morris, ed., The Revival of Pragmatism: New Essays on Social Thought, Law, and Culture (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1998)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Harris, Leonard, ed., The Critical Pragmatism of Alain Locke: A Reader on Value Theory, Aesthetics, Community, Culture, Race and Education (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999)Google Scholar; Harris, Leonard, “The Legitimation Crisis in American Philosophy: Crisis Resolution from the Standpoint of the Afro-American Tradition of Philosophy,” 21 (1987): 57–73Google Scholar; Harris, Leonard, ed., Philosophy Born of Struggle: Anthology of Afro-American Philosophy from 1917 (Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall/Hunt, 1983)Google Scholar; and Posnock, Ross, color and culture: Black Writers and the Making of the Modern Intellectual (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1988)Google Scholar.

2. West, Cornel, The American Evasion of Philosophy (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1989), 4CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

3. Ibid., 6. As West writes, “American pragmatism is a diverse and heterogeneous tradition. But its common denominator consists of a future-oriented instrumentalism that tries to deploy thought as a weapon to enable more effective action. Its basic impulse is a plebeian radicalism that fuels an antipatrician rebelliousness for the moral aim of enriching individuals and expanding democracy. This rebelliousness, rooted in the anticolonial heritage of the country, is severely restricted by an ethnocentrism and a patriotism cognizant of the exclusion of peoples of color, certain immigrants, and women yet fearful of the subversive demands these excluded peoples might make and enact” (5).

4. This is Nancy Fraser's phrasing of West, Cornel's challenge in “Another Pragmatism: Alain Locke, Critical ‘Race’ Theory, and the Politics of Culture,” in Dickstein, , Revival of Pragmatism, 157Google Scholar. Fraser's essay was first presented as a paper at a conference on pragmatism held at the Graduate School of the City University of New York in November 1995.

5. Ibid.

6. As Jeffrey C. Stewart writes, “These lectures, originally titled, ‘Race Contacts and Interracial Relations: A Study of the Theory and Practice of Race,’ were first given in April and May of 1915; Locke delivered them again in March and April of 1916. Much later, as a visiting professor at Fisk University, he revised and delivered them in the spring semester of 1928. While Locke may have given these lectures at other times during his career, the only existing transcriptions in the Alain Locke Papers of the Moorland-Spingarn Research Center at Howard University in Washington, D.C., are of his presentations in 1916 and 1928” (Locke, , Race Contacts and Interracial Relations: Lectures on the Theory and Practice of Race, ed. Stewart, Jeffrey C. [Washington, D.C.: Howard University Press, 1992], lxiGoogle Scholar).

7. As Fraser writes, “If many of Locke's insights derive from his pragmatism, his lectures present a strand of pragmatist thought that differs importantly from the mainstream of the movement. Like Kallen, Bourne, and Dewey, Locke was concerned with the regulation of group difference in twentieth-century America. Unlike them, however, he did not understand the problem as one of harmoniously orchestrating the cultural differences of immigrant groups, a view largely irrelevant to Negroes and to the struggle against racism. Rather, Locke understood difference in the light of power, domination, and political economy. Thus, unlike the pragmatist mainstream, he grasped that a dominated group might need to forge a cultural identity as a weapon of struggle against oppression. Locke represents, in sum, another pragmatism (Fraser, “Another Pragmatism,” 172).

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid., 168.

10. Ibid., 173.

11. Hutchinson, George, The Harlem Renaissance in Black and White (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995), 41Google Scholar.

12. Ibid., 35.

13. Ibid., 93.

14. Though careful to note Locke's reading and response to many of the same figures that Hutchinson details, Nancy Fraser was less concerned with locating Locke in an intellectual field than with establishing his pragmatic credentials.

16. Harris, , Critical Pragmatism, xiGoogle Scholar.

17. As Harris writes, “Alain Locke was a pragmatist. However, ‘pragmatism’ is an inadequate name for Locke's philosophy. It fails to capture the radical implications of Locke's approach within pragmatism: the critical temper embedded in his works, the central role of power and empowerment of the oppressed, and the concept of broad democracy that Locke employed” (ibid., xii).

17. Ibid., xi–xii. Leonard Harris has long argued that “values” have been central to understanding the philosophical discourse of African Americans. As he writes, “The Afro-American tradition of philosophical discourse, itself a feature of the larger complex of traditions among African peoples and a genre of American philosophical discourse, consistently takes as a norm of its discourse value commitments for radical transformation of existing states of affairs…. The enlivening norms endogenous to Afro-American traditions have more to do with value commitments than commitments masquerading as objective appeals to value-free epistemic validity…. The centrality of historical and value commitments within the history of Afro-American philosophy thus stands counter to the Anglo-American tradition of philosophy represented by pragmatism” (Harris, , “The Legitimation Crisis in American Philosophy: Crisis Resolution from the Standpoint of the Afro-American Tradition of Philosophy,” Social Science Information 26 [03 1987]: 68–69CrossRefGoogle Scholar).

18. Posnock, , color and culture, 198, 197Google Scholar.

19 Locke, Alain, “Values and Imperatives,” in The Philosophy of Alain Locke: Harlem Renaissance and Beyond, ed. Harris, Leonard (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989), 34Google Scholar.

20. Locke later wrote, “The above survey of the problems of value may be regarded as confirming most of the preliminary points noticed in #1 [“The Nature of Value”]. The philosophic importance of the subject has been attested by the great variety and universal prevalence of values. The provisional definition of value as essentially a personal attitude, as a recognition of the supremacy of the category of personality, has maintained itself and proved a clue to the labyrinth of values. It also renders somewhat nugatory the psychological debates of the schools of Meinong and Ehrenfels as to whether values are rooted in feeling, will or desire. For a personal attitude is a concern of the whole man and not of psychological abstractions. If, however, it is thought necessary to pick one among such psychological phrases, it is probably best to say that value is a personal attitude, of welcome or the reverse, towards an object of interest. For few are likely to dispute that ‘interests’ are relative to personality” (Locke, , “Value,” in Harris, , Philosophy of Alain Locke, 125–26Google Scholar).

21. The close relation between philosophy and psychology in the 19th century, as well as the increasing tension between the two disciplines, broadly served to shape the exploration Locke had undertaken (see Kusch, Martin, Psychologism: A Case Study in the Sociology of Philosophical Knowledge [New York: Routledge, 1995]Google Scholar; and Jay, Martin, Cultural Semantics: Keywords of Our Time [Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1998]Google Scholar). Given Locke's deep interest in the theories of Franz Clemens Brentano and the Austrian school of value theory, Judith Ryan's comments regarding William James are instructive: “Well versed in the philosophy of his German-speaking contemporaries and a personal correspondent of certain of them, William James communicated the ideas of Brentano, Mach, and others to the English-speaking world. By the late 1880s he was already lecturing on the new psychologies at Harvard and working out his own system. His elephantine two-volume work, The Principles of Psychology, produced over a period of twelve years was at once a synthesizing résumé and an original elaboration of his Austrian contemporaries'ideas. His popularization of this work in his more coherent Psychology, Briefer Course (1892) made the new psychologies accessible to an even wider audience” (Ryan, , “The New Psychologies,” in The Vanishing Subject [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991], 12–13Google Scholar).

22. Locke, Alain, The New Negro (1925; rept. New York: Atheneum, 1968), 3Google Scholar.

23. Ibid., 4.

24. Ibid.

25. The use of personality to suggest the existence of a complex African American identity was not limited to intellectual discourse. The following, for example, appeared in the African American newspaper the St. Louis Argus (June 3, 1927): “Dr. George F. Haynes of New York City, Secretary of the Church's Commission on Church and Race Relations, speaking before the National Council of the Congregational Church … states that a sympathetic understanding of personality [my italics] is the greatest factor for consideration of racial relations. …. Perhaps the greatest difficulty today … is the fact that the white race has been entrusted so many countries with dominant power over other groups that it is difficult for white people to realize that there is personality in other races demanding and expecting equal recognition and respect… The greatest problem is to secure that respect and recognition for personality which makes for cooperation and fellowship between racial groups” (my emphasis).

26. This essay was soon followed by Blake, Casey Nelson's Beloved Community: The Cultural Criticism of Randolph Bourne, Van Wyck Brooks, Waldo Frank, and Lewis Mumford (1990)Google Scholar. The title was taken from Bourne's admonition “All our idealisms must be those of future social goals in which all can participate, the good life of personality lived in the environment of the Beloved Community” (Blake, , “The Young Intellectuals and the Culture of Personality,” American Literary History [Fall 1989]: 510–33Google Scholar).

27. Brooks, Van Wyck, “Highbrow and Lowbrow,” in America's Coming of Age (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1970), 34Google Scholar.

28. See, for example, Benedict, Ruth, “Psychological Types in the Cultures of the Southwest” (1928), in An Anthropologist at Work: The Writings of Ruth Benedict, ed. Mead, Margaret (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1959), 242–83Google Scholar; Melville Herskovits, “Psychology and Culture” (May 1927); and Sapir, Edward, “The Emergence of the Concept of Personality in a Study of Cultures,” Journal of Social Psychology Culture 5 (1934): 408–15CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

29. Susman, Warren, “Personality and the Making of Twentieth Century Culture,” in Culture as History: The Transformation of American Society in the Twentieth Century (New York: Pantheon, 1984), 271–85Google Scholar; and Lears, T. J. Jackson, “From Salvation to Self-Realization: Advertising and the Therapeutic Roots of the Consumer Culture, 1880–1930,” in The Culture of Consumption (New York: Pantheon, 1983), 3–38Google Scholar.

30. As Nathan G. Hale Jr. writes, “The Clark Conference was a decisive event in the history of psychoanalysis in America for several reasons — the moment at which it occurred, the personal relationships it established, the impression Freud's vision created in a few strategically placed Americans. The Conference brought together many of the leaders in American professional life who determined Freud's reception” — Edward Titchener, William James, Franz Boas, Adolf Meyer, A. A. Brill, and Ernest Jones (Hale, , Freud and the Americans: The Beginnings of Psychoanalysis in the United States, 1876–1917 [New York: Oxford University Press, 1995], 4Google Scholar).

31. See Kloppenberg, James T., Uncertain Victory: Social Democracy and Progressivism in European and American Thought, 1870–1920 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986)Google Scholar.

32. As Jeffrey C. Stewart writes, “Dr. Franz Boas (1858–1942) was the father of American anthropology and the most important critic of racial theories that asserted the permanency of racial characteristics …. In terms of race theory, Boas's most important contribution appeared in his essay, “The Instability of Human types,” delivered at the First Universal Races Congress, and later published as part of his pioneer work [The Mind of Primitive Man, 1911]…. Boas was perhaps the most important speaker Locke heard at the First Universal Races Congress, for Boas was conducting the kind of research that others at the Congress cited in their papers” (Stewart, , introduction to Race Contacts, 17Google Scholar). Also, see my “Feeling Universality and Thinking Particularistically”: Alain Locke, Franz Boas, and Melville Herskovits,” in The Harlem Renaissance: The One and the Many (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1999), 43–67Google Scholar.

33. Locke, Alain, “The Theoretical and Scientific Conceptions of Race,” in Stewart, , Race Contacts, 14Google Scholar.

34. Locke, Alain, “Race Contacts and Interracial Relations,” in The Critical Temper of Alain Locke; A Selection of His Essays on Art and Culture, ed. Stewart, Jeffrey C. (New York: Garland, 1983), 408Google Scholar. As Locke writes in the full text of the lecture, “[We find the earliest race sense] [w]here people feel that there is something in kinship relationship which makes a great difference and makes one code prevail among them and another code prevail among their neighbors … We therefore find in the earliest type of race sense nothing more than this sense of kinship, this sense of what now expresses itself in the proverb ‘Blood is thicker than water’” (Locke, , “The Political and Practical Conceptions of Race,” in Stewart, , Race Contacts, 20–21Google Scholar).

35. Hollis R. Lynch claims that Edward W. Blyden's first literal reference to an “African personality” appeared in “Study and Race,” a lecture he gave in Sierra Leone on May 19, 1893, and appeared eight days later in the Sierra Leone Times. As Blyden remarked, “It is sad to think that there are some Africans, especially among those who have enjoyed the advantages of foreign training, who are blind enough to the radical facts of humanity as to say, ‘Let us do away with the sentiment of Race. Let us do away with our African personality [my italics] and be lost, if possible in another Race.’” In response, Blyden argued, “Be yourselves, as God intended you to be or he would not have made you thus. We cannot improve upon his plan. If you are not yourself, if you surrender your personality, you have nothing left to give the world.… to give up your personality would be to give up the peculiar work and the peculiar glory to which we are called. It would really be to give up the divine idea — to give up God — to sacrifice the divine individuality; and this is the worst of suicides” (quoted in Lynch, Hollis R., ed., Black Spokesman: Selected Published Writings of E. W. Blyden [New York: Humanities, 1971], 195–204Google Scholar; also see July, Robert W., “Nineteenth-Century Negritude: Edward W. Blyden,” Journal of African History 5 [1964]: 73–86CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Shepperson, George, “Notes on Negro American Influences on the Emergence of African Nationalism,” Journal of African History 1 [1960]: 299–312CrossRefGoogle Scholar).

36. Although Blyden generally looked more favorably on Islam, he was critical of both religions.

37. Blyden, Edward W., Christianity, Islam and the Negro Race (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1967), 276Google Scholar.

38. Ibid., 277.

39. Ibid., 262, 264.

40. This psychological landscape, as Blyden phrased it, was a mix of heredity and culture: “Nature determines the kind of tree, environments determine the quality and quantity of the fruit” (ibid., 277, my emphasis).

41. In an image strikingly similar to one that Horace Kallen later used in “Democracy v/s The Melting Pot” (1915), Blyden argued, “In the music of the universe each shall give a different sound, but necessary to the grand symphony” (ibid., 278).

42. Ibid., 277.

43. In addition, Locke rejected Blyden's claim that (a) African Americans would be lost unless they returned to Africa and (b) the mixing of blacks and whites was by definition a horror.

44. Locke, Alain, “Phenomena of Race Contacts,” in Stewart, , Race Contacts, 54Google Scholar.

45. Alain Locke, “Modern Race Creeds,” in ibid., 66.

46. I am not aware that Locke read Gertrude Stein's Three Lives (1903), but it would have been interesting to see his response to her effort in “Melanctha” to capture the emotion of thought in the act of expression.

47. Locke, Alain, “The Problem of Classification in the Theory of Value” (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1918), 4Google Scholar. Locke also later wrote, “We must realize that not in every instance is this normative control effected indirectly through judgmental or evaluational processes, but often through primary mechanisms of feeling modes and dispositional attitudes…. We are forced to conclude that the feeling-quality, irrespective of content, makes a value of a given kind, and that a transformation of the attitude effects a change of type in the value situation” (Locke, , “Values and Imperatives,” 34, 40Google Scholar).

48. Mason, Ernest D., “Alain Locke's Philosophy of Value,” in Alain Locke: Reflections on a Modern Renaissance Man, ed. Linnemann, Russell (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1982), 4Google Scholar.

49. As Stephen C. Pepper has written, “Theory of value is generally regarded as having its official origin in the debate between Alexius Meinong (1853–1920) and Christian Ehrenfels (1859–1932) during the '90's and the first two decades of the present century. Behind them was the work of Franz Clemens Brentano (1838–1914) and issues over value discussed by economists…. Value did not emerge as a new infant problem in the '90's. It had a long past history. What emerged was a notion that there was something common to all these problems which could be gathered into one central problem of value in general” (Pepper, , “A Brief History of General Theory of Value,” in A History of Philosophical Systems, ed. Anselm, Vergilus Ture [Paterson, N.J.: Littlefield, Adams, 1961], 493Google Scholar).

50. Eaton, Howard O., The Austrian Philosophy of Values (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1930), 19Google Scholar. Although Meinong and Ehrenfels differed as to whether the source of value was rooted in feeling or desire, they both located value in the subjectivity of the individual.

51. Locke, , “Problem of Classification,” 23Google Scholar.

52. As Pepper writes, “In briefly following this development [of the general value theory], it will be possible to name only a few of the men most influential in its course. From the standpoint of American philosophy, W M. Urban (1873–) is of first importance. His book Valuation, Its Nature and Laws, published in America in 1909 and written as a result of his studies in Austria where he absorbed the issues of the new subject, did much to plant these issues in American soil” (Pepper, , “Brief History,” 494Google Scholar).

53. Urban, Wilbur Marshall, Valuation: Its Nature and Laws Being an Introduction to the General Theory of Value (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1909), 9Google Scholar.

54. Ibid., 5.

55. Ibid., 50.

56. Ibid., 51.

57. As Urban writes, “Whatever may be said as to the ultimate metaphysical reality of the self, it is not, strictly speaking, an object of immediate experience, not an object of perception, nor, on the side of feeling, of simple appreciation, but is rather a construct of a higher order built up upon immediate perceptions and appreciations. The self is not first there as an object and then characterised, but is rather an object which is constructed and individuated in the very processes of characterisation. Constructed first for practical purposes, as a concept for the regulation of our expectations of sympathetic participation, it becomes individuated as an object with intrinsic value and meaning, to which obligations, responsibilities, merits, and demerits may be imputed, concepts which stand for certain acquired meanings of feeling. It is first of all, a worth construction, and only secondarily an object of knowledge” (ibid., 262–63).

58. Ibid., 234.

59. As Alain Locke writes, “It will be our contention that far from being constants, these important aspects of human society are variables, and in the majority of instances not even paired variables, and that though they have at all times significant and definite relationships, they nevertheless are in no determinate way organically or causally connected” (Locke, , “The Concept of Race as Applied to Social Culture,” in Philosophy of Alain Locke, 188Google Scholar).

60. Ibid., 189.

61. Ibid., 191.

62. Ibid.

63. Ibid., 192.

64. Ibid., 194.

65. Locke writes, “Race operates as tradition, as preferred traits and values, and when these things change culturally speaking ethnic remoulding is taking place. Race then, so far as the ethnologist is concerned, seems to lie in that peculiar selective preference for certain culture-traits and resistance to certain others which is characteristic of all types and levels of social organization” (ibid., 195).

66. Ibid., 198. To help make this point, Locke quoted from Herskovits, Melville and Wiley, Malcolm M.'s “The Cultural Approach to Sociology,” American Journal of Sociology (1923): 188–99CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

67. Ibid.

68. As Locke writes in his first lecture, “I am fundamentally convinced that the term ‘race,’ the thought of race, represents a rather fundamental category in social thinking and that it is an idea that we can ill dispense with. In fact the more thought of the right kind [that] can be centered in it, the more will the term [race] itself be redeemed, in the light of its rather unfortunate history. The only way to treat the subject scientifically is to regard it as a center of meaning. To [develop a rational] concept of race [is] one of the unworked opportunities of social science, particularly because it is in the field of the social sciences that we must hope for a clarification of the idea and for the arrival at a final clear meaning” (“Theoretical and Scientific Conceptions,” 1–2). Locke goes on to argue in the second lecture, “The Political and Practical Conceptions of Race,” “The sense of race really almost antedates anything in its name, in the etymology of it, because just as long as you have groups of people knit together by a kinship feeling and [who] realiz[e] that different practices [operate in] their society from those which [operate in other societies and therefore] determine their treatment of other groups, [then] you really have what is the germ [of] the race sense” (20). Stewart traces the germ of these ideas to the First Universal Races Congress at the University of London, England (July 26–29,1911), which, he claims, Locke “probably attended” (ibid., 14–15).

69. Locke, , “Value,” 111Google Scholar.

70. Ibid., 126.

71. Locke writes, “In discussing in its generality this inference from value to existence, we should remember that all values are initially claims, which may fail of validation; hence it will hardly seem valid to rest the reality of the valuable objects on what may be an unsound claim, viz., on the demand for them alone, unsupported and unconfirmed by experience” (ibid., 120).

72. Ibid., 125.

73. I have linked these two essays based on the effort of Leonard Harris to date their being written: “‘Value’ is filed in the Alain Locke Collection in front of ‘Values and Imperatives.’At first glance, it would appear to be notes taken for the preparation of ‘Values and Imperatives.’ However, upon close reading I found that it is too unlike ‘Values and Imperatives’ to be simply notes…. I doubt that ‘Values’ was written prior to 1935. However, there is little evidence that it was written much later, except for the discussion of Christian Freiherr von Ehrenfels…. If Dewey and Ehrenfels can be taken as guides, then ‘Value’ was written between 1935 and 1947” (Harris, , introduction to Locke, “Value,” 109Google Scholar).

74. As Locke writes, “The role of feeling can never be understood nor controlled through minimizing it; to admit it is the beginning of practical wisdom in such matters. As Hartmann has well observed, — ‘Every value, when once it has gained power over a person, has a tendency to set itself up as a sole tyrant of the whole human ethos, and indeed at the expense of other values, even of such as are not inherently opposed to it.’ We must acknowledge this, though not to despair over it, but by understanding how and why, to find principles of control from the mechanisms of valuation themselves” (“Values and Imperatives,” 46).

75. Ibid., 35.

76. Ibid., 37.

77. As Locke writes in an endnote, “Compare Dewey, The Quest for Certainty, p. 21: Are the objects of desire, effort, choice, that is to say, everything to which we attach value, real? Yes, — if they can be warranted by knowledge; if we can know objects having their value properties we are justified in thinking them real. But as objects of desire and purpose they have no sure place in Being until the are approached and validated through knowledge” (ibid., 50).

78. Locke writes, “It is the Roycean principle of ‘loyalty to loyalty,’ which though idealistic in origin and defense, was a radical break with the tradition of absolutism. It called for a revolution in the practise of partisanship in the very interests of the values professed. In its larger outlines and implications it proclaimed a relativism of values and a principle of reciprocity. Loyalty to loyalty transposed to all the fundamental value orders would then have meant, reverence for reverence, tolerance between moral systems, reciprocity in art, and had so good a metaphysician been able to conceive it, relativism in philosophy” (ibid., 49). In his essay “Value,” Locke called attention to Royce, Josiah's Spirit of Modern Philosophy (1892)Google Scholar and claimed that it had influenced pragmatists “to recognize the presence of valuations in cognitive processes, as a proof of the fictitious nature of ‘pure’ thought and ‘absolute’ truth. They tend to regard all values as relative, primarily in the particular situation which is valued, and declare the existence and efficacy of values to be plain, empirical facts.” However, Locke was quick to add, “The philosophic importance of the subject has been attested by the great variety and universal prevalence of values. The provisional definition of value as essentially a personal attitude, as a recognition of the supremacy of the category of personality, has maintained itself and proved a clue to the labyrinth of values. It also renders somewhat nugatory the psychological debates of the schools of Meinong and Ehrenfels as to whether values are rooted in feeling, will or desire. For a personal attitude is a concern of the whole man and not of psychological abstractions…. it is probably best to say that value is a personal attitude, of welcome or the reverse, towards an object of interest. For few are likely to dispute that ‘interests’ are relative to personality” (Locke, , “Value,” 115, 125–26Google Scholar).

79. Note that Leonard Harris had earlier but more generally argued that Locke's writings are best understood as polemics, as “weapons in the theoretical battles of the day,” and not as “treatises or explicit and definite statements of beliefs” (Harris, , “Identity: Alain Locke's Atavism,” Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 24 [Winter 1988]: 70Google Scholar).

80. Huggins, Nathan, “Alain L. Locke Symposium,” in Harvard Advocate, 12 1, 1973, 24Google Scholar.

81. Nancy Fraser, “Another Pragmatism,” 172. In his introduction to Locke's essay, “A Functional View of Value Ultimates” (1945), Leonard Harris writes, “In my opinion, Locke intentionally prefers here, as well as in other articles, a notion of functionalism to depict values rather than a pragmatic depiction. The functionality of values implies for Locke that values are manifest in the operation of material interests or social conventions to accomplish some goal. They are never completely available to us, and a useful method of reasoning may be pragmatic, exegetical, dialectic, or intuitive — that is, no privilege is a priori accorded. A pragmatic depiction of values, however, implies that values are tools, foreign instruments, or contrived methods used to accomplish some goal. In this sense, pragmatic values are goods that stand, like a hammer, outside of us, but the notion of functional values allows us to conceive of values as being always integral to our deliberations, actions, and goals. Like one sense of James's and Dewey's understanding of ‘pragmatism,’ the word ‘functional’ both depicts what values are and recommends a reasoning modality. However, Locke does not intend ‘functional’ to privilege experimental science as a model of reasoning” (Harris, , introduction to Locke, “A Functional View of Value Ultimates,” in Harris, , Philosophy of Alain Locke, 80Google Scholar).