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The Novelty Perspectives Framework: A New Conceptualisation of Novelty for Cognitive Design Studies
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 26 July 2019
Abstract
Novelty can be evaluated from the perspective of the designer who creates a concept (personal novelty), and people who perceive it post-creation (socio-novelty). In each case, the extent to which the concept is new compared to known artefacts is judged. The designer's evaluation is based on the same knowledge from which the concept was produced. Thus, if the concept is novel to the designer, creative cognitive processing must have occurred, i.e. something new was created in the mind. Evaluations made by other people are based on their own knowledge, which may differ from the designer's. Thus, concepts they view as novel are not necessarily the output of creative cognition. In this paper, we posit that personal novelty is directly related to designer cognition, whilst socio-novelty is not. However, existing metrics focus on the latter, and may be misleading in cognitive studies. To stimulate discussion, we formalise personal and socio-novelty in the Novelty Perspectives Framework. Empirical data suggests that the perspectives may be distinguished in practice. Future implications of the NPF are explored, highlighting the potential for insights at both the cognitive and neural level.
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- Information
- Proceedings of the Design Society: International Conference on Engineering Design , Volume 1 , Issue 1 , July 2019 , pp. 389 - 398
- Creative Commons
- This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is unaltered and is properly cited. The written permission of Cambridge University Press must be obtained for commercial re-use or in order to create a derivative work.
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- © The Author(s) 2019
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