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The Venezuela Crisis 2019: Use of Lethal Force and Action Short of Force
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 31 December 2019
Extract
These comments briefly address two international legal issues of concern in the Venezuela crisis: the legality of any party resorting to lethal force or taking action short of lethal force. Turmoil in Venezuela moved to a new, more dangerous level, when in January 2019 the leader of the parliament, Juan Guaidó, claimed to be the legitimate president in place of the incumbent, Nicolás Maduro. A variety of parties have taken and have threatened to take action in the wake of Guaidó’s claim. The news media has reported on three categories of action short of lethal force, including economic sanctions, military assistance, and humanitarian assistance. In the second category, lethal force, two examples are most relevant, the use of force against protesters and others not organized to use armed force, and the use of force by, on behalf of, and against groups that are organized to fight.
- Type
- Late Breaking Panel: Crisis in Venezuela
- Information
- Copyright
- Copyright © 2019 by The American Society of International Law
Footnotes
This panel was convened at 11:00 a.m., on Friday, March 29, 2019, by its moderator, Alonso Gurmendi Dunkelberg of the Universidad del Pacifico, who introduced the panelists: Mariano de Alba, consultant; Russ Dallen of Caracas Capital; Nicole Erb of White & Case LLP; and Mary Ellen O'Connell of the University of Notre Dame School of Law.
References
1 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 ICJ Rep. 14, para. 192 (June 27). See also Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, 2005 ICJ Rep. 168, paras. 163–65 (Dec. 19).
2 Aguilar-Amory and Royal Bank of Canada Claims (Tinoco Case) (Gr. Brit. v. Costa Rica), 1 RIAA 369 (1923).
3 See Brad R. Roth, Whither Democratic Legitimism?: Contextualizing Recent Developments in the Recognition and Non-recognition of Governments, 108 AJIL Unbound 213 (2015).
4 See Mary Ellen O'Connell, The Crisis in Ukraine–2014, in The Use of Force in International Law: A Case-Based Approach, at 855 (Tom Ruys, Olivier Corten & Alexandra Hofer eds., 2018).
5 See, e.g., SC Res. 242 (Nov. 22, 1967).
6 For details on attempts to provide humanitarian assistance to Venezuelans, see Dylan Baddour, When Humanitarian Aid Is Used as a Weapon to Bring Down Regimes, Atlantic (Feb. 21, 2019), at https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/02/venezuela-humanitarian-aid-weapon-regimes/583309.
7 McCann and Others v. United Kingdom, 21 Eur. H.R. Rep. 97, 176–77, para. 213 (1995). See also Montero-Aranguren et al. (Det. Ctr. of Catia) v. Venezuela, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 150, para. 69 (July 5, 2006); United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, 112, 114 princ. 9, UN Doc. A/CONF.144/28/Rev.1 (1990), available at https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/1296532/files/a-conf-144-28-rev-1-e.pdf.
8 See generally Jan Arno Hessbruegge, Human Rights and Personal Self-Defense in International Law (2017).
9 See Mary Ellen O'Connell, The Art of Law in the International Community, at chs. 2, 5 (2019).
10 Erica Chenoweth & Maria J. Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict (2011).
11 Stephen Kinzer, Yes, Conditions in Venezuela Are Bad. No, We Shouldn't Intervene, Boston Globe (Feb. 8, 2019), at https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2019/02/08/yes-conditions-venezuela-are-bad-shouldn-intervene/HSbu7B33xlU1BI9gjPkAzL/story.html.
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