¹ Fifty percent of UN member states have ratified the Torture Convention.

² Togo, fourteen overdue reports; Liberia, thirteen overdue reports; Central African Republic, eleven overdue reports; Somalia, eleven overdue reports; Afghanistan, ten overdue reports; Cambodia, ten overdue reports; Lebanon, ten overdue reports. Date of information is as of June 30, 1996, HRI/MC/1996/3.

³ This figure includes the time spent by the presessional working groups.

⁴ If the questionable practice of three of the treaty bodies, namely, to allow states to expunge their entire record of overdue reports by the submission of a single report, is to be followed, it would still take the treaty bodies an average of five years to expunge the current backlog.

⁵ This includes the differences in time allotted by most of the treaty bodies to the consideration of initial reports and subsequent reports, and the marked differences in time allotted to the consideration of reports as among the treaty bodies.

⁶ This includes the time for a government’s opening statement, which is often lengthy, questions by treaty body members (which can number between ten and twenty-three individuals, depending on the committee), answers by the government representatives, and any concluding remarks by treaty body members.

⁷ The lack of familiarity with country situations on the part of treaty body members is a consequence of a number of factors, many of which are beyond the members’ control.

⁸ Furthermore, the dialogue with state parties is conducted only in Geneva or, additionally in the case of two treaty bodies, New York. This seriously impedes the ability of most nationally based groups to attend. This difficulty is exacerbated by the fact that the treaty bodies tend to conduct the dialogue and the adoption of conclusions on the state report over many days or weeks, so as to make die costs of monitoring the proceedings prohibitive.

⁹ Under Article 20 of the Torture Convention, the Torture Committee is able to conduct investigations in a limited set of circumstances. It has completed two such reports (although its members were denied permission to go to Egypt). The Committee on the Rights of the Child has engaged in visits to various countries where it has been able to learn first-hand of specific situations, although such visits have not been explicitly characterized as fact-finding missions. The Human Rights Committee sent one of its members to Jamaica to follow up individual communication matters. The Economic Committee has visited Panama on a fact-finding mission.

¹⁰ The Economic Committee, for example, has permitted NGO oral criticism of Israel at the last two sessions, in May and November 1996, on non-Covenant subjects such as the implementation of the Oslo agreements, in the absence of having scheduled a dialogue with the state party or the consideration of a state report.

¹¹ This is despite the fact, for example, that Article 25 of the Covenant—which can give rise to claims under the Protocol—deals with the right of individuals to take part in the conduct of public affairs, to vote and to be elected, and hence requires the realization of core values of democratic government based on the consent of the people.

¹² Cases range from situations revealing appalling prison conditions to discriminatory nuances in the provision of state benefits.

¹³ Widespread ignorance of the Optional Protocol and the complaint mechanism continue to be significant deterrents to increased usage. Evidence also exists that fear of retaliation inhibits victims from lodging cases in a number of states parties.

¹⁴ Twenty-five of the current twenty-nine pending cases concern this issue.

¹³ So, for example, the summary records produced quickly after the session on Morocco before me Child Committee in September 1996 were all in English. Six months later, one of the three sessions of the Committee’s consideration of Morocco’s report is still not available in French.

¹⁶ The Committee’s report also made clear the states parties that had refused to cooperate during the Committee’s consideration of communications.

¹⁷ Report of the Human Rights Committee, at 79, para. 429, U.N. Doc. A/51/40 (1996) [hereinafter Human Rights Report].

¹⁸ An earlier annual report published information received from Canada specifically on what it had done in order to implement the Lovelace decision.

¹⁹ Human Rights Report, supra note 17, at 91 para. 466.

²⁰ Report of the Human Rights Committee, at 100-01, U.N. Doc A/50/40 (1995). The Committee states cryptically, “The Special Rapporteur did indicate ... that compliance with its Views still left much to be desired, ” and “the Special Rapporteur recalled that formal follow-up replies remained outstanding in respect of 18 Views.” Id at 100, para. 560, at 101, para. 562.

²¹ This is the result of an examination that has occured on only two occasions, the other one being in relation to Turkey.

²² Report of the Committee against Torture, at 36, para. 220, U.N. Doc. A/51/44 (1996).

²³ Human Rights Report, supra note 17, at 18, para. 45. The annual report also specifically names those states that have not cooperated with respect to individual complaints, or that have not replied to requests for follow-up information on cases of violations of the Covenant. The 1996 annual report states that “the following States have offered no cooperation in the Committee’s consideration of communications pending under the Optional Protocol relating to them: Peru, Togo and Zaire.” Id. at 77, para. 423. The following states “have not replied to requests for follow-up information ... Bolivia, Dominican Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Jamaica, Libya, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Zaire.” Id. at 90-91, para. 463.

²⁴ This is despite the fact that there are general resolutions directed at acknowledging and responding to annual reports. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res 51/86 (1996); Effective Implementation of International Instruments on Human Rights, Including Reporting Obligations under International Instruments on Human Rights, G.A. Res. 51/87 (1996).

²⁵ U.N. Human Rights Commission, at 4, para 9, UN. Doc. E/CN.4/1997/74 (1997).