1 See, e.g., Sweeney, Joseph Modeste et al., The International Legal System (3d ed. 1988)Google Scholar; Carter, Barry E. & Trimble, Phillip R., International Law (1991)Google Scholar.

2 Folsom, Ralph H. et al., International Business Transactions (2d ed. 1991)Google Scholar.

3 See, e.g., Sweeney, supra note 1, at 44–75.

4 The leading Carter & Trimble book devotes six pages to the “effect of General Assembly resolutions” and a scant two pages to “international organizations as sources of law.” Carter & Trimble, supra note 1, at 114–20, 123–25. Institutional issues receive more coverage. Id. at 452–547.

5 See, e.g., Partan, Daniel G., The International Law Process (1992)Google Scholar. Note, however, that this book also deals only tangentially with international organizations as such. In addition, the section of Partan’s book on “law-making by international organizations” deals only with the most traditional topics, e.g., the role of General Assembly resolutions in the formation of customary international law regarding compensation for expropriation and formation of the law of the sea. Id. at 132–70.

6 On UN developments, see generally the “Legal Issues” chapters in Tessitore, John & Woolfson, Susan (Eds.), A Global Agenda: Issues Before the 46Th General Assembly of the United Nations (1991)Google Scholar and A Global Agenda: Issues Before the 47Th General Assembly (1992). For one survey of international business regulatory activity, see Adelman, Carol C. (Ed.), International Regulation (1988)Google Scholar. For an analysis of international human rights law informed by an international regimes analysis, see Donnelly, Jack, International Human Rights: A Regime Analysis, 40 Intl Org. 599 (1986)Google Scholar. For a recent survey of UNCITRAL and UNIDROIT developments, see Spanogle, John A., The Arrival of International Private Law, 25 Geo. Wash. J. Intl L. & Econ. 477 (1991)Google Scholar.

7 See, e.g., Paul C. Szasz, “The United Nations and the International Legal Order,” Expanded Course Outline, October 1, 1990, at 2 (copy on file with author).

8 Id. at 2–3.

9 See, e.g., id. at 3–4.

10 See, e.g., id. at 5–6.

11 Id. at 9.

12 See, e.g., Carter & Trimble, supra note 1, at 133–64; Sweeney, supra note 1, at 1055–1120.

13 See, e.g., Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., who cites the example of the International Labour Organisation, under which conventions are adopted with "strings attached" such as a duty to submit them to domestic ratification process and a duty to report on compliance periodically to the promulgating agency. Kirgis, Frederic L. Jr., The Promulgation of International Norms in the UN System by Nontraditional Methods, in Schachter, Oscar & Joyner, Christopher (Eds.) The United Nations and the International Legal Order (forthcoming)Google Scholar. Kirgis has enumerated other organizational techniques for lawmaking, namely:

provisional application of some treaties before they formally enter into force; treaty-implementing standards that enter into force upon tacit consent, subject to a limited opt-out privilege; formally binding regulations, sometimes linked to an opt-out privilege; authoritative findings of legislative facts, to be implemented by regulatory regimes within or outside the agency; recommendations, often in the form of codes or guidelines, that clearly have more than hortatory design and effect; pronouncements developing a “common law” for members, including formal pronouncements as part of dispute settlement proceedings or as reasoned interpretations by agency organs; and informal interpretations during contacts with individual members.

14 See, e.g., Thomas Buergenthal, Law-Making in the International Civil Aviation Organization 57–61, 80–120 (1969); Kirgis, Frederic L. Jr., International Organizations in Their Legal Setting (2d. ed. 1993)Google Scholar, especially chapters 3 and 4.

15 Compare remarks by the late Ted Stein, in Cassese, Antonio & Weiler, Joseph H. H. (Eds.), Change and Stability in International Law-Making 13 (1988)Google Scholar.

16 See generally Jackson, John H., Status of Treaties in Domestic Legal Systems: A Policy Analysis, 86 AJIL 310 (1992)Google Scholar.

17 See generally Cassese & Weiler, supra note 15.

18 Cf. Thomas M. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations (1990).

19 See, e.g., Palmer, Geoffrey, New Ways to Make International Environmental Law, 86 AJIL 259 Google Scholar (drawing upon a number of institutional insights, including the usefulness of “soft law”).

20 Simma, Bruno, Consent: Strains in the Treaty System, in Macdonald, Ronald St. J. & Johnston, Douglas M. (Eds.), The Structure and Process of International Law 487, 494 (1983)Google Scholar.

21 Id. at 487.

22 Id. at 490. See also Weil, Prosper, Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?, 11 AJIL 413 (1983)Google Scholar.

23 Bruno Simma, supra note 20, at 494–97.

24 Id. at 497–504.

25 See generally Cassese & Weiler, supra note 15.

26 Abbott, Kenneth W., Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for International Lawyers, 14 Yale J. Intl L. 335, 336 (1989)Google Scholar; see also 86 ASIL PROC. 167 (1992).

27 See, e.g., Abbott, id. at 354–75.

28 See, e.g., id. at 375–404.

29 See, e.g., Ernst B. Haas, When Knowledge is Power (1990).

30 See, e.g., Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony (1984).

31 Thomas M. Franck, supra note 18; see also Alvarez, José E., The Quest for Legitimacy, 24N.Y.U. J. Intl L. & Pol. 199, 228–34 (1991)Google Scholar.

32 See, e.g., Carter & Trimble, supra note 1, at 8–28; Joseph M. Sweeney, supra note 1, at 1261–91.

33 See 46 Intl Org., Winter 1992 (Issue devoted to studies of these epistemic communities).

34 For a survey of the public choice literature, see Farber, Daniel A. & Frickey, Philip P., Law and Public Choice (1991)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; see also Eskridge, William N. Jr. & Frickey, Philip P., Cases and Materials on Legislation: Statutes and the Creation of Public Policy (1988)Google Scholar.

35 For varying views on the value of institutional practice in Charter interpretation, compare the views of, for example, Sir Percy Spender, separate opinion in the Certain Expenses of the United Nations Case, 1962 ICJ REP. 151, 184–97; Judge Alvarez, dissenting opinion in Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a State to the United Nations, 1950 ICJ REP. 4, 15–19, 23–24; and Judge Jessup, dissenting opinion in South-West Africa Cases, 1966 ICJ REP. 6, 352–53.

36 Cf. Effect of Awards of Compensation Made by the United Nations Administrative Tribunal, 1954 ICJ REP. 4 (Advisory Opinion) (General Assembly can properly create Tribunal and delegate to it exclusive judicial competence to judge certain disputes).

37 Cf. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276, 1971 ICJ REP. 16 (rejecting South Africa objections that it had been illegally prevented from appointing an ad hoc judge and improperly prevented from addressing the Security Council).

38 Cf. Case Concerning Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie, 1992 ICJ REP. 114.

39 See, e.g., Wirth, David, A Matchmaker’s Challenge: Marrying International Law and American Environmental Law, 32 Va. J. Intl L. 377 (1992)Google Scholar; Briefing Book for the 103d Congress, Why Voters are Concerned: Environmental Problems in Gatt and Nafta (1993).

40 Id.

41 See Turley, Jonathan, Dualistic Values in the Age of International Legisprudence, 44 Hastings L.J. 185 (1993)Google Scholar (applying a public choice critique to the Charming Betsy canon of construction and the presumption against extraterritoriality).

42 See, e.g., Steinhardt, Ralph G., The Privatization of Public International Law, 25 Geo. Wash. J. Int’L L. & Econ. 523, 538–41, 551–53 (1991)Google Scholar.