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Introductory Remarks by Vincent-Joël Proulx

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 March 2019

Vincent-Joël Proulx
Vincent-Joël Proulx*
Affiliation:
Assistant Professor, National University of Singapore's Faculty of Law. I extend warm thanks to Kimberley Trapp for organizing a thought-provoking panel.
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Extract

In recent years, individuals have increasingly travelled from their respective countries to join the ranks of armed opposition groups and terrorist networks, oftentimes in zones of ongoing armed conflict. One must look no further than recent newspaper headlines to realize that the “foreign fighters” phenomenon is as pervasive across borders as it is challenging, both from policy and legal standpoints. While the prospect of individuals travelling abroad to join ongoing hostilities is far from novel, the number of such foreign fighters lending support to terrorist organizations has been unprecedented in recent years, posing considerable threats to domestic, regional, and international peace and security. Hence, domestic, regional, transnational, and international actors have adopted measures to counteract terrorism, more broadly, and have begun to address the problem of foreign (terrorist) fighters. The contributions of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) are particularly noteworthy and, indeed, there has been growing interest in that organ's “quasi-legislative” activities.

Type
Foreign Fighters: Looking Beyond Counterterrorism Laws
Information
Proceedings of the ASIL Annual Meeting , Volume 112 , 2018 , pp. 301 - 303
Copyright
Copyright © by The American Society of International Law 2019 

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Footnotes

This panel was convened at 9:00 a.m., on Saturday, April 7, 2018, by its moderator, Vincent-Joël Proulx of the National University of Singapore Faculty of Law, who introduced the panelists: David DeBartolo of the U.S. State Department; Sandra Krähenmann of the Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights; and Moira Macmillian of the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

References

1 See, e.g., Ian Johnstone, The Power of Deliberation: International Law, Politics and Organizations 93–105 (2011); José Alvarez, International Organizations as Law-Makers (2005).

2 SC Res. 1373 (Sept. 28, 2001).

3 On the CTC's work, see https://www.un.org/sc/ctc. See also Rosand, Eric, Security Council Resolution 1373, the Counter-Terrorism Committee, and the Fight against Terrorism, 97 AJIL 333 (2003)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

4 On relevant post-9/11 UNSC practice, see Proulx, Vincent-Joël, An Incomplete Revolution: Enhancing the Security Council's Role in Enforcing Counterterrorism Obligations, 8 J. Int'l Disp. Sett. 303 (2017)Google Scholar.

5 See, e.g., Talmon, Stefan, The Security Council as World Legislature, 99 AJIL 175 (2005)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Szasz, Paul, The Security Council Starts Legislating, 96 AJIL 901 (2002)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also David Debartolo's comments on this panel, below.

6 For these instruments, see http://www.un.org/en/counterterrorism/legal-instruments.shtml.

7 See Crawford, James, State Responsibility: The General Part 160 (2013)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

8 See, e.g., Vincent-Joël Proulx, Transnational Terrorism and State Accountability: A New Theory of Prevention (2012); Kimberley Trapp, State Responsibility for International Terrorism (2011).

9 Further information is available at http://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/166. Recently, the Court declined to indicate provisional measures related to this convention.

10 The “targeted” sanctions regime has generated controversy, not least because of human rights concerns and a perceived lack of transparency. See, e.g., Devika Hovell, The Power of Process: The Value of Due Process in Security Council Sanctions Decision-Making (2016).

11 SC Res. 1540, 8th preambular, paras. 1–2 (Apr. 28, 2004).

12 SC Res. 2170 (Aug. 15, 2014). See also SC Res. 2199 (Feb. 12, 2015).

13 SC Res 2178 (Sept. 24, 2014).

14 With SC Res. 2178 (Sept. 24, 2014) and SC Res. 2396 (Dec. 21, 2017), the UNSC expanded the FTF regime, arguably beyond what SC Res. 1373 (Sept. 28, 2001) and the sectoral anti-terrorism conventions require.

15 See Chesterman, Simon, Dogs of War or Jackals of Terror?: Foreign Fighters and Mercenaries in International Law, 18 Int'l Comm. L. Rev. 389, 396–97, 399 (2016)Google Scholar.