¹ Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute].

² Kofi Annan, Former Secretary General of the United Nations, Address at the Rome Conference (July 18, 1998).

³ The Secretary General, Address at the Review Conference on the International Criminal Court Kampala: An Age of Accountability (May 31, 2010), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/RC2010/Statements/ICC-RC-statements-BanKi-moon-ENG.pdf.

⁴ See Human Rights Watch, Unfinished Business, Closing the Gaps in the Selection of the ICC Cases (Sept. 2011) [hereinafter HRW Policy Paper]; International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), The International Criminal Court, 2002–2012; International Bar Association, Enhancing Efficiency and Effectiveness of ICC Proceedings: A Work in Progress (Jan. 2011).

⁵ Prosecutor v. Ntaganda Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute (Mar. 14, 2012); Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/12, Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute (Dec. 18, 2012); Le Procureur v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute (Mar. 7, 2014), with the very strong minority opinion of Judge Van den Wyngaert regarding violation of fair trial standards.

⁶ Jallow, Charles, Regionalising International Criminal Law, 9 Int’l Crim. L. Rev. 445—99 (2009)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁷ Arsanjani, Mahnoush H. & Reisman, W. Michael, The Law in Action of the International Criminal Court, 99 AJIL 385 (2005)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Kreβ, Claus, ‘Self-Referrals’ and ‘Waivers of Complementarity’, 2 J. Int’l Crim. Just. 944, 946 (2004)Google Scholar; Schabas, William, First Prosecutions at the International Criminal Court, 27 Hum. Rts. L.J. (2006)Google Scholar; Bassiouni, M. Cherif, The ICC—Quo Vadis?, 4 J. Int’l Crim. Just. (2006)Google Scholar. But see Akhavan, Payam, Self-Referrals Before the International Criminal Court: Are States the Villains or the Victims of Atrocities? 21 Crim. L.F. (2010)Google Scholar; Robinson, Daryl, The Mysterious Mysteriousness of Complementarity, 21 Crim. L.F. (2010)Google Scholar; Rastan, Rod, Comment on Victor’s Justice and the Viability of Ex Ante Standards, 43 J. Marshall L. Rev. 569–602 (2010)Google Scholar. More recently, the Journal of International Criminal Justice published a special issue devoted to the performance of international criminal justice from a critical perspective. See Schabas, William A., The Banality of International Justice, 11 J. Int’l Crim. Just. (2013)Google Scholar; Delmas-Marty, Mireille, Ambiguities and Lacunae: The International Criminal Court Ten Years On, 11 J. Int’l Crim. Just. 553 (2013)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Akhavan, Payam, The Rise, and Fall, and Rise of International Criminal Justice, 11 J. Int’l Crim. Just. 527 (2013)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Luban, David, After the Honeymoon: Reflections on the Current State of International Criminal Justice, 11 J. Int’l Crim. Just. 505 (2013)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁸ See http://www.effective-intl-adjudication.org for a thorough analysis of the normative framework of the project. See Shany, Yuval, Assessing the Effectiveness of International Courts: A Goal-Based Approach, 106 AJIL 225 (2012)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Yuval Shany, Assessing the Effectiveness of International Courts (2014).

⁹ See Instead Sigall Horovitz, Gilad Noam & Yuval Shany, The International Criminal Court, in Shany, supra note 8, at 223–52 (2014), for an extensive application of the normative effectiveness framework to the overall performance of the ICC.

¹⁰ See, E.G., Grossman, Nienke, Legitimacy and International Adjudicative Bodies, 41 Geo. Wash. Int’l. L. Rev. 107 (2010)Google Scholar; Grossman, Nienke, The Normative Legitimacy of International Courts, 86 Temp. L. Rev. 61 (2013)Google Scholar; 14 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 2 (2013) (special issue dedicated to international courts and the quest for legitimacy).

¹¹ Martin Shapiro, Courts: A Comparative and Political Analysis (1981); Yuval Shany, The Competing Jurisdictions of International Courts and Tribunals 3–7 (2003); Romano, Cesare P., The Proliferation of International Judicial Bodies: The Pieces of the Puzzle, 31 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L.&Pol. 709 (1999)Google Scholar; Martinez, Jenny S., Towards an International Judicial System, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 429 (2003)Google Scholar; José E. Alvarez, International Organizations as Law-Makers (2005); Romano, Cesare P.R., The Shift from the Consensual to the Compulsory Paradigm in International Adjudication: Elements for a Theory of Consent, 39 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 791, 797–98 & n.18 (2007)Google Scholar; Romano, Cesare P.R., A Taxonomy of International Rule of Law Institutions, 2 J. Int’l Disp. Settlement (2011)Google Scholar; Born, Garry, A New Generation of International Adjudication, 61 Duke L.J. 775 (2012)Google Scholar; Alter, Karen, The New Terrain of International Law: Courts, Politics, Rights (2014); The Oxford Handbook of International Adjudication (Romano, Cesare P.R., Alter, Karen & Shany, Yuval eds., 2013)Google Scholar.

¹² See 31 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. (1999) (special issue with contributions by leading scholars such as Benedict Kingsbury, Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Jonathan Charney, Tullio Treves, and Georges Abi-Saab on the question of fragmentation).

¹³ See Abbott, Kenneth W. et al., The Concept of Legalization, in Legalization and World Politics 17–18 (Goldstein, Judith et al., 2001)Google Scholar; Kingsbury, Benedict, International Courts: Uneven Judicialization in Global Order, in The Cambridge Companion to International Law 203 (Crawford, James & Koskenniemi, Martti eds., 2012)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁴ Sweet, Alec Stone, Judicialization and the Construction of Governance, 32 Comp. Pol. Stud. 147 (1999)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Martin Shapiro & Alec Stone Sweet, on Law, Politics and Judicialization (2002); Hirschl, Ran, The Judicialization of Politics, in The Oxford Handbook of Law and Politics (Caldeira, Gregory A., Kelemen, R. Daniel & Whittington, Keith E. eds., 2008)Google Scholar; Ran Hirschl, Towards Juristocracy: The Origins and Consequences of the New Constitutionalism (2004).

¹⁵ See Helfer, Laurence & Slaughter, Anne-Marie, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication, 107 Yale L.J. 273 (1997)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Posner, Eric A. & Yoo, John C., Judicial Independence in International Tribunals, 93 Calif. L. Rev. 173–79 (2005)Google Scholar; Helfer, Laurence & Slaughter, Anne-Marie, Why States Create International Courts and Tribunals: A Response to Professors Posner and Yoo, 93 Calif. L. Rev. (2005)Google Scholar; Skouteris, Thomas, The New Tribunalism: Strategies of De-Legitimization in the Era of Adjudication, 17 Finn. Y.B. Int’l L. 307 (2006)Google Scholar; The International Judge: An Introduction to the Men and Women Who Decide the World’s Cases 11–14 (Terris, Daniel, Romano, Cesare P.R. & Swigart, Leigh eds., 2007)Google Scholar; Guzman, Andrew T., International Tribunals: A Rational Choice Analysis, 157 U. PA. L. Rev. 171, 188 (2008)Google Scholar; Shany, Yuval, No Longer a Weak Department of Power? Reflections on the Emergence of a New International Judiciary, 20 Eur. J. Int’l L. 73 (2009)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. But see Kingsbury, supra note 13 (who concludes that the project of judicialization has not been subjected to severe critique and that the current status of attitude is more reformist rather than rejectionist).

¹⁶ For the concept of compliance and its limits, see Kingsbury, Benedict, The Concept of Compliance as a Function of Competing Conceptions of International Law, 19 Mich. J. Int’l L. 345 (1997–1998)Google Scholar; Downs, George W., Rocke, David M. & Barsoom, Peter N., Is the Good News About Compliance Good News About Cooperation?, 50 Int’l Org. 379 (1996)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Raustalia, Kal & Marie-Slaughter, Anne, International Law, International Relations and Compliance, in The Handbook of International Relations (Carlsnaes, Walter, Risse, Thomas & Simmons, Beth A. eds., 2002)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Howse, Robert & Teitel, Ruti, Beyond Compliance: Rethinking Why International Law Really Matters, 1 Global Pol’y 127 (2010)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁷ See Helfer, Laurence & Slaughter, Anne-Marie, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication, 107 Yale L.J. 273 (1997)CrossRefGoogle Scholar (although they later reversed their claim); Guzman, Andrew T., International Tribunals: A Rational Choice Analysis, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 171, 188 (2008)Google Scholar; Raustalia, Kal, Compliance & Effectiveness in International Regulatory Cooperation, 32 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 387 (2004)Google Scholar; Posner & Yoo, supra note 15; Raustalia & Slaughter, supra note 16.

¹⁸ For a thorough analysis of the normative framework of the project, see Shany, supra note 8; Yuval Shany, Assessing the Effectiveness of International Courts (2014).

¹⁹ See Shany, supra note 8, at 225, 230, and his further sources.

²⁰ The rational-system approach is compared in organizational theory to the open-system and system-resource approach. The normative advantages of the rational system approach outweighed the other two theories.

²¹ Shany, supra note 8, at 240–48. A comprehensive analysis of the entire normative framework of the project is beyond the scope of this paper. For this reason, there is no analysis on relevant issues such as goal ambiguity, the difference between goals and motives, or the justification for the predominant role of the mandate providers.

²² Note that similar goals have been identified by other scholars who explore ICTs. von Bogdandy, Armin & Venzke, Ingo, In Whose Name? An Investigation of International Courts’ Public Authority and Its Democratic Justification, 23 Eur. J. Int’l L. 7–41 (2012)Google Scholar; von Bogdandy, Armin & Venzke, Ingo, On the Functions of International Courts: An Appraisal in Light of the Burgeoning Public Authority, 26 Leiden J. Int’l L. 49–72 (2013)Google Scholar; Alter, Karen, The Multiple Roles of International Courts and Tribunals, Enforcement, Dispute Settlement, Constitutional and Administrative Review, in Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and International Relations: The State of the Art (Dunoff, Jeffrey L. & Pollack, Mark A. eds., 2013)Google Scholar; Kingsbury, supra note 13.

²³ The project acknowledges the difficult task of proving causation between the operation of the courts and the specific state’s conduct.

²⁴ The generic goal of regime legitimization pertains both to the relevant institutions and the norms they generate.

²⁵ See, e.g., Alter, Karen, Agents or Trustees? International Courts in Their Political Context, 14 Eur. J. Int’l Rel. 1 (2008)Google Scholar; Venzke, Ingo, International Bureaucracies from a Political Science Perspective—Agency, Authority and International Institutional Law, 9 Ger. L.J. 1401 (2008)Google Scholar; von Bogdandy, Armin & Venzke, Ingo, On the Functions of International Courts: An Appraisal in Light of the Burgeoning Public Authority, 26 Leiden J. Int’l L. 9–72 (2013)Google Scholar.

²⁶ See Robert Howse, The Wto System: Law, Politics and Legitimacy 213 (2007); Yuval Shany, Assessing the Effectiveness of International Courts 44–46 (2014) (claiming that legitimization is the raison d’être for preferring judicial avenues to other institutional approaches to certain policy problems).

²⁷ Shany, supra note 8, at 265–66.

²⁸ Yuval Shany, Assessing the Effectiveness of International Courts 137–38 (2014).

²⁹ Hersch Lauterpacht, The Function of Law in the International Community 426 (1933); Grossman, Nienke, Legitimacy and International Adjudicative Bodies, 41 Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev. 107, 148–52 (2010)Google Scholar.

³⁰ Paulus, Andreas, International Adjudication, in The Philosophy of International Law 216 (Besson, Samantha & Tasioulas, John eds., 2010)Google Scholar.

³¹ Shany, supra note 8, at 265–66.

³² See, e.g., Danner, Allison Marston, Enhancing the Legitimacy and Accountability of Prosecutorial Discretion at the International Criminal Court, 97 AJIL 510 (2003)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Goldston, James A., More Candor About Criteria: The Exercise of Discretion by the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, 8 J. Int’l Crim. Just. (2010)Google Scholar; Lepard, Brian D., How Should the ICC Prosecutor Exercise His or Her Discretion? The Role of Fundamental Ethical Principles, 43 J. Marshall L. Rev. 553–67 (2010).Google Scholar

³³ Danner, for example, while acknowledging the perceived angle of legitimacy, insists on the procedural legal one and applies the model developed by Chayes.

³⁴ Ocampo, Luis Moreno, The International Criminal Court: Seeking Global Justice, 40 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 215, 224 (2007–2008)Google Scholar.

³⁵ Id. at 225.

³⁶ The specific goals advanced in the various prosecutorial policies could also be considered as operative goals in comparison to the official goals of the Court as a whole. Yuval Shany, Assessing the Effectiveness of International Courts 17 (2014).

³⁷ Shany, supra note 8, at 233–35.

³⁸ Id.

³⁹ Id.

⁴⁰ ICC-OTP, Strategic Plan June 2012–2015 (Oct. 11, 2013).

⁴¹ Thomas M. Franck, Recourse to Force 178 (2002).