¹ Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Technology and the Twenty-first Century Battlefield: Re-Complicating Moral Life for the Statesman and the Soldier, U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute, Jan. 15, 1999.

² For a discussion of “the revolution in military affairs” in the information age see generally, Select Enemy. Delete., The Economist, March 8, 1997, at 21; Cohen, Eliot A., A Revolution in Warfare, Foreign Affairs, Mar./Apr. 1996, at 37 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Kxepinevich, Andrew F., Cavalry to Computers: The Pattern of Military Revolutions, The National Interest, Fall 1994, at 30 Google Scholar; and Fitzsimonds, James R. and Tol, Jan M. Van, Revolutions in Military Affairs, Joint Force Q., Spring 1994, at 24 Google Scholar.

³ There are at least six categories of PGMs: (1) “man-in-the-loop” weapons such as laser-guided bombs which require an operator to “illuminate” the target or weapons that have on-board sensors which allow an operator to guide the weapon to the target; (2) autonomous weapons relying only on inertial navigation systems (INS) and autonomous weapons updated by Global Positioning Satellites (GPS) for guidance to the target; (3) autonomous weapons with terrain-aided INS/GPS systems; (4) autonomous weapons with INS/GPS systems and template matching algorithms for guidance; (5) anti-emitter PGMs that rely on onboard systems to home on emitting targets such as enemy radars; and (6) PGMs with “smart” submunitions that use various sensors to guide themselves to targets. See John Birkler et al., A Framework for Precision Conventional Strike in Post-Cold War Military Strategy, at 6-11 (1996).

⁴ Walter J. Boyne, Beyond the Wild Blue: A History of the Air Force 1947-1997, at 7 ( 1997). ‘Id.

⁶ Id.

⁷ W. Michael Reisman and Chris T. Antóniou, THE Laws of War, at xxiv (1994). This trend has led Edward Luttwak to argue that an even greater investment in technology is required because modern democracies simply cannot tolerate casualties. See Luttwak, Edward, Post-Heroic Armies, Foreign Affairs, July/Aug. 1996, at 33 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁸ See Winn Schwartau, The Ethics of Civil Defense and Information Warfare, J. Nat’l Computer Security Ass’n (NCSA News), June 1997, at 15, 16-17.

⁹ See Commander Crawford, James W., The Law of Noncombatant Immunity and the Targeting of National Electrical Power Systems, 21 Fletcher F. World Aff. 101 (Summer/Fall 1997)Google Scholar.

¹⁰ Crawford, supra note 9, at 54.

¹¹ Essentially, the concept of proportionality requires commanders to refrain from attacks when it “may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects or combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the direct and concrete military advantage anticipated.” See Department of the Air Force Pamphlet (AFP) 110-31, International Law—The Conduct of Air Operations, Nov. 19, 1976, para. 5-3c(l)(b)(I)(c).

¹² The system uses terms that have specific definitions and this affects the evaluation. For example, “casualties” are defined as the “estimated number of people who die or receive injuries that require medical treatment due to short term effects (6 months) of nuclear detonations.” “Population at Risk” is defined as the “total civilian population in danger of dying, independent of shelter, from short term (6 months) effects of nuclear detonations.” See Memorandum, Acronyms/Definitions Used in SIOP Analysis (ЦІ, USSTRATCOM Plans and Policy Directorate, Force Assessment Branch (Apr. 1997) (on file with author).

¹³ See AFP 110-31, supra note 11, para. 5-3c(l)(b)(I)(c).

¹⁴ See generally Paul R. Camacho, Further Development in the Construction of Political Action Expert Systems Software: Fuzzy Logic Techniques on Social Science Variables, a presentation for the Biennial International Conference of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, Baltimore, Md., Oct. 24-26, 1997 (unpublished paper on file with author).

¹⁵ “War is typically nonlinear, meaning the smallest effects can have unpredicted, disproportionate consequences.” See McKitrick, Jeffrey, et. al, Revolution in Military Affairs, in Battlefield of the Future (Air Univ., 1995)Google Scholar. See also Glenn E. James, Chaos Theory: The Essentials for Military Applications 57-95 (Newport Paper No. 10, Naval War College, 1996) (discussing the limitations of computer modeling).

¹⁶ Robert N. Ellithorpe, Warfare in Transition? American Military Culture Prepares for the Information Age, at 4, a presentation for the Biennial International Conference of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, Baltimore, Md., Oct. 24-26,1997 (unpublished paper on file with author) (“History has demonstrated the fatal error of military decisions based on the use of scientific and technical analysis at the expense of understanding the warfighting art.”).

¹⁷ Kuehl, Daniel, The Ethics of Information Warfare and Statecraft, paper presented at InfoWARcon ‘96, Washington, D.C., (Sept. 10, 1996)Google Scholar (copy on file with the author).

¹⁸ As quoted by George Wilson. See George С Wilson, Like it or Not, Space Warfare is Way of Future—and Past, Air Force Times, June 28, 1994, at 70.

¹⁹ See Jennifer Heroema, A.F. Space Chief Calls War in Space Inevitable, Space News, Aug. 1-18, 1996, at 4.

²⁰ See U.S. Space Command, U.S. Space Command Vision for 2020 (1997), at 6.

²¹ As quoted in U.S. Air Force, Global Engagement: A Vision for the 21^st Century Air Force (1997), at 7.

²² See, e.g., Article I, Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Explorations and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27,1967,18 U.S.T. 2411,1.I.A.S. No. 6347; 610 U.N.T.S. 205 (the “Outer Space Treaty”). See generally, Morgan, Richard A., Military Uses of Commercial Communications Satellites: A New Look at the Outer Space Treaty and “Peaceful Purposes”, 60 J. Air L. & Com. 237 (Fall 1994)Google Scholar.

²³ Kagan, Frederick W., Star Wars in Real Life: Political Limitations on Space Warfare, Parameters Autumn 1998, at 112 Google Scholar.

²⁴ See Mantz, Michael R., The New Sword: A Theory of Space Combat Power (Air University Press, May 1995), at 12 Google Scholar (emphasis added).

²⁵ National Science and Technology Council, National Space Policy (White House Press Release, Sept. 19, 1996), at 6.

²⁶ See e.g., Bova, Ben, Laser foes forget crossbow’s history, USA Today, January 7, 1998, at 15 Google Scholar.

²⁷ The GAO found that 45% of military personnel performed support functions that could be done by civilians for an average of $15,000 less. See Bowman, Tom, Shift Military Support Jobs to Civilians, Close Inefficient Facilities, GAO Urges, Baltimore Sun, April 5, 1997, at 4 Google Scholar.

²⁸ Peters, Katherine M., Civilians at War, Government Executive, July 1996, at 23 Google Scholar.

²⁹ AFP 110-31, supra note 11, para. 3-5.

³⁰ Parks, W. Hays, Air War and the Law of War, 32 A.F. L. Rev. 1, 168 (1990)Google Scholar.

³¹ AFP 110-31, supra note 11, para. 3-3.

³² Kennedy, Paul and Andreopoulos, George J., The Laws of War: Some Concluding Reflections, in The Laws of War: Constraints on Warfare in the Western World 215 (Howard, Michael, Andreopoulos, George J., and Shulman, Mark L., eds., 1994)Google Scholar.

³³ See Bender, Bryan, Defense Contractors Quickly Becoming Surrogate Warriors, Defense Daily, March 28, 1997, at 490 Google Scholar.

³⁴ U.S. Air Force, Global Engagement: A Vision for the 21^st Century Air Force (1997), at 7.

³⁵ Id., at 19.

³⁶ AFP 110-31, supra note 11, para. 3-3 provides:

See also Lt Gehring, Colonel Robert W., Loss of Civilian Protections Under the Fourth Geneva Convention and Protocol I, 90 Mil. L. Rev. 49 (1980)Google Scholar.

³⁷ “Unlawful combatants” are not ordinarily considered “war criminals.” Rather, they would be subject to prosecution under the domestic law of the belligerent who captures them, much as out-of-uniform saboteurs would be. During World War II, for example, the United States captured eight German saboteurs and executed six. See American Heritage New History of World War II 276 (Rev. and updated by Stephen E. Ambrose based on the original text by C. L. Sulzberger, 1997).

³⁸ See U.S. Navy, Annotated Supplement to the Commander’s Handbook of the Law of Naval Operations, Naval Warfare Publication (NWP) 9 (Rev.A) (1989) para. 8.5.1.2 (discussing the prohibition on the bombardment for the sole purpose of terrorizing civilians) and Parks, supra note 27, at 142 (discussing the general proposition of psychological purposes as military objectives).

³⁹ See Geoffrey Best, Law and War Since 1945 274-275 (1994).

⁴⁰ Rowney, Edward L., Tough Times, Tougher Talk, American Legion Magazine, May 1997, at 24 Google Scholar, 25-26.

⁴¹ H.R. McMaster, Dereliction of Duty (1997), at 327 (emphasis added).

⁴² Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (1996).

⁴³ Libyans to form shield at suspected arms plant, Baltimore Sun, May 17, 1996, at 14.

⁴⁴ supra note 7.

⁴⁵ Gary D. Sous, Son Thang: An American War Crime (1998).