¹ At a press conference in 1963, President Kennedy remarked that “personally I am haunted by the feeling that by 1970, unless we are successful, there may be ten nuclear powers instead of four, and by 1975, 15 or 20.” Text of President Kennedy’s News Conference on Foreign and Domestic Affairs, N.Y. Times, Mar. 22, 1963, at 4.

² Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 21 UST 483, 729 UNTS 161, entered into force March 5, 1970.

³ Id., Art. VI.

⁴ For example, the Bush Administration recently proposed a multibillion-dollar plan to create a new generation of nuclear warheads. The plan has generated criticism, particularly in the context of the failure of the United States to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. See Walter Pincus, Congress Skeptical of Warhead Plan: Lawmakers and Experts Question Necessity, Implications of a New Nuclear Weapon, Wash. Post, Apr. 22, 2007, at A05 (quoting former Senator Sam Nunn as saying that “If Congress gives a green light to this program in our current world environment... I believe that this will be misunderstood by our allies, exploited by our adversaries, [and] complicate our work to prevent the spread and use of nuclear weapons.”).

⁵ See Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 ICJ Rep. 1, at 33 (“The emergence, as lex lata, of a customary rule specifically prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons as such is hampered by the continuing tensions between the nascent opinio juris on the one hand, and the still strong adherence to the practice of deterrence on the other.”).

⁶ See, e.g., Tannenwald, Nina, Stigmatizing the Bomb: Origins of the Nuclear Taboo, 29 Int’L Security, No. 4, 5, 41 (Spring 2005)Google Scholar.

⁷ See Article 1, Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, Jan. 13, 1993, 32 ILM 800 (the “CWC”); Article 1, Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, Apr. 10, 1972, 26 UST 583, 1015 UNTS 163 (the “BWC”). Although the BWC is deeply flawed by indeterminate language in its key provisions and by a lack of mandatory transparency mechanisms, neither the BWC nor the CWC explicitly exempt any state party from compliance with each regime’s respective disarmament obligations. Proponents of a taboo against nuclear weapons concede that the lack of a universal nuclear prohibition in the NPT “departs in some ways from the objective characteristics of a taboo.” See e.g., Tannenwald, supra note 6, at 9.

⁸ Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, the Director of the International Atomic Energy Agency, has observed that the uranium enrichment process, which is a key capability in the building of a nuclear weapon, has come to be viewed as a symbol of power and prestige by some states. See Daniel Dombey, Pressure Mounts on Iran over its Nuclear Programme, Fin. Times (London), Feb. 21, 2007 (quoting ElBaradei as saying that “Iran sees enrichment. . . as a strategic goal because they feel that this will bring them power, prestige and influence.”)

⁹ See Falk, Richard, The Challenges of Biological Weaponry: A Twenty-First-Century Assessment, in Biological Warfare and Disarmament, in Biological Warfare and Disarmament: New Problems/New Perspectives 41-42 (Wright, Susan ed., 2002)Google Scholar.

¹⁰ Whether the underlying motives were perceived strategic needs or national pride, the development and testing of nuclear weapons by India, Pakistan, and North Korea, and questionable nuclear activities being pursued by Iran raise serious questions about the relevance of any nuclear taboo on the decision-makers in these states. See, e.g., John J. Mearsheimer India Needs the Bomb, N.Y. Times, Mar. 24, 2000, at A21 (“India did not acquire these [nuclear] weapons for frivolous reasons, like misplaced pride or domestic politics, as some Americans believe. Rather, India, like the United States, had sound strategic reasons for wanting mem.”); Simon Rosenblum and Ernie Regehr, The Status of Nuclear Weapons, Toronto Star, June 16, 1998, at A19 (“Nuclear weapons by virtue of the legitimacy invested in them by the policies and arsenals of the major nuclear powers, are still thought to convey status, enhance national pride, and force the world to reckon with any state that acquires them. Who can doubt that the people of India and Pakistan feel that the possession of nuclear weapons will put them on the world’s political map?”); Karl Vick, Iranians Assert Right to Nuclear Weapons; Issue Unites Conservatives, Reformers, Wash. Post, Mar. 11, 2003, at A16 (“While maintaining that their country is not developing nuclear weapons, Iranians argue strenuously and with rare unanimity that they have a right to such weapons, to balance Israel’s arsenal and as a manifestation of national pride.”)

¹¹ ‘ Japan is an example of a country with an understandably strong aversion to nuclear weapons that does not correspond with a national policy of rejecting nuclear protection. Following an apparent North Korean nuclear test, the Japanese government welcomed reassurances by U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice that “[t]he United States has the will and the capability to meet the full range—and I underscore full range—of its deterrent and security commitments to Japan.” Thomas Shanker & Norimitsu Onishi, Japan Assures Rice that it Has No Nuclear Intentions, N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 2006, at 14. At the same time, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and South Korean Defense Minister Yoon Kwang Ung approved a joint communiqué that emphasized the “continuation of the extended deterrence offered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella” for South Korea. Glenn Kessler, China Gave ‘Strong Message’ to North Koreans, Rice Says; Beijing Is Called Ready to Apply U.N. Sanctions, N.Y. Times, Oct. 21, 2006, at All.

¹² See, e.g. Joseph S. Nye Jr., Nonproliferation After North Korea, Wash. Post, Nov. 5, 2006, at B7 (“Our allies in Europe and Japan were protected by our nuclear umbrella, and we told South Korea and Taiwan that our willingness to defend them would be jeopardized if they developed the bomb.”)

¹³ See, e.g., Jozef Goldblat, Arms Control: The New Guide to Negotiations and Agreements 110 (2002).

¹⁴ See, e.g., Bill Keller, The Thinkable, N.Y. Ttmes, May 4, 2003, at 48 (“The first Bush administration and then the Clinton administration bargained hard for the surrender of Ukraine’s weapons, promising abundant financial aid and a military partnership that UKrainians hoped would lead to American security guarantees.”).

⁷ See generally Moltz, James Clay, Introduction: Assessing United States Nonproliferation Assistance to the Newly-Independent States, 7 Nonproliferation Rev. 55, 56 (2000), available at <http://CNs.miis.edu/pubs/npr/Voİ07/7l/intro71.htm>CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁶ See David Sanger, U.S. and Russia Will Police Potential Nuclear Terrorists, N.Y. Times, July 15, 2006, at A8.

¹⁷ See, e.g., Thomas C. Schelling, The Nuclear Taboo, Wall St. J., Oct. 24, 2005, at A14.

¹⁸ See Goldblat, supra note 12, at 112-13 (concluding that arguments for preserving the option of using nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states are “not convincing” and describing as “surprising” the fact that nuclear postures have remained largely unchanged after the end of the Cold War in light of the limited, residual role that nuclear weapons play in deterring only the first use of an enemy’s nuclear weapons).

¹⁹ These useful efforts include attempts by the International Atomic Energy Agency to strengthen safeguards agreements and other transparency measures by making them more determinate and comprehensive, particularly in the context of the ongoing controversy surrounding Iran’s nuclear activities.