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Extending the European Debt Discussion to Broader International Governance

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 February 2017

Odette Lienau
Odette Lienau*
Affiliation:
Cornell University Law School
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Abstract

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Type
Seamlessness or Segmentation? International Economic Governance and European Sovereign Debt
Information
Proceedings of the ASIL Annual Meeting , Volume 105 , 2011 , pp. 141 - 145
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of International Law 2011

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References

1 Petrakis, Maria & Weeks, Natalie, China Supports Stable Euro, Won’t Reduce European Bondholdings, Wen Says, Bloomberg (Oct. 3, 2010)Google Scholar, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-10-01/china-s-wen-visits- greece-to-sign-cooperation-deals-show-confidence-in-eu.html.

2 For a leading European restructuring proposal, see Gianviti, François et al., A European Mechanism/or Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Proposal (2010)Google Scholar, http://www.bmegel.org/publications/publication-detail/publication/446-a-european-mechanism-for-sovereign-debt-crisis-resolution-a-proposal/.

3 For concerns about the efficacy of CACs, particularly in the European context, see, e.g., Gelpem, Anna & Gulati, G. Mitu, Forward: of Lawyers, Leaders and Returning Riddles in Sovereign Debt, 73 Law & Contemp. Probs. i, ii-xii (2010)Google Scholar.

4 Anne Krueger’ s initial November 2001 speech, “International Financial Architecture for 2002: A New Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring,” is available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2001/112601.HTM.

5 For brief overviews of issues surrounding the IMF SDRM proposals, see, e.g., Helleiner, Eric, Filling a Hole in Global Financial Governance? The Politics of Regulating Sovereign Debt Restructuring, in the Politics of Global Regulation 89, 100-20 (Mattli, Walter & Woods, Ngaire eds., 2009)Google Scholar; Gianviti et al, supra note 2, at 15-19.

6 As an empirical matter it might be difficult to tease out this particular effect. But cf. Eichengreen, Barry & Mody, Ashoka, Do Collective Action Clauses Raise Borrowing Costs?, 114 Econ. J. 247–64 (2004)CrossRefGoogle Scholar (suggesting that CACs lower borrowing costs for creditworthy borrowers, but can raise them for those considered more risky).

7 For a slightly different characterization of this internal and external dimension, see, e.g., Jackson, Robert H., Sovereignty and World Politics: A Glance at the Historical and Conceptual Landscape, in Sovereignty at the Millennium 11 (Jackson, Robert H. ed., 1999)Google Scholar.

8 The earlier, post-World War Ii lending by international financial institutions to European countries had been more accepting of domestic policy control.

9 O’Harrow, Robert Jr. et al., U.S. Found a Surprise as it Sought to Hinder Libya, Wash. Post, Mar. 24, 2011, at A11Google Scholar.