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Die Geister die Ich Rief: Uncommon Remedies in International Dispute Resolution
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 20 January 2017
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- Uncommon Remedies in International Dispute Resolution
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- Copyright © American Society of International Law 2014
References
1 Associate Professor of Law, Washburn Law School, Topeka, Kansas.
2 Senior Associate, King & Spalding LLP, Houston, Texas.
3 Counsel, Chaffetz Lindsey LLP, New York.
4 Senior Associate, Covington & Burling LLP, London.
5 Associate, Volterra Fretta, London.
6 Assistant Professor of Law, University of Calgary, Calgary, Alberta.
7 Associate Professor of Law, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, Sacramento, California. The panelists wish to thank the organizing committee for their support and particularly would like to recognize Dr. Todd Weiler and Prof. Dr. Behlolavek for their tremendous enthusiasm and support in organizing the panel.
8 The following represents a summary of the panel.
9 Andrew Guzman, Against Consent, 52 Va. J. Int’l L. 747, 786 (2012) (quoting Alter, Karen J., Delegating to International Courts: Self-Binding vs. Other Binding Delegation, 71 Law & Contemp. Probs. 37, 75 (2008))Google Scholar.
10 Shany, Yuval, Assessing the Effectiveness of International Courts: A Goal-Based Approach, 106 AJIL 225 (2012)Google Scholar; see also Addis, Adeno, The Concept of Critical Mass in Legal Discourse, 29 Cardozo L. Rev. 97 (2007)Google Scholar (discussing the concept of critical mass).
11 Compare W. Michael Reisman, The Supervisory Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice: International Arbitration and International Adjudication 41 (1997) (compliance with classical international dispute resolution mechanisms was brought about because submitting states had “discounted” the expected loss in a specific dispute submitted to arbitration or adjudication ex ante), with Hersch Lauterpacht, The Function of Law in the International Community 159–61 (2011).
12 See, e.g., Judd, Patricia, Towards a TRIPS Truce, 32 Mich. J. Int’l L. 613 (2011)Google Scholar (arguing that WTO decisions can effectively depoliticize international intellectual property rights disputes).
13 Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 15 June 1962 in the Temple of Preah Vihear (Camb. v. Thai.), Provisional Measures, 2011 ICJ. Rep. 116–24 (July 18); Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russ.), Provisional Measures, 2008 ICJ. Rep. 50–54 (Oct. 15).
14 See, e.g., Quiborax S.A., Non-Metallic Minerals S.A. & Allan Fosk Kaplún v. Plurinational State of Bolivia, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/2, Provisional Measures (Feb. 26, 2010) (in which the tribunal decided that Bolivia had to suspend criminal proceedings against a number of named individuals, including one of the claimants, and any other criminal proceedings directly related to the arbitration). See also City Oriente Limited v. Republic of Ecuador & Empresa Estatal Petróleos del Ecuador (PetroEcuador), ICSID Case No. ARB/06/21, Provisional Measures (Nov. 19, 2007); Sergei Paushok et al. v. Mongolia, UNCITRAL, Interim Measures (Sept. 2, 2008) [hereinafter Paushok]; Perenco Ecuador Ltd. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/6, Provisional Measures (May 8, 2009) (in which tribunals have restrained states from collecting alleged taxes due and enforcing laws for failure to pay those taxes pending final determinations in the respective arbitrations).
15 Int’l Court of Justice, Rules of Court, art. 75(1) (July 1978), http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/index.php?pl=4&p2=3&p3=0.
16 Int’l Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Rules of the Tribunal, art. 89(5) (Oct. 1997), http://www.itlos.org/documents_ publications/documents/rules_en.pdf.
17 Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, art 27(1), 20 ILM 1289 (1981).
18 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, art. 26, General Assembly Res. No. 31/98, UN Doc. A/RES/31/17 (1976).
19 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, art. 26(2), General Assembly Res. No. 65/22, UN Doc. A.RES/65/22.
20 ICSID, Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings, rule 39, http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/ICSID/RulesMain.jsp.
21 See, e.g., supra note 13.
22 See, e.g., supra notes 15, 16.
23 For a discussion of inherent powers in international adjudication, see Chester Brown, A Common Law of International Adjudication 119–51 (2007).
24 Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries, in Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Fifty-third Session, 56 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 10) art. 37, cmt(3) UN Doc. A/56/10 (2001), reprinted in 2 Y.B. Int’l Law Comm’n 87 (2001), http://www.un.org/law/ilc, [hereinafter ILC Draft Articles & Commentary].
25 ILC Draft Articles & Commentary, id. at 89.
26 Cf. Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. v. Republic of Tanzania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22, Procedural Order, para. 67 (Mar. 31, 2006) (quoting Christoph Schreuer et al., The ICSID Convention: A Commentary 744, 746 (2001), stating that “the Tribunal has to strike a careful balance between the urgency of a request for provisional measures and the need not to prejudge merits of the case”).
27 See supra note 23.
28 Cf. Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia 257 (2005) (noting that “[i]n the Right of Passage and Asylum Cases, preference for interpreting sovereignty restrictively lead nowhere because we do not know which of the two States’ sovereignty to prefer”). The same observation similarly applies to rights.
29 But see id. at 614:
One need not be Talleyrand or a student of the League debates on the Spanish Civil War in order to realize that that even non-intervention is intervention—namely intervention on the side of the status quo. And there is no essential limit for such a reading of international law as a set of wide-ranging authorizations for the use of power and privilege—in fact, this is the most traditional (though of course contested) reading of the law as it emerges from the case of the SS Lotus.
30 For a discussion of this theory, see supra note 22.
31 Cf. Victor Pey Casado, Fondation President Allende v. Chile, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/2, para. 25 (Sept. 25, 2001).
32 See id.
33 Cf. supra note 22.
34 Passage Through the Great Belt (Fin. v. Den.), Provisional Measures, 1991 ICJ Rep. 12, 16 (July 29).
35 This is not the only requirement for the issuance of interim relief at international law. It is, however, the most problematic.
36 Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), Merits, 1949 ICJ Rep. 4 (April 9).
37 Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Guinea v. Dem. Rep. Congo), Judgment, 2010 ICJ Rep. 692 (June 19).
38 See, e.g., Borzu Sabahi, Compensation and Restitution in Investor-State Arbitration (2011); Simmons, Joshua B., Valuation in Investor-State Arbitration: Towards a More Exact Science, 30 Berkeley J. Int’l L. 196 (2012)Google Scholar.
39 See, e.g., Agreement Between the Government of the PRC and Mongolia Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, art. 8, http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/china_mongolia.pdf.
40 Occidental Petroleum Corporation, et al. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/11, Decision on Provisional Measures (Aug. 17, 2007).
41 Id. para. 79.
42 Id. paras. 79–86.
43 Id. para. 98.
44 Id.
45 Paushok, supra note 13.
46 Id. at 16–17.
47 Id.
48 Id. para. 78.
49 Id.
50 Application of the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995 (Maced. v. Gr.), 2011 ICJ Rep. 1, 19 (Dec. 5).
51 Christoph Schreuer et al., The ICSID Convention: A Commentary 657 (2d ed. 2009) (noting that “[i]n a number of cases tribunals have indicated that they would draw adverse inferences from a party’s failure to supply documents”).
52 See Libananco Holdings Co. Ltd. v. Republic of Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/8, Preliminary Issues, para. 42 (June 28, 2008) (Claimant requesting “summary judgment”).
53 See supra note 45.
54 Phoenix Action, Ltd. v. Czech Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5, Award, para. 151 (Apr. 15, 2009).
55 Desert Line Projects LLC v. Republic of Yemen, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/17, Award, para. 290 (Feb. 6, 2008).
56 Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Guinea v. Dem. Rep. Congo), 2012 ICJ. Rep., para. 18 (June 19, 2012).
57 Id. para. 21.
58 Id. para. 24.
59 Id. para. 23.
60 Id.
61 On the compensatory nature of moral damages, see generally Wong, Jarrod, The Misapprehension of Moral Damages in Investor-State Arbitration, in Contemporary Issues in International Arbitration and Mediation: The Fordham Papers 2012 (Rovine, Arthur ed., forthcoming)Google Scholar.
62 ILC Draft Articles & Commentary, supra note 23.
63 Id. art. 36, cmt. (16).
64 Id. at 111.
65 See Wong, supra note 60, at part 111(E).
66 See Rainbow Warrior (N.Z. v. Fr.), 20 R.I.A.A. 217, 272–73, para. 122 (1990) (“There is a long established practice of States and international Courts and Tribunals of using satisfaction as a remedy or form of reparation (in the wide sense) for the breach of an international obligation. This practice relates particularly to the case of moral or legal damage done directly to the State, especially as opposed to the case of damage to persons involving international responsibilities”) (emphasis added); ILC Draft Articles, supra note 23, art. 37, cmt. (1) (noting that satisfaction “is not a standard form of reparation, in the sense that in many cases the injury may be fully repaired by restitution and/or compensation”).
67 ILC Draft Articles & Commentary, supra note 23, at 107.
68 Carl Schmitt, Legalität und Legitimität 11–12 (1932) (our translation).
69 Carl Schmitt, Politische Theologie, Vier Kapitel zur Lehre von der Souveränität 42–13 (1934) (our translation).