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Postwar Trends and Developments in International Law from a North American Viewpoint

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 February 2017

William W. Bishop Jr.*
Affiliation:
University of Michigan Law School

Abstract

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Type
Second Session
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of International Law 1953

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References

1 In American Constitutional Law the term “treaty” is applied to any international agreement which becomes binding upon the United States through ratification by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate, two-thirds of the Senators present concurring therein. The term “executive agreement” is used to describe all international agreements which become binding on the United States in other ways—through action of the President alone, or by the President in conjunction with both Houses of Congress acting by majority vote in each House, whether the authorization of Congress is given in advance or after the negotiation of the agreement. Regarding “executive agreements,” see 5 Hackworth, Digest of International Law (1943) 390-433; McDougal, and Lans, , “Treaties and Congressional-Executive or Presidential Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments of National Policy,” 54 Yale Law Journal (1945) 181 and 534 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Borchard, “Treaties and Executive Agreements—A Reply,” ibid. (1945) 616; Moore, J. B., “Treaties and Executive Agreements,” 20 Political Science Quarterly (1905) 385 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Wallace McClure, International Executive Agreements (1941).

2 For the Canadian difficulties in this field, stemming particularly from Atty.-Gen. for Canada v. Atty.-Gen. for Ontario, [1937] A.C. 326, see Scott, F. K., “Centralization and Decentralization in Canadian Federalism,” 29 Canadian Bar Review (1951) 1095, 1112-1119Google Scholar; K. J. Matas, “Treaty Making in Canada,” 25 ibid. (1947) 458; Symposium, 15 ibid. (1937) 393-507.

3 Note the Constitutional Amendments limiting the treaty-making power currently proposed by the American Bar Association.

4 As Lamont, J., said for the Supreme Court of Canada in Ее Arrow River and Tributaries Slide & Boom Co., [1932] 2 D.L.E. 250, 260: “Where, as here, a treaty provides that certain rights or privileges are to be enjoyed by the subjects of both contracting parties, these rights and privileges are, under our law, enforceable by the Courts only where the treaty has been implemented or sanctioned by legislation rendering it binding upon the subject.... In this respect our law would seem to differ from that prevailing in the United States where by an express provision of the constitution, treaties duly made are ‘the supreme law of the land’ equally with Acts of Congress duly passed. “See also D. C. Vanek, “Is International Law Part of the Law of Canada?”, 8 Univ. of Toronto Law Journal (1950) 251, 265, 270.

5 For the distinction between treaties which are “self-executing” in courts within the United States, and those which cannot be applied by the courts until there has been implementing legislation, see Poster & Elam v. Neilson, 2 Peters (U. S.) 253 (1829); Robertson v. General Electric Co., 32 F. (2d) 495 (4th Cir., 1929); Sei Fujii v. California, 217 Pac. (2d) 481 (1950), and 242 Pac. (2d) 617 (1952); 5 Hackworth, Digest of International Law (1943) 177-185; Dickinson, “Are the Liquor Treaties Self-Executing?”, 20 American Journal of International Law (1926) 444; Henry, L., “When Is a Treaty Self-Executing?”, 27 Mich. Law Review (1929) 776 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Comment, 26 Columbia Law Review (1926) 859; Comment, 48 Mich. Law Review (1950) 852; Alona E. Evans, “Some Aspects of the Problem of Self-Executing Treaties,” Proceedings, American Society of International Law, 1951, p. 66.

6 See the Bricker and A.B.A. proposals for Constitutional Amendments relating to the treaty-making power.

7 Opposing the currently proposed Constitutional Amendments, see, inter alia, Sutherland, A. E., “Restricting the Treaty Power,” 65 Harvard Law Review (1952) 1305 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Perlman, P., “On Amending the Treaty Power,” 52 Columbia Law Review (1952) 825 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Chafee, Z., “Amending the Constitution to Cripple Treaties,” 12 Louisiana Law Review (1952) 346 Google Scholar; Wright, Q., “Congress and the Treaty Power,” Proceedings, American Society of International Law, 1952, p. 43 Google Scholar; Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Committee on Federal Legislation and Committee on International Law, Report on “Joint Resolution Proposing an Amendment to the Constitution of the United States Relative to the Making of Treaties and Executive Agreements” (1952) ; Dept. of State Press Release No. 174, April 6, 1953. Supporting the proposala to amend the Constitution, see, inter alia, Holman, F. E., “Treaty Law-Making: A Blank Check for Writing a New Constitution,” 36 A.B.A. Journal (1950) 707 Google Scholar; Frank B. Ober, “The Treaty-Making and Amending Powers: Do They Protect Our Fundamental Rights?”, ibid. 715; George A. Finch, “The Treaty-Clause Amendment: The Case for the Association,” 38 ibid. (1952) 467; Eberhard Deutsch, “Need for a Treaty Amendment,” ibid. 735; Florence E. Allen, The Treaty as an Instrument of Legislation (1952).

8 See Art. I, Convention for the Preservation of Halibut Fishery of the Northern Pacific Ocean and Bering Sea signed by United States and Canada, Jan. 29, 1937, U. S. Treaty Series 917, 50 Stat. 1351. On the operation of this treaty, see J. Tomasevich, International Agreements on Conservation of Marine Resources (1943), pp. 125-215; ‘L. Larry Leonard, International Regulation of Fisheries (1944), pp. 110-114.

9 See Arts. 108-109, United Nations Charter, reprinted in 39 American Journal of International Law (1945) Supp. 190, 214.

10 Chicago Convention on Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, Treaties and Other International Acts Series 1591. Cf. Wm. Fuller, E., “International Civil Aviation Organization: International Standards in the Technical Annexes—Their Effect within the United States and Validity under the Constitution,” 21 Geo. Wash. Law Review (1952) 86 Google Scholar.

11 See C. A. Riches, Majority Rule in International Organization (1940); P. C. Jessup, A Modern Law of Nations (1948), p. 135. Cf. J. L. Brierly, Outlook for Inter national Law (1944), pp. 98 ff.; Law of Nations (4th ed., 1949), pp. 87-91. And see, of course, M. O. Hudson, International Legislation, Vol 1 (1931), pp. xiii-xxxvii.

12 See, generally, L. Larry Leonard, International Organization (1951); Clyde Eagleton, International Government (rev. ed., 1948); P. B. Potter, An Introduction to the Study of International Organization (5th ed., 1948) ; International Agencies in Which the United States Participates (State Dept. Pub. 2699, 1946; revised as State Dept. Pub. 3655, 1950); Louis B. Sohn, Cases on World Law (1950); and materials appearing in the quarterly journal, International Organization.

13 See C. J. Chacko, The International Joint Commission (1932).

14 See Jessup, P. C., A Modern Law of Nations (1948), p. 3 Google Scholar, criticizing Morgenthau, Hans, “Diplomacy,” 55 Yale Law Journal (1946) 1067 CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Cf. Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (1948), pp. 419-445.

15 See Oliver, C. T., “Reflections on Two Recent Developments Affecting the Function of Law in the International Community,” 30 Texas Law Review (1952) 815 Google Scholar, criticizing George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy, 1900-1950 (1951).

16 Regarding the development of the [British] Commonwealth of Nations, see 1 Oppenheim’s International Law (Lauterpacht’s 7th ed., 1948), § 94a-94b; Robert Stewart, Treaty Relations of the British Commonwealth of Nations (1949); Carter, , “The Evolving Commonwealth,” 4 International Law Journal (1949) 261 Google Scholar; Harvey, H. J., “The British Commonwealth: A Pattern of Cooperation,” International Conciliation, No. 487 (1953)Google Scholar.

17 See Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court prepared in 1951 by a United Nations Committee, U.N. Doc. A/AC/48/4, reprinted in 46 American Journal of International Law (1952) Supp. 1; Historical Survey of the Question of International Criminal Jurisdiction, Memorandum Submitted by the Secretary General, U.N. Doe. A/CN.4/7/Rev. 1 (1949); Sottile, A., “The Problem of the Creation of a Permanent international Criminal Court,” 1951 Revue đe droit international (Geneva) 267 Google Scholar; Wright, Q., “Proposal for an International Criminal Court,” 46 American Journal of International Law (1952) 60 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; George A. Finch, “Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court,” ibid. 89; Parker, J. J., “An International Criminal Court: The Case for Its Adoption,” 38 A.B.A. Journal (1952) 641 Google Scholar; George A. Finch, “An International Criminal Court: The Case against Its Adoption,” ibid. 644.

18 See, generally, P. C. Jessup, A Modern Law of Nations (1948).

19 See Bishop, “Exercise of Jurisdiction for Special Purposes in High Seas Areas beyond the Outer Limit of Territorial Waters,” address before Sixth Conference of Inter-American Bar Association, Detroit, 1949, reprinted in 99 Cong. Record 2586 (March 30, 1953). See also Dickinson, E. D., “Jurisdiction at the Maritime Frontier,” 40 Harvard Law Review (1926) 1 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

20 Presidential Proclamation 2667, Sept. 28, 1945, 10 Fed. Reg. 12303, reprinted in 40 American Journal of International Law (1946) Supp. 45. For comment, see Borchard, , “Resources of the Continental Shelf,” 40 American Journal of International Law (1946) 53 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; R. Young, “Recent Developments with Respect to the Continental Shelf,” 42 ibid. (1948) 849; “Legal Status of Submarine Areas beneath the High Seas,” 45 ibid. (1951) 225; Holland, H. F., “The Juridical Status of the Continental Shelf,” 30 Texas Law Review (1952) 586 Google Scholar; Bishop, loc. cit.

21 Presidential Proclamation 2668, Sept. 28, 1945, 10 Fed. Beg. 12304, reprinted in 40 American Journal of International Law (1946) Supp. 46. For comment, see Borchard, loc. cit., note 20, supra; Bishop, loc. cit., note 19, supra; J. W. Bingham, “The Continental Shelf and the Marginal Belt,” 40 American Journal of International Law (1946) 173; O. Selak, “Recent Developments in High Seas Fisheries Jurisdiction under the Presidential Proclamation of 1945,” 44 ibid. (1950) 670.

22 Report of the International Law Commission Covering Its Third Session, reprinted in 45 American Journal of International Law (1951) Supp. 103, 139-147.

23 See notes of July 2, 1948, from United States to Argentine, Chilean and Peruvian Governments, quoted by Selak, “Recent Developments in High Seas Fisheries Jurisdiction under the Presidential Proclamation of 1945,” 44 ibid. (1950) 670, 674.

24 See International Organizations Immunities Act of Dec. 29, 1945, 59 Stat. 669, reprinted in 40 American Journal of International Law (1946) Supp. 85; U.N. Charter, Art. 105; General Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, 1 U.N. Treaty Series 15, reprinted in 43 American Journal of International Law (1949) Supp. 1, which is not yet in force as to the U. S. ; Headquarters Agreement between the United Nations and the United States, U. S. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 1676, 61 Stat. 756, reprinted in 43 American Journal of International Law (1949) Supp. 8. Commenting on this subject, see, inter alia, 4 Hackworth, Digest of International Law (1942) 419-423; Preuss, Lawrence, “Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities of Agents Invested with Functions of an International Interest,” 25 American Journal of International Law (1931) 694 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; “The International Organizations Immmunities Act,” 40 ibid. (1946) 332; “Immunity of Officers and Employees of the United Nations for Official Acts: The Ranollo Case,” 41 ibid. (1947) 555; J. L. Kunz, “Privileges and Immunities of International Organizations,” ibid. 828.

25 In addition to the immunities enjoyed by consular officers under treaty or by reason of their official position, on which see Harvard Research in International Law, Legal Position and Functions of Consuls, 26 American Journal of International Law (1932) Supp. 189, 313-358; Stewart, Consular Privileges and Immunities (1926); and Beckett, “Consular Immunities,” 1944 British Year Book of International Law 34, see the various statutes which give certain exemptions to “foreign government officials,” such as U. S. Internal Revenue Code §116 (h) giving reciprocal exemption from income tax if the official is not an American national; 8 U.S.C.A.§ 136 (r) giving exemptions from certain immigration law restrictions; 8 U.S.C.A.§ 453 (b) exempting from alien registration and finger-printing ; and Selective Service Regulations § 611.13. See further the developments with respect to immunities for foreign armed forces during World War II and since then, summarized in King, Archibald, “Jurisdiction over Friendly Foreign Forces,” 36 American Journal of International Law (1942) 539 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; “Further Developments Concerning Jurisdiction over Friendly Foreign Forces,” 40 ibid. (1946) 257; Barton, G. P., “Foreign Armed Forces: Immunity from Supervisory Jurisdiction,” 1949 British Year Book of International Law 380 Google Scholar; “Foreign Armed Forces: Immunity from Criminal Jurisdiction,” 1950 ibid. 186. It may be noted that the Harvard Research in International Law, Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities, 26 American Journal of International Law (1932) Supp. 15, 99, states: “Immunity for official acts, as the application of a general principle of international law, and attaching to the intrinsic nature of the acts themselves . . . applies to all public acts, by whomsoever performed, and to all state agents, whether diplomatic or otherwise.”

26 See Bishop, “New United States Policy Limiting Sovereign Immunity,” 47 American Journal of International Law (1953) 93. Cf. Lauterpacht, H., “The Problem of Jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign States,” 1951 British Year Book of International Law 220 Google Scholar.

27 Rose v. The King, [1947] 3 D.L.B. 618.

28 See 22 U.S.C.A.§§ 1621-1627. Regarding the United States-Yugoslav settlement of July 19, 1948, see 19 Dept. of State Bulletin (1948) 137 and 413; 21 ibid. (1949) 868.

29 Established by the Act of July 3, 1948, 62 Stat. 1240. Regarding this Commission, see Report of War Claims Commission, March 31, 1950, House Doc. 580, 81st Cong., 2d Sess.; Supplementary Report of the War Claims Commission, Jan. 9, 1953, House Doc. 67, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess.

30 See the position taken by the United States in connection with the Mexican agrarian and petroleum expropriations, 3 Hackworth, Digest of International Law 655-665 (1942), 19 Dept. of State Press Releases (1938) 50, 136, 139, 165; 1 Hyde, International Law 710-722 (2d ed., 1945); Gaither, Expropriation in Mexico (1940). Generally, see Fachiri, A. P., “Expropriation and International Law,” 1925 British Year Book of International Law 159 Google Scholar; “International Law and the Property of Aliens,” 1929 ibid. 32; Anderson, C. P., “Basis of the Law against Confiscating Foreign-owned Property,” 21 American Journal of International Law (1927) 525 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Re, E. D., “Nationalization of Foreign-owned Property,” 36 Minn. Law Review (1952) 323 Google Scholar.

31 Note the unwillingness of Mexico to submit to international arbitration the question of compensation for expropriation of foreign-owned property, and the unwillingness of Iran to submit to adjudication by the International Court of Justice of claims of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. The arguments that international law does not require compensation for expropriation of foreign property, put forth by Mexico and Iran in these instances, were summarized earlier by Williams, J. F., “International Law and the Property of Aliens,” 1928 British Year Book of International Law 1 Google Scholar.

32 See the treaties discussed in Wilson, R. R., “Property-Protection Provisions in United States Commercial Treaties,” 45 American Journal of International Law (1951) 83 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

33 See John Allison, “The Japanese Peace Treaty and Belated Security Pacts,” Proceedings, American Society of International Law, 1952, p. 35; statement by John Foster Dulles, Aug. 15, 1951, 25 Dept. of State Bulletin (1951) 346.

34 See, for example, Art. 78 of the Treaty of Peace with Italy, signed Feb. 10, 1947, Treaties and Other International Acts Series 1648, 61 Stat. 1245, reprinted in 42 American Journal of International Law (1948) Supp. 47, 77. See similar provisions of Art. 23 of the Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria, ibid. 179, 186; Art. 25 of the Treaty of Peace with Finland, ibid. 203, 209; Art. 26 of the Treaty of Peace with Hungary, ibid. 225, 234; and Art. 24 of the Treaty of Peace with Eumania, ibid. 252, 259. Comparable arrangements are made in the Allied Powers Property Compensation Law adopted in Japan in accordance with the provisions of Article 15 of the Treaty of Peace with Japan. Regarding these treaty provisions, see Fraleigh, , “Compensation for War Damage to American Property in Allied Countries,41 American Journal of International Law (1947) 748 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; A. E. Kane, “Some Unsolved Problems Regarding War Damage Claims under Article 78 of the Italian Peace Treaty,” 45 ibid. (1951) 357; Tate, Jack B., “International Reclamations and the Peace Settlements,” Proceedings, American Society of International Law, 1949, p. 27 Google Scholar; Surrey, W., “Problems of the Italian Peace Treaty,” 16 Law & Contemporary Problems (1951) 435 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

35 Art. 75 of the Treaty of Peace with Italy, 42 American Journal of International Law (1948) Supp. 47, 73; Art. 22 of the Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria, ibid. 179, 185; Art. 24 of the Treaty of Peace with Finland, ibid. 203, 209; Art. 24 of the Treaty of Peace with Hungary, ibid. 225, 233; and Art. 23 of the Treaty of Peace with Eumania, ibid. 252, 258.

36 See treaty provisions cited in footnote 34, supra.

37 See Art. 79 of the Treaty of Peace with Italy, Art. 25 of the Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria, Art. 29 of the Treaty of Peace with Hungary, and Art. 27 of the Treaty of Peace with Rumania, all cited in note 35, supra. See also Art. 14 of the Treaty of Peace with Japan, 46 American Journal of International Law (1952) Supp. 71, 77. For comment, see works cited in note 34, supra, and Mann, , “Enemy Property and the Paris Peace Treaties,” 64 Law Quarterly Review (1948) 492 Google Scholar; Martin, A., “Treatment of Enemy Property under the Peace Treaties of 1947,” 34 Grotius Society Transactions (1948) 77 Google Scholar; and symposium on “War Claims,” 16 Law & Contemporary Problems (1951) 345-553.

38 See War Claims Commission, Supplementary Report, Jan. 9, 1953, House Doc. 67, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. See also Rubin, S. J., “‘Inviolability’ of Enemy Private Property,” 11 Law & Contemporary Problems (1945) 186 Google Scholar; Gearhart, “Post-War Prospects for Treatment of Enemy Property,” ibid. 183; M. S. Mason, “Relationship of Vested Assets to War Claims,” 16 ibid. (1951) 395; C. J. Stetler, “The What Extent Should Congress Appropriate to Distribute the Burden of War Loss, Given the Insufficiency of War Reparation?”, ibid. 469; Ernest Schein, “War Damage Compensation through Rehabilitation: The Philippine War Damage Commission,” ibid. 519.

39 Compare Arts. 231 and 232 of the Treaty of Versailles, under the former of which “Germany accepts the responsibility of Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies.”

40 46 Stat. 2343, 4 U. S. Treaties, etc. (Trenwith) 5130.

41 Art. 2, par. 4, of the Charter provides : “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”

42 The Judgment of the International Military Tribunal at Nürnberg is reprinted in 41 American Journal of International Law (1947) 172.

43 See Arts. 39-50 of the Charter. Unfortunately, as is well known, little progress has been made in arrangements to make these provisions effective.

44 See U. S. Policy in the Korean Crisis (Dept. of State Pub. 3922, 1950) ; U. S. Participation in the United Nations, Report by the President to Congress for the Year 1950, pp. 29-59; idem, 1951, pp. 24-48; Korea and the United Nations (U.N. Pub. 1950.1.8); Gross, Leo, “Voting in the Security Council: Abstention from Voting and Absence from Meetings,60 Yale Law Journal (1951) 209 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; MeDougal and Gardner, “The Veto and the Charter: An Interpretation for Survival,” ibid. 258; Padelford, Norman, “The United Nations and Korea,5 International Organization (1951) 685 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Hans Kelsen, Recent Trends in the Law of the United Nations, pp. 927-949.

45 See the “Uniting for Peace” Resolution adopted by the General Assembly Nov. 3, 1950, General Assembly, Fifth Session, Official Records, Supp. No. 20, p. 10 (A/1775) ; reprinted in 45 American Journal of International Law (1951) Supp 1. For comments, see U. S. Participation in the United Nations, Report by the President to Congress for the Year 1951, pp. 49-58; Douglas, Paul, “United to Enforce Peace,30 Foreign Affairs (1951) 1 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; H. Kelsen, Recent Trends in the Law of the United Nations (1951), pp. 953-990; statements by John Foster Dulles, 23 Dept. of State Bulletin (1950) 651, 687, 773; J. J. Siseo, “The U.N. and Collective Security,” 25 ibid. (1951) 771.

46 U. S. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 1964; reprinted in 43 American Journal of International Law (1949) Supp. 159. For comment, see Acheson, “Meaning of the North Atlantic Pact,” 20 Dept. of State Bulletin (1949) 384; W. E. Beckett, The North Atlantic Treaty, the Brussels Treaty and the Charter of the United Nations (1950); Marina Salvin, “The North Atlantic Pact,” International Conciliation, No. 451 (1949); Kirk, G., “The Atlantic Pact and International Security,3 International Organization (1949) 239 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; H. Kelsen, Recent Trends in the Law of the United Nations (1952), pp. 913-926; North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Its Development and Significance (Dept. of State Pub. 4630, 1952); Finch, George A., “The North Atlantic Pact in International Law,” Proceedings, American Society of International Law, 1949, p. 90 Google Scholar.

47 Revisions of the Prisoners of War Conventions and those on the Sick and Wounded, and a new convention on civilian internees, were concluded at Geneva on Aug. 12, 1949. See 75 U.N. Treaty Series 31, 135 and 287. For comments, see Pictet, J., “The New Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War Victims,” 45 American Journal of International Law (1951) 462 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; R. T. Yingling and R. W. Ginnane, “The Geneva Conventions of 1949,” 46 ibid. (1952) 393; Gutteridge, , “The Geneva Conventions of 1949,1949 British Year Book of International Law 294 Google Scholar; de la Pradelle, La Conférence diplomatique et les nouvelles conventions đe Genève (1951).

48 See Art. 22 of the London Naval Treaty of 1930, 46 Stat. 2858; 2 Hackworth, Digest of International Law 690-695; 6 ibid. 466; opinion of the International Military Tribunal at Nürnberg with respect to Admiral Dönitz, 41 American Journal of International Law (1947) 172, 303-305; and U. S. Navy Dept. statement regarding its policy of unrestricted submarine warfare in the Pacific from the beginning of U. S. participation in World War II, quoted in The Washington Sunday Star, Feb. 3, 1946, p. A7.

49 Art. 2, par. 5, of the Charter provides that: “All Members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter, and shall refrain from giving any assistance to any state against which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action.” See 7 Hackworth, Digest of International Law (1943) 668-693; Lalive, , “International Organization and Neutrality,1947 British Year Book of International Law 72 Google Scholar.

50 See H. Lauterpacht, An International Bill of Human Eights (1945); International Law and Human Eights (1950); symposium in 14 Law & Contemporary Problems (1949) 411.

51 For the Declaration of Human Eights, seen U.N. Doc. A/810; General Assembly, 3rd Sess. (I), Official Records, Resolutions, p. 71; reprinted in 43 American Journal of International Law (1949) Supp. 127.

52 For a recent survey of some of these difficulties, see Neal, Marian, “The United Nations and Human Eights,” International Conciliation, No. 489 (1953)Google Scholar. There is of course a wide documentary and periodical literature on the draft Covenants of Human Eights.

53 Regarding the U. S. Constitution and the draft Covenants of Human Eights, see McDougal and Leighton, “Eights of Man in the World Community,” 59 Yale Law Journal (1949) 60; Chafee, “Federal and State Powers under the U.N. Covenant on Human Eights,” 1951 Wisconsin Law Review 389, 623; Claudy, D. E., “The Treaty Power and Human Eights,36 Cornell Law Quarterly (1951) 699 Google Scholar. Cf. Holman, , “An ‘International Bill of Eights’: Proposals Have Dangerous Implications for U. S.,34 A. B. A. Journal (1948) 984 Google Scholar; C. B. Rix, “Human Eights and International Law,” 35 ibid. (1949) 551; “Human Eights and International Law,” Proceedings, American Society of International Law, 1949, p. 46.

54 Dept. of State Press Release No. 174, April 6, 1953; 28 Dept. of State Bulletin (1953) 580, 591, 842.

55 Cf. Philip M. Brown, International Realities (1917), p. 21.

56 Cf. Brierly, J. L., Law of Nations (1st ed., 1928)Google Scholar, preface: “the law of nations is neither a chimera nor a panacea, but just one institution among others which we have at our disposal for the building up of a saner international order. It is foolish to under-estimate either the services that it is rendering today, or the need for its improvement and extension.”