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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 04 October 2013
For the last few years the public press and current literature have been full of discussion upon the corruption and inefficiency of our representative bodies, national, State and city.
The student of political science must search deeper than this popular clamor for the cause of the lack of confidence in our legislative bodies.
We are all aware of the stupendous changes in our economic and industrial conditions, which this country has undergone since the Constitution was adopted. To meet these conditions our whole theory of government has been strained. Great administrative bodies and powerful commissions have arisen. The courts have assumed a power never conferred upon them in the original Constitution. The unwritten law of the land has grown with amazing rapidity. But what corresponding changes have been made in the fundamental source of law—the will of the people as expressed through our legislative representatives? Surely no branch should be more affected by changing conditions than the branch whose duty it is primarily to fit our economic conditions to law. Yet a slight examination will convince us that this body has not changed as other bodies have changed. It has not improved, nor has it become flexible with the increasing demands upon it. Science has increased, but the science of law making has remained practically without static development.