Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-r5fsc Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-22T19:37:09.730Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Significance of a Level-2,“Selective, Secondary Evacuation” Hospital during a Peripheral Town Terrorist Attack

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 June 2012

Dagan Schwartz ,
Moshe Pinkert ,
Adi Leiba ,
Meir Oren ,
Jacob Haspel ,
Yehezkel Levi ,
Avishay Goldberg  and
Yaron Bar Dayan
Dagan Schwartz
Affiliation:
Israeli EMS, Magen David Adom Faculty of Health Sciences, Ben Gurion University, Beer-Sheva, Israel
Moshe Pinkert
Affiliation:
Home Front Command Medical Department, Israel
Adi Leiba
Affiliation:
Home Front Command Medical Department, Israel
Meir Oren
Affiliation:
Hillel Yafe Hospital, General Manager Office, Israel
Jacob Haspel
Affiliation:
Hillel Yafe Hospital, General Manager Office, Israel
Yehezkel Levi
Affiliation:
Israeli Defense Force Medical Corps, Surgeon General Headquarters
Avishay Goldberg
Affiliation:
Faculty of Health Sciences, Ben Gurion University, Beer-Sheva, Israel
Yaron Bar Dayan*
Affiliation:
Home Front Command Medical Department, Israel Faculty of Health Sciences, Ben Gurion University, Beer-Sheva, Israel
*
Col. Dr. Y. Bar-Dayan, MD, MHA Chief Medical Officer, Israeli Defense Force Home Front Command 16 Dolev St. Neve Savion, Or-Yehuda ISRAEL E-mail: [email protected]
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Introduction:

Mass-casualty incidents (MCIs) can occur outside of major metropolitan areas. In such circumstances, the nearest hospital seldom is a Level-1 Trauma Center. Moreover, emergency medical services (EMS) capabilities in such areas tend to be limited, which may compromise prehospital care and evacuation speed. The objective of this study was to extract lessons learned from the medical response to a terrorist event that occurred in the marketplace of a small Israeli town on 26 October 2005. The lessons pertain to the management of primary and secondary evacuation and the operational practices by the only hospital in the town, which is designated as a Level-2 Trauma Center.

Methods:

Data were collected during the event by Home Front Command Medical Department personnel. After the event, formal and informal debriefings were conducted with emergency medical services personnel, the hospitals involved, and the Ministry of Health.The medical response components, interactions (mainly primary triage and secondary distribution), and the principal outcomes were analyzed.The event is described according to Disastrous Incidents Systematic Analysis Through Components, Interactions, Results (DISAST-CIR) methodology.

Results:

The suicide bomber and four victims died at the scene, and two severely injured patients later died in the hospital. A total of 58 wounded persons were evacuated, including eight severely injured, two moderately injured, and 48 mildly injured. Forty-nine of the wounded arrived to the nearby Hillel Yafe Hospital, including all eight of the severely injured victims, the two moderately injured, and 39 of the mildly injured. Most of the mildly injured victims were evacuated in private cars by bystanders.

Five other area hospitals were alerted, three of which primarily received the mildly injured victims. Twodistant, Level-1 Trauma Centers also were alerted; each received one severely injured patient from Hillel Yafe Hospital during the secondary distribution process.

Emergency medical services personnel were able to treat and evacuate all severely and moderately injured patients within 17 minutes of the explosion. A total of 12 of the 21 ambulances arriving on-scene within the first 20 minutes were staffed by emergency medical services volunteers or off-duty workers.

Conclusion:

When a mass-casualty incident occurs in a small town that is in the vicinity of a Level-2 Trauma Center, and located a >40 minute drive from Level-1 Trauma Centers, the Level-2 Trauma Center is a critical component in medical management of the event. All severely and moderately injured patients initially should be evacuated to the Level-2 Trauma Center, and given advanced, hospital-based resuscitation. The patients needing care beyond the capabilities of this facility should be distributed secondarily to Level-1 Trauma Centers.To alleviate the burden placed on the local hospital, some of the mildly injured victims can be evacuated primarily to more distant hospitals.The ability to control the flow of mildly injured patients is limitedby the large percentage of them arriving by private cars. The availability of emergency medical services in small towns can be augmented significantly by enrolling off-duty emergency medical services workers and volunteers to the rescue effort. Level-2 hospitals in small towns should be prepared and drilled to operate in a “selective evacuation” mode during mass-casualty incidents.

Type
Original Research
Information
Prehospital and Disaster Medicine , Volume 22 , Issue 1 , February 2007 , pp. 59 - 66
Copyright
Copyright © World Association for Disaster and Emergency Medicine 2007

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1.Almogy, G, Belzberg, H, Mintz, Y et al. : Suicide bombing attacks: Update and modifications to the protocol. Ann Surg 2004;239(3):295–303.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
2.Leiba, A, Blumenfeld, A, Bar-Dayan, Y, et al. : Lessons learnedfrom the cross-border medical response to the terrorist bombings in Tabba and Ras-el-Satan, Egypt, on 07 October 2004. Prehosp Disast Med 2005;20(4):253–257.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
3.Leiba A, HP, Halpern, A, Bar-Dayan, Y et al. : A terrorist suicide bombing at the nightclub: Analyzing medical response to a nighttime, weekend, multi casualty incident scenario. J Emerg Nurs 2006;32(4):294–298.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
4.Leiba A, HP, Halpern, A, Bar-Dayan, Y et al. : Lessons from aterrorist attack in Tel-Aviv Market: Putting all the golden eggs in one basket might save lives. International Journal of Disaster Medicine 2005;2(4):157–160.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
5.Pinkert, MLA, Leiba, A, Bar-Dayan, Y et al. : The significance ofa small, level C, “semi-evacuation” hospital in the midst of a terrorist attack in a near-by town.Disasters 2005 (in press).Google Scholar
6.Home Front Command Medical Department: Debriefing of Suicide bombing in “Park” hotel. Netanya: Home Front Command, 2002.Google Scholar
7. Home Front Command Medical Department Doctrine: Automatic Helicopter Recruitment for mass-casualty incidents in Peripheral Areas. 2003.Google Scholar
8.Einav, SFZ, Weissman, C: Evacuation priorities in mass casualty terror-related events: Implications for contingency planning. Ann Surg 2004;(239):304–310.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
9.Leiba, AWG, Schwartz, D, Bar-Dayan, Y et al. : DISAST-CIR: Disastrous Incidents Systematic Analysis Through Components, Interactions and Results. Application to a large-scaletrain accident. J Emerg Med 2007 (submitted).Google Scholar