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Model Describing the Effect of Employment of the United States Military in a Complex Emergency

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 June 2012

Donald S. MacMillan*
Affiliation:
Yale Section of Emergency Medicine, New Haven, Connecticut, USA
*
Yale Section of Emergency Medicine, 464 Congress Avenue, Suite 260New Haven, CT 06519-1315USA E-mail: [email protected]

Abstract

The end of the Cold War vastly altered the worldwide political landscape. With the loss of a main competitor, the United States (US) military has had to adapt its strategic, operational, and tactical doctrines to an ever-increasing variety of non-traditional missions, including humanitarian operations. Complex emergencies (CEs) are defined in this paper from a political and military perspective, various factors that contribute to their development are described, and issues resulting from the employment of US military forces are discussed. A model was developed to illustrate the course of a humanitarian emergency and the potential impact of a military response. The US intervention in Haiti, Northern Iraq, Kosovo, Somalia, Bosnia, and Rwanda serve as examples.

A CE develops when there is civil conflict, loss of national governmental authority, a mass population movement, and massive economic failure, each leading to a general decline in food security. The military can alleviate a CE in four ways: (1) provide security for relief efforts; (2) enforce negotiated settlements; (3) provide security for non-combatants; and/or (4) employ logistical capabilities.

The model incorporates Norton and Miskel's taxonomy of identifying failing states and helps illustrate the factors that lead to a CE. The model can be used to determine if and when military intervention will have the greatest impact. The model demonstrates that early military intervention and mission assignment within the core competencies of the forces can reverse the course of a CE. Further study will be needed to verify the model.

Type
Theoretical Discussion
Copyright
Copyright © World Association for Disaster and Emergency Medicine 2005

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