Before his death in 2002, paleontologist Stephen Jay Gould elaborated a large and inclusive theory of life's change. In this essay I concentrate on the aspects of Gould's vast theory that have the most direct political relevance. I briefly discuss his views on the philosophy of science. I examine the way he combined political values and methodology in a seamless, critical analysis of intelligence-testing and sociobiology. I concentrate most extensively on the impact his “punctuated equilibria” concept has made on contemporary political analysis, and I demonstrate that in their appropriation of this concept political scientists have violated the rules that Gould himself articulated for its use. In closing, I consider the possibility that a comprehensive theory of life, a theory that must include political values, might approach traditional questions of political thought more satisfyingly than has conventional philosophy.

While the science of animal biotechnology is advancing at a rapid pace, the ethical discussion about the boundaries the public might want to set is at the most nascent stage. There is a tendency in the public debate for opponents to favor an all-out ban on the science, while proponents want to grant it carte blanche. I argue that a more nuanced position on animal biotechnology considers individual projects to be located on a moral continuum, where some are clearly morally justified, others morally impermissible, and some lie in the ethical gray-zone. To begin to define this continuum, we use the bioethical method of casuistry to analyze one case at the end of moral permissibility, and we contrast it with a case that is located at the opposite end of the moral spectrum. I advocate this approach to assessing the moral merit of biotechnology projects because of its attention to the details of individual cases — the protocols, ends, and methods — on which an accurate moral judgment necessarily rests.

Political science, as a discipline, has been reluctant to adopt theories and methodologies developed in fields studying human behavior from an evolutionary standpoint. I ask whether evolutionary concepts are reconcilable with standard political-science theories and whether those concepts help solve puzzles to which these theories classically are applied. I find that evolutionary concepts readily and simultaneously accommodate theories of rational choice, symbolism, interpretation, and acculturation. Moreover, phenomena perennially hard to explain in standard political science become clearer when human interactions are understood in light of natural selection and evolutionary psychology. These phenomena include the political and economic effects of emotion, status, personal attractiveness, and variations in information-processing and decision-making under uncertainty; exemplary is the use of “focal points” in multiple-equilibrium games. I conclude with an overview of recent research by, and ongoing debates among, scholars analyzing politics in evolutionarily sophisticated terms.

Land is necessary for human flourishing, and its use remains a compelling concern for every society, even those wherein industrialization has sharply diminished people's awareness of land. Here, we consider land's influence on political thinking, particularly thinking about democratic governance, and ask if this influence might be made more beneficial by the application of lessons drawn from ecological research. We identify five such lessons and apply them in six ways to the institution of private-property rights in nature — the main legal institution that allocates and perpetuates power over land — and to modern assumptions about liberal individualism and rights to health. We conclude that people can live well on land, promoting both human and land health, only in governmental forms engaging more citizens more deliberatively than now typical even in democracies. Implications for political institutions and human welfare are discussed under conditions of globalizing interdependence.

By the end of the Clinton administration, the claim that terrorists armed with biological weapons represented a huge threat to the security of the United States had achieved the status of received knowledge. How this linkage was forged, despite informed dissent not only outside the Clinton administration but also within it, and how it was used to justify a radical reframing of biological knowledge, especially in genetic engineering and genomics, in terms of military goals is the subject of this essay. My method is historical. I assume that no category is fixed but, rather, that key terms, such as “weapons of mass destruction,” “biological weapon,” and “terrorism” itself, are contingent, shaped under specific historical and political circumstances, and are therefore more fluid than often thought. This account draws on a wide variety of sources including government documents, policy papers and books, conference records, media materials, memoirs, and detailed interviews with nine subjects selected from among participants in the events examined. It shows that the nature of a linkage between terrorism and biological weaponry was debated at many levels in Washington, and it offers reasons why, ultimately, a counterbioterrorism “bandwagon” was constructed and began rolling at the end of the second Clinton administration.