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Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention: Comments on the Contributions of Marie Isabelle Chevier and Lynn Marvin Hansen

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 May 2016

Erhard Geissler
Erhard Geissler*
Affiliation:
Central Institute of Molecular Biology, Academy of Sciences, Berlin-Buch, GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
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Extract

In agreement with the overwhelming number of experts, I certainly share the view of Chevier and Hansen that the Biological Weapons Convention needs to be strengthened. Of course it is still a matter of discussion whether the military utility of biological and toxin weapons (hereafter, respectively, BW and TW) changed after the introduction of biotechnology. It is impossible, however, to ignore the 1986 statement of the U.S. Department of Defense (1988), that:

… perhaps the most significant event in the history of biological weapons development has been the advent of biotechnology. It enables the development of new microorganisms and products with new, unorthodox characteristics… Conceptually, then, a nation or terrorist group can design a biological weapon to meet a variety of contingencies or needs… The break through and the subsequent achievements make biological warfare much more feasible and effective for countries which either are not bound by the convention or which choose to violate it.

Type
Commentaries
Information
Politics and the Life Sciences , Volume 9 , Issue 1: Special Issue: Biotechnology and International Conflict , August 1990 , pp. 122 - 126
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Politics and the Life Sciences 

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References

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