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The Nuclear Arms Race: An Evolutionary Perspective*1

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 May 2016

Arthur A. Joyce*
Affiliation:
Department of Anthropology, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, New Jersey 08903

Abstract

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This paper uses a Darwinian perspective to examine the nuclear arms race in the context of “arms races” in evolution and throughout human history. The rise of human “arms races,” or escalatory intergroup competition, is traced to a variety of environmental triggers initiated during the Terminal Pleistocene/Early Holocene. These triggers removed extraspecific environmental constraints to escalatory intergroup competition in some areas of the world, making it reproductively advantageous for individuals to live in increasingly larger and more competitive groups. This process is linked to the development of social complexity and the intensification of intergroup competition, warfare, and arms production, culminating in the nuclear arms race. Historically, escalatory intergroup competition has been reproductively advantageous to elites because it enables them to acquire a disproportionately large share of resources. It is argued that the continuation of the nuclear arms race past a level of mutual assured destruction results from the benefits it provides to elites as well as a variety of evolved behavioral mechanisms that encourage in-group affiliations, out-group hostilities, and obedience to authority.

Type
Articles and Commentaries
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Politics and the Life Sciences 

References

Notes

2. The founding of the Journal of Conflict Resolution in 1957 and the Journal of Peace Research in 1964 can be seen as a result of this increased concern.Google Scholar

3. When confrontations occurred they may have been violent (Roper, , 1969), but given the archaeological evidence it is unlikely that this involved organized warfare (Toth, , 1987).Google Scholar

4. During this period war involvement has been common regardless of regime type (Chan, , 1984; Hass, , 1965; Weede, , 1984), althoughGeller, (1987) indicates that personalist nations have been more likely to engage in long-term conflict than either polyarchic or centrist states. The longest episodes of relative peace usually followed decisive victories in warfare (Maoz, , 1984).Google Scholar

5. Recent U.S. presidents have tended to suffer at the polls if they involved the nation in a major war (Cotton, , 1986). However, the greatness of a president as measured from public opinion polls is highly correlated with the years that his administration was involved in a war (Simonton, , 1986). This suggests that while actual warfare induces hardships and internal unrest, the concept of conflict and warfare carries great symbolic and emotional weight.Google Scholar

6. This relative decline in elite reproductive success would have been particularly adaptive if failure to respond to the unrest of the citizenry resulted in revolutions (although this was only one among many concessions made by the elite). The demographic transition does seem to correspond in time with the end of the great revolutionary movements of the eighteenth, nineteenth, and early twentieth centuries.Google Scholar

7. This should not be read as a discouragement of the antiwar or antinuclear movement. At present, these seem to provide the best hope for influencing people to curb the arms race. Falger, (1987) suggests that people might be redirected to see the enemy as the weapons themselves rather than other people. I would say that this is more adaptive in the longrun and is exactly what has happened for many of the people in the antiwar and antinuclear movements. The key is to educate more people, especially elites, to this fact.Google Scholar