Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-g8jcs Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-28T17:26:50.356Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Biotechnology, International Law, and the National Interest

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 May 2016

Elizabeth Crump Hanson*
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, University of Connecticut, Storrs, CT 06268
Get access

Extract

On November 25, 1969 Richard Nixon announced that because of the “massive, unpredictable, and potentially uncontrollable consequences” of biological weapons, the United States would never use these weapons, would destroy all existing stocks, and would confine its research to strictly defined measures of defense (Harris, 1987:193). This unilateral renunciation followed an extensive review by the National Security Council of U.S. chemical and biological warfare policy, which lasted six months and involved every relevant agency in the U.S. government and which concluded that U.S. biological warfare capabilities provided no compelling military advantages (Tucker, 1984-85:61). Three years later the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) was signed; it was the first postwar arms control agreement to elminate an entire class of weapons from the arsenals of states (U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1982:122). The treaty was ratified unanimously by the U.S. Senate in 1974, and over 100 nations have acceded to it. This arms control achievement has been attributed in part to the serious doubts which many countries, including the United States, shared about the military value of biological weapons (Harris, 1987:205-6). Within a decade of the signing of this treaty, however, the development of recombinant-DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) technology had raised the possibility of a new and more effective form of biological warfare.

Type
Commentaries
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Politics and the Life Sciences 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Harris, E.D. (1987). “The Biological and Tox Weapons Convention.” In Carnesale, A. and Haass, R. N. (eds), Superpower Arms Control: Setting the Record Straight. Cambridge, MA.: 191219.Google Scholar
Keohane, R.O. (1984). After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Meselson, M.S. (1970), ed. “Symposium on Chemical and Biological Warfare,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 65,1: 250279.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tucker, J.B. (198485). “Gene Wars.” Foreign Policy 57:5879.Google Scholar
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. (1982). Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.Google Scholar