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Vaccines for Peace: An International Program of Development and Use of Vaccines Against Dual-Threat Agents

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 May 2016

Erhard Geissler
Erhard Geissler*
Affiliation:
Max Delbrück Center for Molecular Medicine, Germany
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Abstract

This article recommends establishment of an international Vaccines for Peace (VFP) program to undertake research on and production of vaccines against pathogens (and possibly toxins) that pose natural health threats and that are also putative biological (and toxin) weapons. Vaccines for Peace is designed to contribute to health care in developing countries, enhance international cooperation in biotechnology, and reduce the danger of weapons proliferation. Vaccine development would be carried out openly and would involve scientists from developing countries that are States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, as well as personnel and facilities from the former Soviet Union. The program would thus help convert biological defense personnel and facilities to peaceful purposes. The program would be administered by the World Health Organization.

Type
Vaccines for Peace
Information
Politics and the Life Sciences , Volume 11 , Issue 2 , August 1992 , pp. 231 - 243
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Politics and the Life Sciences 

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