Research on women in Latin American politics in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s showed that very few women ran for and won political office and that those who did often did not fit the mold of the typical legislator. Yet significant cultural, social, and political changes have occurred over the past 30 years, and few studies have reexamined the types of women who win political office in the region today. In this article, I examine the social backgrounds, paths to power, and political ambition of women and men elected to national legislatures in Argentina, Colombia, and Costa Rica. I argue that women and men are likely to be more similar than different, given the tight constraints imposed on legislative candidates in democratic elections, and empirically examine this hypothesis with data from an original survey of legislators conducted in 2001–2. I find that, indeed, women and men are quite similar on an array of characteristics. Women who win elected office in Latin America today do so by playing the traditional, male-defined, political game.

Three issues are central to, but underdeveloped in, theoretical debates about the welfare state. First, the array of welfare services is of equal, or greater, importance than welfare transfers; second, spending varies across substantively different domains; and third, the welfare state is profoundly shaped by gender. While a comprehensive body of research has provided many claims and critiques on these points, their potential for empirical examination has not been fully realized. This article addresses these points by analyzing development according to substantively disaggregated measures of welfare spending, as well as theorizing and testing explicit gender-relevant influences alongside established indicators. Results from cross-sectional and fixed-effect models indicate that established factors are particularly relevant for transfer spending, and much less so for services. Notably, gender measures emerge as strong determinants of services spending generally, but the specific impact of gender varies according to both the substantive spending domain and the aspect of gender being measured. The findings, overall, show strong support for the broader inclusion of gender, and the utility of moving beyond programmatic generalist approaches.

Diversity management and gender mainstreaming can be considered technologies of government in the Foucaultian sense; that is, they are technologies that guide people to conduct themselves in a particular manner; their purpose is the “conduct of conduct.” This article illustrates the value of applying a Foucaultian “analytics of government” to generate insights on the effects of inserting feminist knowledge into institutional contexts through the practices of gender mainstreaming and diversity management. I first reinterpret these strategies as technologies of government that meet the characteristics identified in the literature on governmentality. Second, I explore the liberal rationality of the contemporary apparatus of gender by juxtaposing it to the disciplinary rationality underlying efforts to govern women at the turn of the nineteenth century. Third, I tease out similarities and differences in the way in which diversity management and gender mainstreaming operate, emphasizing, in particular, the way in which they make difference productive and outlining how one deploys a neoliberal logic and the other a bureaucratic logic. Ultimately, I argue that governance feminism should be interpreted as the governmentalization of feminist knowledge; that is, feminist knowledge has been adapted so that it becomes available for the government of conduct.

The prominence and acceptance of gender as an important subject of inquiry in U.S. politics has been steadily growing in political science. Indeed, in the 1960s and 1970s, small sample sizes of women in politics and disdain from the disciplinary gatekeepers made the serious study of gender in U.S. politics difficult to pursue (Flammang 1997; Tolleson-Rinehart and Carroll 2006). The world is clearly different today, as gender politics courses are finding their way into undergraduate and graduate curricula throughout the United States. While the ascension of gender analysis of U.S. politics as a critical variable for study is not complete, the future is bright. Several recent volumes have addressed the current state of the subfield, and most notably, Susan J. Carroll's (2003) edited volume Women and American Politics: New Questions, New Directions focused on the very purpose of laying out a research agenda for those studying gender in U.S. politics (see also Krook and Childs 2010; Wolbrecht, Beckwith, and Baldez 2008). In this essay, I continue the discussion of where the gender and U.S. politics subfield is headed by providing a brief overview of the state of the field and by offering suggestions for future avenues of study, primarily in the area of candidate emergence.

Approximately one-fifth, or 21%, of the members of the American Political Science Association identify themselves as comparativists, according to data in 2004. Among those affiliated with the APSA Women and Politics Research Section, the corresponding figure is nearly one-third, or 31% (Tripp 2010, 192). While not a majority, these patterns suggest that gender and politics scholars have been attracted in greater proportions to this particular subfield. The reasons for this, Karen Beckwith (2010) has noted, are linked to features of comparative politics particularly conducive to work on gender: an interest in answering “real world” questions, a lack of a hegemonic research agenda making the subfield more open to new topics, an emphasis on methodological pluralism valuing the contributions of qualitative and case study analysis, and a stress on fieldwork as an important vehicle for data collection.

I once mentioned to a prominent feminist scholar that I was using one of her books in my course on feminism and political theory. She looked at me blankly for a moment and then replied, “Feminism and political theory? I thought feminism is political theory.” She was right of course; in some sense, everything that is feminist theory is also political theory. Feminism illuminates gendered relations of power in politics and social life, after all, and it contributes (however indirectly) to the larger project of transforming them. Moreover, since the rise of “second wave” feminism in the 1970s, feminist theorists have significantly reshaped political theory as a discipline, moving crucial questions from the margins of the field to its center, questions about gender equity and justice, the constitution of the political subject, the demands of difference, the intersecting dynamics of domination, the differential effects of globalization, and the conditions of freedom, among other things. As a result, much of what we think of as “mainstream” political theory is now also feminist theory. This is often true even of work that does not make women or gender its sole subject matter, as the leading voices in the field increasingly are scholars whose work has been shaped by literatures central to feminism and who think about politics in ways that are informed by a critical consciousness of the gendered quality of power relations.

Feminist international relations is situated uneasily within a subfield of political science, on the one hand, and within an interdisciplinary literature on globalization, on the other. Emerging in the 1990s from a critique of the realist and rationalist IR canon, feminist IR research has diversified considerably, including different lines of theoretical and empirical inquiry and drawing on a range of methods. Different emphases emerge in three fields – feminist security studies, feminist international political economy, and feminist work on international governance.

Nearly 40 years ago, the women's movement—my own passionate engagement in it, my delighted, mystified questions about what the movement and feminism were doing not just to change women's rights but also to change women's and men's whole conception of women as political actors (questions I could later phrase in the language of political psychology, though I could not do so then)—drove me from biology to political science. Freshly armed with an undergraduate biology degree from Georgia Tech (the student body of which, at that time, was more than 99% male), working the graveyard shift as a medical technologist, and spending my days marching, rallying, and lobbying for passage of the Equal Rights Amendment and many other feminist policy proposals in those heady days, I began to realize that the intellectual life I had always assumed I would pursue in biomedicine had departed from my imagination, to be replaced by an overmastering desire to study political science and, in particular, to study the political psychology of gender, as we came to define the inquiry.