Published online by Cambridge University Press: 24 December 2010
I explore the notion of ascriptive autonomy as a conceptual and political tool that can be used to understand and enact potentially liberatory practices that enable marginalized people to have greater individual autonomy. “Ascriptive autonomy” refers to the sense in which autonomy is partly constituted by the conferral of the status of “autonomous individual.” Autonomy is both a capacity to determine one's own ends and a status conferred by virtue of being recognized by others. I focus on the link between these two facets of autonomy insofar as recognition may enable the development of capacity. In certain situations, autonomy may be ascribed even if one lacks some requirements associated with the capacity for autonomy because of either institutional or psychic constraints that follow from oppression. In such instances of “selective, purposeful misrecognition,” ascription may lead to the cultivatation of the capacity for autonomy while opening up a space for politics. To demonstrate this, I recast the feminist debate over sexuality using the terms of ascriptive autonomy. When viewed through the lens of misrecognition, we can better respond to critiques that charge proponents of the “pro-sex”position with focusing on sexual pleasure at the expense of sufficient attention paid to the constraints faced by women.