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The Techno-Thriller in the Classroom: Red Storm Rising as a Guide to World War III
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 30 October 2015
Extract
Most of the literature in the field of international security studies does not focus on the details of battlefield operations or the use of weapons in combat. The American military is usually left alone to devise effective tank tactics or solutions to the problems encountered as pilots attempt to place bombs on a target. Scholars increasingly realize, however, that theoretical work must reflect the reality of the battlefield and likely operational constraints. For example, recent explorations of the intricacies of nuclear operations have influenced the way analysts view the problem of deterrence. To be useful, theories and policy prescriptions must respond to the prevailing conditions on the battlefield.
When it becomes necessary to integrate operational considerations into theoretical work, scholars often turn to members of the military to determine if highly touted weapons perform “as advertised,” or to discover the potential limitations of tactics described in current manuals. Within the constraints created by issues of secrecy, officers and enlisted personnel usually are flattered by the interest taken in their profession and are forthcoming in supplying detailed answers to operational questions. Orgahized tours of military facilities also provide an opportunity to examine military hardware at close range and often lead to a fruitful exchange of ideas, especially after the conclusion of the formal presentations. Still, the information gathered from contacts with soldiers and sailors is largely anecdotal and limited to the general experiences of the individuals questioned.
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- Copyright © American Political Science Association 1989
References
Notes
1. On this point see Nye, Joseph S. Jr. and Lynn-Jones, Sean M., “International Security Studies: A Report of a Conference on the State of the Field,” International Security (Spring 1988), p. 7Google Scholar.
2. For recent examples of this type of analysis see Carter, Ashton B., Steinbrunner, John and Zraket, Charles A. (eds.), Managing Nuclear Operations (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1987)Google Scholar; and Lebow, Richard Ned, Nuclear Crisis Management (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987)Google Scholar.
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5. Clancy might have been inspired by the positive popular response which greeted a work produced in the late 1970s which also attempted to depict the likely course of WWIII, especially if certain procurement policies were followed, see SirHackett, General Johnet al., The Third World War August 1985 (New York: MacMillan, 1978)Google Scholar. Another novel often compared to Clancy's work is Coonts, Stephen, Flight of the Intruder (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1986)Google Scholar.
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7. Clancy, Tom, Red Storm Rising (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1986)Google Scholar; for a description of the “research” conducted by Clancy in writing his novels see Pear, Robert, “For the Patient Reader, Military Secrets are Self-Revealing,” New York Times (August 30, 1987), Sec. IV, p. 5Google Scholar; and Lekachman, Robert, “Virtuous Men and Perfect Weapons,” New York Times (July 27, 1986), Sec. VII, p. 7Google Scholar.
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15. Glen Palmer, who was kind enough to comment on this article, assured me that he would never read another novel written by Tom Clancy after finishing The Cardinal of the Kremlin, a thinly disguised polemic for SDI.
16. This is how Viscount Esher, a member of the British Committee of Imperial Defense, described the attitude of many of his countrymen in August of 1914, see Blainey, , The Causes of War, pp. 37–38Google Scholar.