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Sidestepping primary reform: political action in response to institutional change

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 October 2020

Seth J. Hill Open the ORCID record for Seth J. Hill [Opens in a new window]
Seth J. Hill*
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, University of California, 9500 Gilman Drive #0521, La Jolla, CA, San Diego, 92093-0521, USA
*
Corresponding author. Email:[email protected]
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Abstract

Many believe primary elections distort representation in American legislatures because unrepresentative actors nominate extremist candidates. Advocates have reformed primaries to broaden voter participation and increase representation. Empirical evidence, however, is quite variable on the effects of reform. I argue that when institutional reform narrows one pathway of political influence, aggrieved actors take political action elsewhere to circumvent reform. I use a difference-in-differences design in the American states and find that although changing primary rules increases primary turnout, campaign contributions also increase with reform. Implementing nonpartisan primaries and reforming partisan primaries lead to estimated 9 and 21 percent increases in individual campaign contributions per cycle. This suggests actors substitute action across avenues of political influence to limit effects of institutional reform.

Keywords

primary electionscampaign financeturnoutdifference-in-differencespolitical institutions
Type
Original Article
Information
Political Science Research and Methods , Volume 10 , Issue 2 , April 2022 , pp. 391 - 407
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the European Political Science Association

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