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Invalid Ballots and Electoral Competition
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 09 September 2016
Abstract
In close elections, a sufficiently high share of invalid ballots—if driven by voter mistakes or electoral fraud—can jeopardize the electoral outcome. We study how the closeness of electoral race relates to the share of invalid ballots, under the traditional paper-ballot hand-counted voting technology. Using a large micro-level data set from the Italian parliamentary elections in 1994–2001, we find a strong robust negative relationship between the margin of victory of the leading candidate over the nearest rival and the share of invalid ballots. We argue that this relationship is not driven by voter mistakes, protest, or electoral fraud. The explanation that garners most support is that of rational allocation of effort by election officers and party representatives, with higher rates of detection of invalid ballots in close elections.
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- © The European Political Science Association 2016
Footnotes
Gani Aldashev, Professor of Economics, Universitè libre de Bruxelles (ULB), ECARES, and CRED, University of Namur, 50 Avenue F Roosevelt, CP 114, 1050 Brussels ([email protected]). Giovanni Mastrobuoni, Professor of Economics, Department of Economics, University of Essex and Collegio Carlo Alberto, Wivenhoe Park, Colchester CO43SQ ([email protected]). The authors thank Enriqueta Aragones, Georg Kirchsteiger, Jim Snyder, and seminar participants at Collegio Carlo Alberto and the University of Padua for useful comments.
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