Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-s2hrs Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-19T12:23:33.513Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Signaling by Signature: The Weight of International Opinion and Ratification of Treaties by Domestic Veto Players*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 February 2016

David Hugh-Jones ,
Karolina Milewicz  and
Hugh Ward
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

The signing of international treaties is usually considered insignificant for international legal cooperation. Accordingly, International Relations theorists have paid it little attention. We show in this paper how and why treaty signature matters for the ultimate decision to ratify an international treaty. We argue that when multiple well-informed actors publicly sign an international treaty, this can provide a strong signal of issue importance to domestic veto players, and in turn may persuade them to ratify the treaty. We formalize this argument in a two-level signaling game, and test it on a data set of 126 international environmental agreements. We find that treaties are more likely to be ratified when their signatories include countries with high levels of general or issue-specific knowledge.

Type
Original Articles
Information
Political Science Research and Methods , Volume 6 , Issue 1 , January 2018 , pp. 15 - 31
Copyright
© The European Political Science Association 2016 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Footnotes

*

David Hugh-Jones, Senior Lecturer, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Research Park, Norwich NR47TJ, UK ([email protected]). Karolina Milewicz, Associate Professor, Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Oxford, Manor Rd, Oxford OX13UQ, UK ([email protected]). Hugh Ward, Department of Government, University of Essex, Wivenhoe Park, Colchester CO34SQ, Essex ([email protected]). We thank to Bob Goodin, Noel Johnston, Duncan Snidal and the reviewers for valuable comments and suggestions. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the International Relations Colloquium, University of Oxford. To view supplementary material for this article, please visit http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/psrm.2016.10

References

Abbott, Kenneth, and Snidal, Duncan. 2000. ‘Hard and Soft Law in International Governance’. International Organization 54(3):421–456.Google Scholar
Andersen, Per K., and Gill, Richard D.. 1982. ‘Cox’s Regression Model for Counting Processes: A Large Sample Study’. Annals of Statistics 10(4):1100–1120.Google Scholar
Axelrod, Robert, and Keohane, Robert O.. 1985. ‘Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions’. World Politics 38(1):226–254.Google Scholar
Barrett, Scott. 2003. Environment and Statecraft: The Strategy of Environmental Treaty-Making. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Beck, Nathaniel, Katz, Jonathan N., and Tucker, Richard. 1998. ‘Taking Time Seriously: Time-Series-Cross-Section Analysis with a Binary Dependent Variable’. American Journal of Political Science 42(4):1260–1288.Google Scholar
Bendor, Jonathan, and Meirowitz, Adam. 2004. ‘Spatial Models of Delegation’. American Political Science Review 98:293–310.Google Scholar
Bernauer, Thomas, Kalbhenn, Anna, Koubi, Vally, and Spilker, Gabriele. 2010. ‘A Comparison of International and Domestic Sources of Global Governance Dynamics’. British Journal of Political Science 40:509–538.Google Scholar
Box-Steffensmeier, Janet M., and Jones, Bradford S.. 2004. Event History Modeling. A Guide for Social Scientists. New York: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Box-Steffensmeier, Janet M., and Zorn, Christopher. 2002. ‘Duration Models for Repeated Events’. Journal of Politics 64(4):1069–1094.Google Scholar
Brown, Joseph M., and Urpelainen, Johannes. 2015. ‘Picking Treaties, Picking Winners. International Treaty Negotiations and the Strategic Mobilization of Domestic Interests’. Journal of Conflict Resolution 59(6):1043–1073.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Carter, David B., and Signorino, Curtis S.. 2010. ‘Back to the Future: Modeling Time Dependence in Binary Data’. Political Analysis 18(3):271–292.Google Scholar
Center for International Earth Science Information Network. 2006. ‘Environmental Treaties and Resource Indicators (ENTRI)’. Available at http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/entri/, accessed 23 July 2008.Google Scholar
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). 2013. The World Factbook 2013–14. Washington, DC: CIA. Available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html, accessed 12 July 2014.Google Scholar
Chapman, Terrence L. 2007. ‘International Security Institutions, Domestic Politics, and Institutional Legitimacy’. Journal of Conflict Resolution 51(1):134–166.Google Scholar
Downs, George W., M. Rocke, David, and N. Barsoom, Peter. 1996. ‘Is the Good News About Compliance Good News About Cooperation?’. International Organization 50(3):379–406.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Elkins, Zachary, Ginsburg, Tom, and Melton, James. 2010. ‘Comparative Constitutions Project: A Cross-National Historical Dataset of Written Constitutions’. Available at http://comparativeconstitutionsproject.org/, accessed 25 November 2014.Google Scholar
Espínola-Arredondo, Ana, and Muñoz-García, Félix. 2011. ‘Free-Riding in International Environmental Agreements: A Signaling Approach to Non-Enforceable Treaties’. Journal of Theoretical Politics 23(1):111–134.Google Scholar
Falkner, Robert. 2012. ‘Business Power, Business Conflict: A Neo-Pluralist Perspective on International Environmental Politics’. In Peter Dauvergne (ed.), Handbook of Global Environmental Politics. 319–329. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.Google Scholar
Fearon, James D. 1997. ‘Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands Versus Sinking Costs’. Journal of Conflict Resolution 41(1):68–90.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Feddersen, Timothy J., and Pesendorfer, Wolfgang. 1996. ‘The Swing Voter’s Curse’. The American Economic Review 86(3):408–424.Google Scholar
Fredriksson, Per G., and Gaston, Noel. 2000. ‘Ratification of the 1992 Climate Change Convention: What Determines Legislative Delay?’. Public Choice 104(3):345–368.Google Scholar
Freedom House. 2015. ‘Freedom in the World’. Available at https://freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world#.VZ-sMvlsHT8, accessed 20 March 2015.Google Scholar
Gilligan, Thomas W., and Krehbiel, Keith. 1990. ‘Organization of Informative Committees by a Rational Legislature’. American Journal of Political Science 34(2):531–564.Google Scholar
Hafner-Burton, Emilie M., Victor, David G., and Lupu, Yonatan. 2012. ‘Political Science Research on International Law: The State of the Field’. The American Journal of International Law 106(1):47–97.Google Scholar
Hafner-Burton, Emilie M., D. Mansfield, Edward, and C.W. Pevehouse, Jon. 2015. ‘Human Rights Institutions, Sovereignty Costs and Democratization’. British Journal of Political Science 45(1):1–27.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Heston, Alan, Summers, Robert, and Aten, Bettina. 2009. ‘Penn World Table Version 6.3’. Center for International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia.Google Scholar
Hollyer, James R., and B. Rosendorff, Peter. 2012. ‘Leadership Survival, Regime Type, Policy Uncertainty and PTA Accession’. International Studies Quarterly 56(4):748–764.Google Scholar
Igoe Walsh, James. 2007. ‘Do States Play Signaling Games?’. Cooperation and Conflict 42(4):441–459.Google Scholar
Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy. 2005. ‘The Treaty Database. U.S. Compliance With Global Treaties’. Available at http://www.iatp.org/files/451_2_60426.pdf, accessed 3 June 2013.Google Scholar
Klein, John P., and Moeschberger, Melvin L.. 2003. Survival Analysis. Techniques for Censored and Truncated Data, 2nd ed. New York: Springer Verlag.Google Scholar
Klingemann, Hans-Dieter, Volkens, Andrea, Bara, Judith, Budge, Ian, and McDonald, Michael D.. 2006. Mapping Policy Preferences II: Estimates for Parties, Electors, and Governments in Eastern Europe, European Union, and OECD 1990–2003. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Leinaweaver, Justin. 2011. ‘The Marketing of Environmental Treaties: Non-Binding Signature as Information and Raising Public Awareness’. Available at SSRN 1927201, 2011 - papers.ssrn.com, accessed 10 February 2016.Google Scholar
Lipson, Charles. 1991. ‘Why are Some International Agreements Informal?’ International Organization 45(4):495–538.Google Scholar
Marshall, Monty G., Gurr, Ted R., and Jaggers, Keith. 2014. ‘Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800–2013’. Available at http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html, accessed 10 October 2014.Google Scholar
Milner, Helen V. 1997. Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Mitchell, Ronald B. 2009. ‘The Influence of International Institutions: Institutional Design, Compliance, Effectiveness, and Indigeneity’. In Helen V. Milner (ed.), Power, Interdependence and Non-State Actors in World Politics: Research Frontiers. 66–83. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Mitchell, Sara McLaughlin, and Hensel, Paul R.. 2007. ‘International Institutions and Compliance With Agreements’. American Journal of Political Science 51(4):721–737.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mo, Jongryn. 1995. ‘Domestic Institutions and International Bargaining: The Role of Agent Veto in Two-Level Games’. American Political Science Review 89(4):914–924.Google Scholar
Morrow, James D. 2000. ‘Alliances: Why Write Them Down?’. Annual Review of Political Science 3:63–83.Google Scholar
Neumayer, Eric. 2002. ‘Do Democracies Exhibit Stronger International Environmental Commitment? A Cross-Country Analysis’. Journal of Peace Research 39(2):139–164.Google Scholar
Perrin, Sophie, and Bernauer, Thomas. 2010. ‘International Regime Formation Revisited: Explaining Ratification Behaviour With Respect to Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution Agreements in Europe’. European Union Politics 11(3):405–426.Google Scholar
Putnam, Robert D. 1988. ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games’. International Organization 42(3):427–460.Google Scholar
Risse, Thomas, and Sikkink, Kathryn. 1999. ‘The Socialization of International Human Rights Norms in Domestic Practices’. In Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink (eds), The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change. 1–38. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Roberts, J. Timmons, Parks, Bradley C., and Vásquez, Alexis A.. 2004. ‘Who Ratifies Environmental Treaties and Why? Institutionalism, Structuralism and Participation by 192 Nations in 22 Treaties’. Global Environmental Politics 4(3):22–64.Google Scholar
Schmidt, Andreas, Ivanova, Ana, and Schäfer, Mike S.. 2013. ‘Media Attention for Climate Change Around the World: A Comparative Analysis of Newspaper Coverage in 27 Countries’. Global Environmental Change 23(5):1233–1248.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Schneider, Christina J., and Urpelainen, Johannes. 2013. ‘Distributional Conflict Between Powerful States and International Treaty Ratification’. International Studies Quarterly 57(1):13–27.Google Scholar
SCImago Research Group. 2015. ‘SCImago Journal Ranking Indicator’. Available at http://www.scimagojr.com/, accessed 23 October 2015.Google Scholar
Simmons, Beth A. 2009. Mobilizing for Human Rights. International Law in Domestic Politics. New York: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Simmons, Beth A. 2010. ‘Treaty Compliance and Violation’. Annual Review of Political Science 13:273–296.Google Scholar
Singer, J. David, Bremer, Stuart, and Stuckey, John. 1972. ‘Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820–1965’. In Bruce and Russett (ed.), Peace, War, and Numbers. 19–48. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.Google Scholar
Slantchev, Branislav L. 2005. ‘Military Coercion in Interstate Crises’. American Political Science Review 99:533–547.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tableman, Mara, and Kim, Jong Sung. 2004. Survival Analysis Using S. Analysis of Time-to-Event Data . London: Chapman & Hall.Google Scholar
Therneau, Terry M., and Grambsch, Patricia M.. 2000. Modeling Survival Data: Extending the Cox Model. New York: Springer Verlag.Google Scholar
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 1969. ‘1155 U.N.T.S. 331, reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679 (May 23, 1969)’. United Nations, Treaty Series 1155:331–512. Available at https://treaties.un.org/pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=080000028003902f, accessed 10 February 2016.Google Scholar
von Stein, Jana. 2005. ‘Do Treaties Constrain or Screen? Selection Bias and Treaty Compliance’. American Political Science Review 99(4):611–622.Google Scholar
von Stein, Jana. 2008. ‘The International Law and Politics of Climate Change. Ratification of the United Nations Framework Convention and the Kyoto Protocol’. Journal of Conflict Resolution 52(2):243–268.Google Scholar
Vreeland, James R. 2008. ‘Political Institutions and Human Rights: Why Dictatorships Enter into the United Nations Convention Against Torture’. International Organization 62(1):65–101.Google Scholar
Ward, Hugh. 2006. ‘International Linkages and Environmental Sustainability: The Effectiveness of the Regime Network’. Journal of Peace Research 43(2):149–166.Google Scholar
World Bank. 2015. ‘World Development Indicators’. Available at http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD, accessed 22 September 2015.Google Scholar
Supplementary material: PDF

Hugh-Jones supplementary material

Hugh-Jones supplementary material 1

Download Hugh-Jones supplementary material(PDF)
PDF 242.7 KB
Supplementary material: File

Hugh-Jones supplementary material

Hugh-Jones supplementary material 2

Download Hugh-Jones supplementary material(File)
File 77 KB