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Information Manipulation and Reform in Authoritarian Regimes*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 June 2015

Jidong Chen  and
Yiqing Xu
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Abstract

We develop a theory of how an authoritarian regime interactively uses information manipulation, such as propaganda or censorship, and policy improvement to maintain social stability. The government can depict the status quo policy more popularly supported than it actually is, while at the same time please citizens directly by enacting a costly reform. We show that the government’s ability of making policy concessions reduces its incentive to manipulate information and improves its credibility. Anticipating a higher chance of policy concessions and less information manipulation, citizens are more likely to believe the government-provided information and support the regime. Our model provides an explanation for the puzzling fact that reform coexists with selective information disclosure in authoritarian countries like China.

Type
Original Articles
Information
Political Science Research and Methods , Volume 5 , Issue 1 , January 2017 , pp. 163 - 178
Copyright
© The European Political Science Association 2015 

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Footnotes

*

Jidong Chen is an Assistant Professor in the Beijing Normal University Business School, Rear Main Building, Beijing Normal University, 19 Xinjiekouwai St., Beijing 100875, China; Visiting fellow, Wallis Institute of Political Economy, University of Rochester, 107 Harkness Hall, Box 027-0158, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY 14627, USA ([email protected]). Yiqing Xu is a PhD Candidate in the Department of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 77 Mass. Ave, E53-470, Cambridge, MA 02142, USA ([email protected]). The authors are indebted to Jonathan Hanson, Mehdi Shadmehr and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments and suggestions.

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