Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-t8hqh Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-26T05:01:24.509Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Constructing Congressional Activity: Uncertainty and the Dynamics of Legislative Attention*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 December 2015

Josh M. Ryan
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Members and parties have electoral incentives to address issues on the congressional agenda to satisfy public demand. When determining which issues to address, majorities seek to minimize their uncertainty about the costs and electoral benefits of legislating by revisiting policy areas previously addressed. This theory is tested using error-correction models that demonstrate that policy activity within each chamber is in a long-term equilibrium and that the passage of legislation, even important bills, promotes future policymaking in the same policy area. This relationship is stronger when the majority has less information about the costs of lawmaking—specifically, when it faces a chamber controlled by the opposite party and when it is a new majority.

Type
Original Articles
Information
Political Science Research and Methods , Volume 6 , Issue 2 , April 2018 , pp. 299 - 321
Copyright
© The European Political Science Association 2015 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Footnotes

*

Josh M. Ryan, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Utah State University, 0725 Old Main Hill, Logan, UT 84322 ([email protected]). A version of this paper was presented at the 2010 Midwest Political Science Association Conference and valuable feedback was provided by Anthony Madonna and James Rogers. Much of the data collection was funded by a grant from the Dirksen Congressional Center. The author thanks Jordan Ragusa, Jenny Wolak, E. Scott Adler, Bill Jaeger, Scott Minkoff, Robert McGrath, and Jon Rogowski for helpful comments on various drafts of the paper, and Drew Fairhurst and Melissa Hill for research assistance. To view supplementary material for this article, please visit http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/psrm.2015.66

References

Adler, E. Scott, and Wilkerson, John. 2007. ‘A Governing Theory of Legislative Organization’. Prepared for the Annual Meetings of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, IL, 29 August–2 September.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Adler, E. Scott, and Wilkerson, John. 2008. Congressional Bills Project: 1973--2009. NSF 00880066 and 00880061.Google Scholar
Adler, E. Scott, and Wilkerson, John D.. 2013. Congress and the Politics of Problem Solving. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Aldrich, John H. 1995. Why Parties? . Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Baumgartner, Frank R., and Jones, Bryan D.. 1991. ‘Agenda Dynamics and Policy Subsystems’. The Journal of Politics 53(2):1044–1074.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Baumgartner, Frank R., and Jones, Bryan D.. 1993. Agendas and Instability in American Politics. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Baumgartner, Frank R., and Jones, Bryan D.. 2013. Policy Agendas Project, 2013. Data available at policyagendas.orgGoogle Scholar
Beckmann, Matthew N. 2010. Pushing the Agenda: Presidential Leadership in US Lawmaking, 1953-2004. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bendor, Jonathan. 2010. Bounded Rationality and Politics. Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press.Google Scholar
Bewley, R. A. 1979. ‘The Direct Estimation of the Equilibrium Response in a Linear Model’. Economic Letters 3(4):357–361.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Binder, Sarah. 1999. ‘The Dynamics of Legislative Gridlock, 1947-96’. The American Political Science Review 93(3):519–533.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Binder, Sarah. 2003. Stalemate: Causes and Consequences of Legislative Gridlock. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.Google Scholar
Burstein, Paul. 2003. ‘The Impact of Public Opinion on Public Policy: A Review and an Agenda’. Political Research Quarterly 56(1):29–40.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cameron, Charles M. 2000. Veto Bargaining. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Canes-Wrone, Brandice, Brady, David W., and Cogan, John F.. 2002. ‘Out of Step, Out of Office: Electoral Accountability and House Members’ Voting’. The American Political Science Review 96(1):127–140.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Canes-Wrone, Brandice, Herron, Michael C., and Shotts, Kenneth W.. 2001. ‘Leadership and Pandering: A Theory of Executive Policymaking’. American Journal of Political Science 45(3):532–550.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Congressional Quarterly Almanac . 1973–2009. ‘Washington DC: Congressional Quarterly News Features’, Congressional Quarterly Almanac.Google Scholar
Cox, Gary W. 2000. ‘On the Effects of Legislative Rules’. Legislative Studies Quarterly 25(2):169–192.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cox, Gary W. 2006. ‘The Organization of Democratic Legislatures’. In Barry R. Weingast and Donald Wittman (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy, 141–161. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Cox, Gary W., and McCubbins, Matthew D.. 1993. Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.Google Scholar
Cox, Gary W., and McCubbins, Matthew D.. 2005. Setting the Agenda: Responsible Party Government in the US House of Representatives. Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cox, Gary W., Kousser, Thad, and McCubbins, Mathew D.. 2010. ‘Party Power or Preferences? Quasi-Experimental Evidence from American State Legislatures’. Journal of Politics 72(3):799–811.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
De Boef, Suzanna, and Keele, Luke. 2008. ‘Taking Time Seriously’. American Journal of Political Science 52(1):184–200.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Edwards, George C. 2006. On Deaf Ears: The Limits of the Bully Pulpit. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.Google Scholar
Edwards, George C., Barrett, Andrew, and Peake, Jeffrey. 1997. ‘The Legislative Impact of Divided Government’. American Journal of Political Science 41(2):545–563.Google Scholar
Edwards, George C., and Dan Wood, B.. 1999. ‘Who Influences Whom? The President, Congress, and the Media’. The American Political Science Review 93(2):327–344.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fenno, Richard F. 1973. Congressmen in Committees. Boston, MA: Little, Brown.Google Scholar
Fenno, Richard F. 1997. Learning to Govern: An Institutional View of the 104th Congress. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.Google Scholar
Hall, Richard L. 1996. Participation in Congress. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.Google Scholar
Hall, Thad. 2004. Authorizing Policy. Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press.Google Scholar
Hammond, Thomas H., and Miller, Gary J.. 1987. ‘The Core of the Constitution’. American Political Science Review 81(4):1155–1174.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Heller, William B. 2007. ‘Divided Politics: Bicameralism, Parties, and Policy in Democratic Legislatures’. Annual Review of Political Science 10:245–269.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Howell, William, Adler, E. Scott, Cameron, Charles, and Riemann, Charles. 2000. ‘Divided Government and the Legislative Productivity of Congress 1945-1994’. Legislative Studies Quarterly 25(2):285–312.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Iyengar, Shanto, Norpoth, Helmut, and Hahn, Kyu S.. 2004. ‘Consumer Demand for Election News: The Horserace Sells’. Journal of Politics 66(1):157–175.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Jacobson, Gary. 2007. ‘Referendum: The 2006 Midterm Elections’. Political Science Quarterly 122(1):1–24.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Jenkins, Jeffrey A., and Monroe, Nathan W.. 2012. ‘Buying Negative Agenda Control in the U.S. House’. American Journal of Political Science 56(4):897–912.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Jones, Bryan D. 2001. Politics and the Architecture of Choice. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Jones, Bryan D., and Baumgartner, Frank R.. 2005. The Politics of Attention: How Government Prioritizes Problems. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Kernell, Samuel. 1997. Going Public: New Strategies of Presidential Leadership. Washington, DC: CQ Press.Google Scholar
Kessler, Daniel, and Krehbiel, Keith. 1996. ‘Dynamics of Cosponsorship’. American Political Science Review 90(3):555–566.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kiewiet, D. Roderick, and McCubbins, Mathew D.. 1985. ‘Congressional Appropriations and the Electoral Connection’. Journal of Politics 47(1):59–82.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kiewiet, D. Roderick, and McCubbins, Mathew D.. 1991. The Logic of Delegation: Congressional Parties and the Appropriations Process. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Kingdon, John W. 1984. Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies (Longman Classics Edition) 2nd ed. Boston, MA: Little, Brown.Google Scholar
Koger, Gregory. 2010. Filibustering: A Political History of Obstruction in the House and Senate. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Koger, Gregory, and Lebo, Matthew J. 2012. ‘Strategic Party Government and the 2010 Elections’. American Politics Research 40(5):927–945.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Krause, George A. 2002. ‘Separated Powers and Institutional Growth in the Presidential and Congressional Branches: Distinguishing Between Short-Run Versus Long-Run Dynamics’. Political Research Quarterly 55(1):27–57.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Krehbiel, Keith. 1991. Information and Legislative Organization. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Krehbiel, Keith. 1998. Pivotal Politics. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Krutz, Glen S. 2000. ‘Getting Around Gridlock: The Effect of Omnibus Utilization on Legislative Productivity’. Legislative Studies Quarterly 25(4):533–549.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lebo, Matthew J., McGlynn, Adam J., and Koger, Gregory. 2007. ‘Strategic Party Government: Party Influence in Congress, 1789-2000’. American Journal of Political Science 51(3):464–481.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Longley, Lawrence D., and Oleszek, Walter J.. 1989. Bicameral Politics: Conference Committees in Congress. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.Google Scholar
Mayhew, David R. 1974. Congress: The Electoral Connection. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.Google Scholar
Mayhew, David R. 1991. Divided we Govern: Party Control, Lawmaking, and Investigations 1946-1990. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.Google Scholar
McCarty, Nolan. 2000. ‘Proposal Rights, Veto Rights and Political Bargaining’. American Journal of Political Science 44(3):506–522.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mooney, Christopher Z. 1991. ‘Information Sources in State Legislative Decision Making (1991): 445-455’. Legislative Studies Quarterly 16(3):445–455.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Page, Benjamin I., and Shapiro, Robert Y.. 1983. ‘Effects of Public Opinion on Policy’. The American Political Science Review 77(1):175–190.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Polsby, Nelson W. 1968. ‘The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives’. American Political Science Review 62(1):144–168.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Poole, Keith, and Rosenthal, Howard. 1997. Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll Call Voting. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Poole, Keith T., and Rosenthal, Howard. 2007. Ideology and Congress 2nd ed. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.Google Scholar
Ragusa, Jordan Michael. 2010. ‘The Lifecycle of Public Policy: An Event History Analysis of Repeals to Landmark Legislative Enactments, 1951-2006’. American Politics Research 38(6):1015–1051.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Riker, William H. 1992. ‘The Justification of Bicameralism’. The American Political Science Review 13(1):101–116.Google Scholar
Rohde, David W. 1991. Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rudalevige, Andrew. 2002. Managing the President’s Program: Presidential Leadership and Legislative Policy Formulation. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Shipan, Charles R. 2006. ‘Does Divided Government Increase the Size of the Legislative Agenda?’. In E. Scott Adler and John S. Lapinski (eds), The Macropolitics of Congress. 151–170. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Simon, Herbert A. 1957. Models of Man: Social and Rational. Oxford: Wiley Press.Google Scholar
Simon, Herbert A. 1972. ‘Theories of Bounded Rationality’. In Jacob Marschak, Charles B. McGuire, Roy Radner and Kenneth Joseph Arrow (eds), Decision and Organization: A Volume in Honor of Jacob Marschak, vol. 12, 161–176. Amsterdam: North-Holland.Google Scholar
Sinclair, Barbara. 1998. Legislators, Leaders and Lawmaking: The U.S. House of Representatives in the Postreform Era. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sinclair, Barbara. 2006. Party Wars: Polarization and the Politics of National Policy Making. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press.Google Scholar
Smith, Richard A. 1995. ‘Interest Group Influence in the US Congress’. Legislative Studies Quarterly 20(1):89–139.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Snyder, James M. Jr., and Groseclose, Tim. 2000. ‘Estimating Party Influence in Congressional Roll Call Voting’. American Journal of Political Science 44(2):192–211.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tsebelis, George, and Money, Jeannette. 1997. Bicameralism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Uscinski, Joseph E. 2009. ‘When Does the Publics Issue Agenda Affect the Medias Issue Agenda (and Vice-Versa)? Developing a Framework for Media-Public Influence’. Social Science Quarterly 90(4):796–815.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Weingast, Barry R., and Marshall, William. 1988. ‘The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets’. Journal of Political Economy 91(1):132–163.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Supplementary material: File

Ryan supplementary material

Ryan supplementary material 1

Download Ryan supplementary material(File)
File 15.1 KB
Supplementary material: PDF

Ryan supplementary material

Appendix

Download Ryan supplementary material(PDF)
PDF 181.5 KB