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Shirking in the Contemporary Congress: A Reappraisal

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 January 2017

Jamie L. Carson
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, Florida International University, DM480, Miami, FL 33199. e-mail: [email protected]
Michael H. Crespin
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, Michigan State University, 303 S. Kedzie Hall, East Lansing, MI 48824. e-mail: [email protected]
Jeffery A. Jenkins
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, Northwestern University, 601 University Place, Evanston, IL 60208. e-mail: [email protected]
Ryan J. Vander Wielen
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, Washington University in St. Louis, Campus Box 1027, One Brookings Drive, St. Louis, MO 63130. e-mail: [email protected]

Abstract

This paper replicates the findings that appeared in the article “Severing the Electoral Connection: Shirking in the Contemporary Congress,” published in the American Journal of Political Science (44:316–325), in which Lawrence Rothenberg and Mitchell Sanders incorporated a new research design and, contrary to all previous studies, found evidence of ideological shirking in the U.S. House of Representatives. We investigate the robustness of their results by reestimating their model with Congress-specific fixed effects and find that their results no longer hold.

Type
Replications and Extensions
Copyright
Copyright © Society for Political Methodology 2004 

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