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Measuring Discretion and Delegation in Legislative Texts: Methods and Application to US States

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 May 2020

Matia Vannoni Open the ORCID record for Matia Vannoni [Opens in a new window] ,
Elliott Ash Open the ORCID record for Elliott Ash [Opens in a new window]  and
Massimo Morelli Open the ORCID record for Massimo Morelli [Opens in a new window]
Matia Vannoni*
Affiliation:
King’s College London, WC2B 4BGLondon, UK. Email: [email protected]
Elliott Ash
Affiliation:
ETH Zurich, 8092Zürich, Switzerland. Email: [email protected]
Massimo Morelli
Affiliation:
Bocconi University and CEPR, 20136Milan, Italy. Email: [email protected]
*
*Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

Bureaucratic discretion and executive delegation are central topics in political economy and political science. The previous empirical literature has measured discretion and delegation by manually coding large bodies of legislation. Drawing from computational linguistics, we provide an automated procedure for measuring discretion and delegation in legal texts to facilitate large-scale empirical analysis. The method uses information in syntactic parse trees to identify legally relevant provisions, as well as agents and delegated actions. We undertake two applications. First, we produce a measure of bureaucratic discretion by looking at the level of legislative detail for US states and find that this measure increases after reforms giving agencies more independence. This effect is consistent with an agency cost model, where a more independent bureaucracy requires more specific instructions (less discretion) to avoid bureaucratic drift. Second, we construct measures of delegation to governors in state legislation. Consistent with previous estimates using non-text metrics, we find that executive delegation increases under unified government.

Keywords

natural language processingtext analysisexecutive delegationbureaucratic independenceUS politics
Type
Articles
Information
Political Analysis , Volume 29 , Issue 1 , January 2021 , pp. 43 - 57
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s) 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Society for Political Methodology.

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Footnotes

Contributing Editor: Jeff Gill

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