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Duverger's Hypothesis, the Run-Off Rule, and Electoral Competition

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 January 2017

Steven Callander
Steven Callander*
Affiliation:
Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL 60208. e-mail: [email protected]
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Abstract

I analyze a model of electoral competition with entry under the run-off rule. I consider both two- and multiple-party systems. The principal result is that two-party systems may prove stable under the run-off rule: I show that a continuum of equilibria exists in which only two parties enter and subsequent entry is deterred. This finding conflicts with the accepted wisdom on the run-off rule encapsulated by Duverger's Hypothesis. The results of the model are then reconciled with Duverger's Hypothesis and a more precise formulation is proposed.

Type
Research Article
Information
Political Analysis , Volume 13 , Issue 3 , Summer 2005 , pp. 209 - 232
Copyright
Copyright © The Author 2005. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Society for Political Methodology 

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