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When Should Political Scientists Use the Self-Confirming Equilibrium Concept? Benefits, Costs, and an Application to Jury Theorems

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 January 2017

Arthur Lupia ,
Adam Seth Levine  and
Natasha Zharinova
Arthur Lupia*
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, University of Michigan, 4252 Institute for Social Research, 426 Thompson Street, Ann Arbor, MI 48104-2321
Adam Seth Levine
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, University of Michigan, 4252 Institute for Social Research, 426 Thompson Street, Ann Arbor, MI 48104-2321. e-mail: [email protected]
Natasha Zharinova
Affiliation:
Risk Advisory Services, ABN AMRO Bank N.V., Gustav Mahlerlaan 10, PO Box 283, 1000 EA Amsterdam, The Netherlands. e-mail: [email protected]
*
e-mail: [email protected] (corresponding author)
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Abstract

Many claims about political behavior are based on implicit assumptions about how people think. One such assumption, that political actors use identical conjectures when assessing others' strategies, is nested within applications of widely used game-theoretic equilibrium concepts. When empirical findings call this assumption into question, the self-confirming equilibrium (SCE) concept provides an alternate criterion for theoretical claims. We examine applications of SCE to political science. Our main example focuses on the claim of Feddersen and Pesendorfer that unanimity rule can lead juries to convict innocent defendants (1998. Convicting the innocent: The inferiority of unanimous jury verdicts under strategic voting. American Political Science Review 92:23–35). We show that the claim depends on the assumption that jurors have identical beliefs about one another's types and identical conjectures about one another's strategies. When jurors' beliefs and conjectures vary in ways documented by empirical jury research, fewer false convictions can occur in equilibrium. The SCE concept can confer inferential advantages when actors have different beliefs and conjectures about one another.

Type
Research Article
Information
Political Analysis , Volume 18 , Issue 1 , Winter 2010 , pp. 103 - 123
Copyright
Copyright © The Author 2009. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Society for Political Methodology 

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Footnotes

Author's note: We thank Timothy J. Feddersen, Drew Fudenberg, Alexander Von Hagen-Jamar, Mika Lavaque-Manty, Justin Magouirk, William McMillan, Marco Novarese, Scott E. Page, Thomas Palfrey, Alexandra Shankster, Dustin Tingley, and Barry R. Weingast for helpful comments.

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