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Introduction to the Special Issue

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 January 2017

Gary Cox*
Affiliation:
University of California, San Diego

Abstract

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Type
Introduction
Copyright
Copyright © 2001 by the Society for Political Methodology 

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References

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