The future is uncertain for Antarctica, with many possibilities – some more plausible, others more preferable. Indeed, the region and its governance regime may be reaching (or may have reached) a crossroads moment as a result of a series of challenges, including the changing Antarctic climate and environment, increasing human activity, shifting values among Antarctic states and a low-cost, somewhat benign governance regime (the Antarctic Treaty System). Within this context there are a number of interdependent drivers that are likely to influence Antarctica's future over, say, 25 years: global environmental and socio-economic developments; Antarctic governance; Antarctic research, including national Antarctic programme operations; and Antarctic tourism. The research presented here involved a thorough examination of Antarctic literature on current Antarctic developments and challenges, and an assessment of global trends. Scenarios were developed through a facilitated workshop process. From these, four future scenarios were developed based on interactions between these drivers. The resulting scenarios provide a dynamic, evolving possibility space to be explored as a means of understanding where Antarctic issues might evolve, depending on the growth or diminishing importance of drivers. In turn these suggest that more structured polar futures are needed based on formal quantitative and qualitative data.

Understanding the benefits and outcomes of Canada's public investment in Arctic science and associated community–researcher partnerships represents a significant challenge for government. This paper presents a capital assets-based approach to conceptualising northern research partnership development processes and assessing the potential outcomes. By more explicitly considering the pre- and post-partnership asset levels (that is, social, human, physical, financial and natural assets) for different collaborators, the potential benefits and challenges associated with community–researcher partnerships can be collaboratively assessed. In order to help refine this approach, we conducted a survey of those involved in developing and maintaining community–researcher partnerships across Arctic Canada. Results indicate that the proposed approach could be useful for research funding agencies seeking to better understand partnership outcomes and promote more effective community–researcher interactions. Challenges include adequately capturing the qualitative nature of different capital assets, pointing to future research and policy needs. Better understanding the role of research in northern development has the potential to improve northern research, policy and practice.

How does a state that is not a ‘natural’ Arctic or Antarctic state perceive the polar regions, interpret their roles in its foreign policy and translate this into actual polar policy? This paper seeks to answer these questions by comparing the Arctic and Antarctic policies of Japan. The paper shows that Japan's national image of the polar regions as a combined region began before World War II due to its imperial past of joining the race to the Antarctic and the Arctic. However, from a policy point of view, the polar regions for Japan long meant primarily Antarctica. Japan, as a defeated power and a late-comer to the international system established after World War II, takes a liberal position in the governance of Antarctica. Having and maintaining a capability to conduct scientific research in the Antarctic via international decision-making institutions has been considered an important status marker associated with great power identity. Regarding the Arctic, Japan attempts to replicate the general success of its Antarctic policy, backed by tools of science and technological diplomacy, the purpose of which is to revive its domestic economy. Japan's scientific whaling in the Antarctic is primarily a domestic, identity-based political conflict between a nostalgia for Japan's imperial past and its more modern, liberal identity of today.

Arguably the best known scientific Antarctic venture was the British Antarctic Expedition of 1911–1913 led by Captain Robert Falcon Scott. Whilst the so-called race to the geographic South Pole with Roald Amundsen's Norwegian Antarctic expedition excited international interest, the tragic death of Scott and his returning Polar Party was a striking reminder of the hazards of operating in the south. Recent work has highlighted the possible role expedition second-in-command Lieutenant Edward ‘Teddy’ Evans played in the deaths of Scott and his men. Here I report newly discovered documents which, when placed in a wider context, raise significant questions over Evans’ behaviour during the expedition. The evidence focuses on the shortage of food at key depots, the apparently deliberate obfuscation of when Evans fell down with scurvy and the failure to pass on orders given by Scott. It is concluded that Evans actions on and off the ice can at best be described as ineffectual, at worst deliberate sabotage. Why Evans was not questioned more about these events on his return to England remains unknown.

Over the last decade claims that an Arctic ‘cold rush’ is taking place have intensified. Proponents of the argument contend that the unprecedented effects of climate change plus strong global demand for the region's natural resources are creating the conditions for a future economic boom. In both of these respects, Greenland merits particular attention. Some recent predictions suggest great riches accruing to Greenland, on account of its abundance of oil, gas and mineral deposits; as a consequence, some further argue, Greenlandic independence from Denmark is assured. In response, this article contests these arguments. For now, the natural and mineral resource sector in Greenland is tiny, and thus it is still much too soon to know whether it will even deliver the dazzling economic outcome forecast – let alone whether or not this outcome will benefit Greenland. In addition, the question of Greenlandic independence does not simply boil down to economics, but also raises various social, political, legal and strategic issues which are not easily resolvable. Consequently, Greenland's independence from Denmark is not simply a matter of time, but remains very much an open question.

Svalbard in the European Arctic has a well-documented history of natural resource exploitation. Since its discovery in 1596, the archipelago has witnessed phases of commercial whaling, sealing, fur hunting and fishing. Scientists, trophy hunters and miners have also added to the depletion of wildlife. The magnitude, scale and speed of the hunt, however, remain largely unknown. This paper collates historical catch data of five selected species of game animal from published written and archaeological sources. These species include the bowhead whale, the Atlantic walrus, the polar bear, the Arctic fox and the Svalbard reindeer. The paper thereby aims to quantify the anthropogenic pressure on Svalbard's ecosystems over more than four centuries. This quantification is only moderately successful. The incomplete record prevents the use of this catch data as a suitable indicator of human-induced ecosystem change. To advance the state of knowledge, the paper recommends a return to the primary sources across international archives, libraries and museum collections, and outlines steps with which to arrive at the much needed time-depth in Svalbard historical ecology.

The third-quarter phenomenon is the dominant theoretical model to explain the psychological impacts of deployment in Antarctica on personnel. It posits that detrimental symptoms to functioning, such as negative mood, increase gradually throughout deployment and peak at the third-quarter point, regardless of overall deployment length. However, there is equivocal support for the model. The current meta-analysis included data from 21 studies (involving 1,826 participants) measuring negative mood during deployment to elucidate this discrepancy. Across studies analyses were conducted on three data types: stratified by month using repeated-measured all time points meta-analytic techniques and pre/post-deployment data for summer/winter deployment seasons. Our results did not support the proposed parameters of the third-quarter phenomenon, as negative mood did not peak at the third-quarter point (August/September) of deployment. Overall effect sizes indicated that negative mood was greater at baseline than the end of deployment for summer and winter deployment seasons. These findings have theoretical and practical implications and should be used to guide future research, assisting in the development and modification of pre-existing prevention and intervention programmes to improve well-being and functioning of personnel during Antarctic deployment.

In Cavell (2017) the opening paragraph states that ‘Alan MacEachern neglects primary evidence cited in my other publications on Bernier (Cavell 2010; Cavell 2011; Cavell 2014; Cavell & Noakes 2010).’