This paper explores Ealing Studios' cinematic production about Robert Falcon Scott and the Terra Nova expedition, released to British audiences in 1948. Under the title of Scott of the Antarctic, the film recreated the tragic failure of the expedition on its return from the South Pole. The race to the South Pole had ended with victory for Roald Amundsen and post-colonial Norway. Three decades later, Britain again found itself involved in an intense territorial competition with two post-colonial states, Argentina and Chile. In the midst of decolonisation, the postwar government under Prime Minister Clement Attlee was engaged in a ‘cold war’ in Antarctica. The Falkland Islands Dependencies Survey (FIDS) had been created in order to protect sovereignty claims to the Antarctic Peninsula. While some attention has been given to the cultural significance of Scott of the Antarctic, there has been little geopolitical commentary on this film. As an empty space devoid of indigenous populations, Antarctica was invitingly incomplete. Produced with the co-operation of the Scott Polar Research Institute and FIDS, this film depicted a failed imperial project at a time when Britain desperately needed scientific practices such as mapping to consolidate territorial sovereignty. The paper explores the actual filming process along with the verdicts of contemporary critics in order to make a critical appraisal of Britain's changing role in Antarctica. It is sobering to note that while FIDS was supporting the film Scott of the Antarctic, Argentina was attempting to indoctrinate a new generation of schoolchildren about the realities of the Argentine Antarctic sector.

On 5 October 1851 a balloon was found near Gloucester, England, bearing a message from one of Sir John Franklin's two ships, last seen by Europeans six years before. The Admiralty responded swiftly and investigated the circumstances for several days before announcing that the message was a fake. During their inquiries no news appeared in the press. When newspapers at last published the story, most of them called the episode a hoax, although their accounts differed from each other and from the facts in many details. The Admiralty's brief announcement late in the day on 11 October gave the impression that the incident had been trivial, but in fact they had taken it very seriously. The author suggests that the hoax was carried out with an authentic balloon made for Admiralty expeditions to the Arctic, inflated with hydrogen or coal gas.

A list of the provisions for the second expedition led by Martin Frobisher was produced on 26 March 1577, for 115 men and 18 months. These plans contain an extraordinarily detailed food procurement list: the quantity of each food, the cost of each item, and how the rations were to be allocated. The subject of this paper is a nutritional analysis of the rations on this list. It is assumed that the March list is simply an 18-month version of what was put in place for the eventual seven-month expedition.

The individual foods for the expedition were grouped into four basic meal plans, rotated throughout the journey at four ‘meat days’ and three ‘fast days’ per week. Since the amount of each food allocated per person per day was indicated, the quantities of each were able to be converted into modern measures, based on foods thought to be near equivalents to those in Frobisher's time, and the caloric and nutrient intake calculated. The results show a fairly monotonous diet of about 4000 calories on fast days to 5000 calories on meat days. Except for a virtual absence of vitamin C, the diet seems nutritionally adequate over short runs. Inadequacies could occur quickly if some foodstuffs went bad, or if members of the crew were depleted of crucial nutrients, such as ascorbic acid, before the voyage began. On longer journeys this diet would have been inadequate, as it is doubtful if beer (29% of the calories) or butter and cheese (most of the vitamin A) could have lasted for more than six months. An examination of 18 Arctic voyages between Frobisher's first (1576) and that of James (1631–1632) demonstrates that they had similar foodstuffs on board, and that few suffered appreciable dietary problems unless they were gone for more than six months.

The commercial nuclear industry is considering the Northern Sea Route (NSR) as an alternative transit route for shipments of radioactive material between Europe and Japan, and as an import$sol;export route for shipments into and out of Russia. Technologically, the NSR is a practicable route, and factors that currently make it uneconomical for most commercial cargoes do not generally apply to nuclear ones. A shorter route between Europe and Japan may reduce operating costs and could enhance the safety and security of nuclearmaterial. Shippers are also attracted by the prospect of reducing political opposition along current routes. These advantages are offset by the cost of building specialised ships, uncertainties associated with Russia and its icebreaker fleet, and uncertainties regarding the risk and effects of a severe transport accident involving radioactive material. The likelihood of using the NSR for nuclear transport remains uncertain. Transit use is unlikely without a basis for long-term transport between Europe and east Asia. Russia's plans to expand its nuclear services industry are not dependent on using the NSR: the Arctic alternative via the port of Dudinka is only one of several suggested routes. Whether it is selected will depend upon whom Russia gains as customers and whether it provides the most convenient, cost-efficient option.

In the article by Hall and others (1995), a topographic correction factor (C) was developed for estimating actual land area by taking into account the effect of sloping terrain. An error that was made during image processing resulted in values of C being exaggerated. For this note, values of C for the example landscape in Glacier National Park were recalculated, and the results with and without the error are compared. It is shown that the error caused the mean value of C reported for the example landscape to be exaggerated by a factor of 2.62 times.