The article discusses how organisational structure and culture affected the preparations for sledging in three Antarctic expeditions between 1901 and 1904. The central focus is how expedition leaders sought tacit knowledge, ‘the knowledge of how we do things.’ Two organisational types were derived from a study of 36 major polar expeditions. These – the industrial organisation and the innovative organisation – were used to analyse how sledging practices evolved in the British National Antarctic Expedition, German South Polar Expedition, and Scottish National Antarctic Expedition. Robert Falcon Scott, in great part as a result of his naval heritage, did not fully understand the need for and the methods required to gain the operational knowledge required for sledging in Antarctica. He applied the traditional command-and-control system based on naval tradition. Erich von Drygalski and William Speirs Bruce applied Fridtjof Nansen's scientific approach, in which the scientific staffs were integrated into sledging operations. In this approach, every variable that could possibly affect the outcome of the research was incorporated into preparations, much as is the case in classical experimental design. While no attempt is made to judge sledging success in the study, the results clearly indicate the importance of knowing how to use the tacit dimension in sledging. The implications go far beyond sledging and suggest the need for managers to have an intimate understanding of how things work.