¹ The first notable attempt at an interpretation, that by W. M. Rossetti (The Shelley Society's Papers, Part i, pp. 138–179), places the emphasis upon the anti-religious element: Jupiter is the anthropomorphic god who tyrannizes over the mind of man (Prometheus) that created him. Most critics, however, have emphasized the moral element and the general pattern of interpretation goes somewhat as follows: Evil—Jupiter—is expelled from the universe by Eternity (or Necessity)—Demogorgon—assisted by Beauty (or Love or Nature)—Asia—as a result of the moral transformation of Mankind (or the Mind of Man)—Prometheus. To this pattern has been added in recent years a neoplatonic superstructure by Professor Carl Grabo in Prometheus Unbound: An Interpretation (Chapel Hill, 1935) and The Magic Plant (Chapel Hill, 1936): Prometheus and Demogorgon are two hypostases of the One, Demogorgon “the generative principle,” Prometheus the “intellectual hyspostasis”; with the overthrow of Jupiter Prometheus draws closer to the mysterious fountain-source of the One. In A Newton Among Poets (Chapel Hill, 1935), Professor Grabo reveals an extensive use of scientific knowledge and symbolism in the poem. The latest interpretation, that of Professor Newman I. White in Shelley (New York, 1941), follows the traditional interpretation, though with rather more flexibility in the handling of the symbolism, e.g., “Up to this point the meaning of the poem is quite clear. Jupiter, the active agent of evil, owes his power to Prometheus; and an inherent, ineradicable impulse in man's nature and in the whole universe stands ready to free humanity from its sufferings (really self-imposed) when the human spirit, like Prometheus, demonstrates its worthiness by steadfastness and generosity” (ii, 117).

² The Complete Works of Percy Bysshe Shelley, ed. by Roger Ingpen and Walter E. Peck, Julian Edition (New York: Scribners, 1926–30), viii, 235. See also viii, 236, 231. The Julian Edition will hereafter be designated as Works.

³ Works, v, 225 f., 263–267, and A Philosophical View of Reform, Works, vii, 13–15; 53–54.

⁴ “In a more presumptuous mood, I recommend the Revolution of France as a theme, involving pictures of all that is best qualified to interest and instruct mankind.” Works, ix, 199.

⁵ For the role of the French Revolution in The Revolt of Islam, see my article, “A Major Source of The Revolt of Islam,” PMLA, lvi, 175–206.

⁶ Works, i, 241 f. See also Proposals for an Association, Works, v, 264–266, and A Philosophical View of Reform, Works, vii, 13–15. For a similar view see Byron, Childe Harold's Pilgrimage, iii. lxxxi ff. and iv. xcvi ff.

⁷ It is interesting (and ironical) to note that Coleridge had long before seen the beginning of that retreat of the English liberal thinkers which Shelley here deplores, and which was so soon to engulf Coleridge himself. In the summer of 1799 he wrote to Wordsworth: “My dear friend: I do entreat you to go on with ‘The Recluse’; and I wish you would write a poem in blank verse, addressed to those, who, in consequence of the complete failure of the French Revolution, have thrown up all hope of the amelioration of mankind, and are sinking into an almost epicurean selfishness, disguising the same under the soft titles of domestic attachment and contempt for visionary philosophes. It would do great good. …” Quoted in: George McLean Harper, William Wordsworth (London, 1929), p. 300.

⁸ Works, vii, 19–20; 51–52.

⁹ The Revolt of Islam, x. v.

¹⁰ Ibid., x. iv.

¹¹ Ibid., x. viii.

¹² Works, vii, 28–29. See also An Address to the People on the Death of the Princess Charlotte, Works, vi, 78. For this conception of a second aristocracy, Shelley was probably indebted in part to Cobbett and Hume. See my article, “Shelley, Cobbett, and the National Debt,” JEGP, xlii (April, 1943).

¹³ Works, vii, 27 ff.

¹⁴ Aeschylus, Prometheus Bound, Loeb Classical Library, i, 257.

¹⁵ De Sapientia Veterum, Works (Boston, n.d.), xiii, 153–154.

¹⁶ A Defence of Poetry, Works, vii, 112.

¹⁷ A Philosophical View of Reform, Works, vii, 7.

¹⁸ Works, ii, 173. My italics. See also A Philosophical View of Reform, Works, vii, 19–20.

¹⁹ A Defence of Poetry, Works, vii, 112.

²⁰ See, for example, J. Todhunter, A Study of Shelley (London, 1880), p. 149: “The general meaning of this dainty but obscure lyric would appear to be that life makes us promises which it never fulfils; we are tantalized with the vision of unrealizable ideals.”

²¹ Works, i, 241–242.

²² See A Philosophical View of Reform, Works, vii, 13.

²³ Swellfoot the Tyrant, ii. ii. 42 ff., 84 ff.

²⁴ Works, vii, 13.

²⁵ The context shows that Shelley is thinking mainly of civil war following revolution.

²⁶ Works, vii, 53–54; cf. p. 14.

²⁷ Works, v, 265.

²⁸ Works, x, 74. The whole “anarchy-despotism” question was one of the most common points of dispute in the political literature of the time. The argument was that revolution would produce mob rule (anarchy) and that this would lead to a renewal of the dictatorship of the military and aristocracy (despotism).

Shelley—who was brought up to be a Whig Member of Parliament—may have encountered the problem first in the Whig debates. Pitt, the Tory leader, used to charge that the Whigs by agitating for reform were breeding revolution and urged that they “check their wishes rather than to risk the inlet of Jacobin principles and avoid the imprudence of affording to the enemies of the constitution the means of accomplishing its destruction.” The standard Whig reply (made in this particular debate by Fox) was that it was the Tory policy of repression which was goading the people to revolution and that the Whig reform plan was the only means of avoiding it. Hansard, Parliamentary Debates (1797), xxxiii, 644 ff. Shelley must certainly also have been aware of Godwin's treatment of this problem: “We have hitherto argued upon the supposition that the attempt which shall be made to effect a revolution, shall be crowned with success. But this supposition must by no means be suffered to pass without notice. Every attempt of this sort, even if menaced only and not carried into effect, tends to excite a resistance which otherwise would never be consolidated. … Amidst the barbarous rage of war, and the clamorous din of civil contention, who shall tell whether the event will be prosperous or adverse? The consequence may be, the riveting on us anew the chains of despotism, and insuring through a considerable period the triumph of oppression, even if it should fail to carry us back to a state of torpor, and obliterate the memory of all our improvements.” Political Justice (London, 1796), i, 276–277. On these fears, Bentham and other radical reformers cast ridicule. (See Jeremy Bentham, Plan of Parliamentary Reform, Works [Edinburgh, 1838–39], iii, 465, 475.)

²⁹ Works, vii, 132.

³⁰ The Revolt of Islam, iv. xxviii; see also iv. xviii.

³¹ Swellfoot the Tyrant, ii. ii. 89 ff. For Shelley's echoing of Coleridge in this passage, see my article, “Shelley and the Conciones ad Populum,” Modern Language Notes, lvii (December, 1942), 673–674. Shelley's theories on the lessons of the French Revolution are remarkably similar to those Coleridge presents in this work. Coleridge's views may be succinctly stated as follows: there were many great and admirable leaders in France but they were unable to restrain the masses from violence; the main problem in England, consequently, is to eradicate the idea of “retribution” from the hearts of the people and to bring about an “illumination” producing “benevolent affections” before any major change takes place; this can best be done by “a small but glorious band” of educated reformers who will look forward to a “glorious period when justice will have established the universal fraternity of love.” (Coleridge, “Condones ad Populum,” Essays on his Own Times [London, 1850], pp. 7–17.)

³² For an elucidation of Shelley's views in The Mask of Anarchy see A Philosophical View of Reform, Works, vii, 48 f.

³³ In spite of Shelley's aversion to violence, he was prepared to support a revolution, if it broke out, and take a chance on anarchy resulting: “In case the subsisting Government should compell the people to revolt to establish a representative assembly in defiance of them, and to assume in that assembly an attitude of resistance and defence, this question would probably be answered in a very summary manner.—No friend of mankind and of his country can desire that such a crisis should suddenly arrive; but still less, once having arrived, can he hesitate under what banner to array his person and his powers.” And again: “The last resort of resistance is undoubtedly insurrection.—The right of insurrection is derived from the employment of armed force to counteract the will of the nation.” (A Philosophical View of Reform, Works, vii, 45, 53.) See also his letter of January 7, 1812, to Elizabeth Hitchener, Works, viii, 234.

³⁴ Works, vii, 118.

³⁵ Speculations on Morals, Works, vi, 76.

³⁶ Works, vi, 249.

³⁷ The Assassins, Works, vi, 162.

³⁸ Works, vi, 201.

³⁹ Ibid., p. 202.

⁴⁰ Ll. 132–139.

⁴¹ L. 99.

⁴² Prologue to Hellas, 1. 161.

⁴³ Prometheus Unbound, iv. 574–575.

⁴⁴ Mask of Anarchy, xxii ff. We may remember also that in the Preface to Prometheus Unbound the two are linked: “until the mind can love, and admire, and trust, and hope.” In The Revolt of Islam (i. 271) the boat left by the woman is commented on as “Fair as herself, like Love by Hope left desolate.”

⁴⁵ For the influence of Hume on Shelley's doctrine of Necessity see: Frank B. Evans, “Shelley, Godwin, Hume, and the Doctrine of Necessity,” Studies in Philology, xxxviii (1940), 632–640.

⁴⁶ Works, i, 144.

⁴⁷ Fragments on Reform, Works, vi, 295. See also the Foreword to A Philosophical View of Reform, Works, vii, 4: “Let us believe not only that [it] is necessary because it is just and ought to be, but necessary because it is inevitable and must be.” See also Shelley's letters in this period (1819–20), for example, that to the Gisbornes on Nov. 6, 1819 (Works, x, 119–121).

⁴⁸ Queen Mab, vi. 197–198.

⁴⁹ The Daemon of the World, ii. 186 f.

⁵⁰ Queen Mab, vi. 146 f.

⁵¹ Prometheus Unbound, iv. 510 ff.

⁵² The Daemon of the World, II. 186 f.

⁵³ Queen Mab, vi. 148 f.

⁵⁴ Prometheus Unbound, ii. iii. 95.

⁵⁵ Ibid., II. ii. 43.

⁵⁶ Queen Mab, vi. 162.

⁵⁷ The Daemon of the World, i. 287; Prometheus Unbound, ii. ii 62. Both the Daemon and Demogorgon, we may note, are associated with the “vast snake Eternity” (Daemon, i. 100; Prometheus, iv. 565). On these matters see Henry G. Lotspeich, “Shelley's Eternity and Demogorgon,” Philological Quarterly, xiii (1934), 309–311, and my article, “A Major Source of The Revolt of Islam,” PMLA, lvi (1941), 201–205. Shelley may first have been introduced to the lore on Demogorgon by Peacock, whose note to Rhododaphne, vi, shows considerable knowledge of the subject.

⁵⁸ Stage direction at opening of ii. iii.

⁵⁹ The Revolt of Islam, x. xxvii; cf. Hellas, ii. 711–712: “The world's eyeless charioteer, Destiny, is hurrying by!”

⁶⁰ As is implied, perhaps, in White, op. cit., ii, 126, where it is asserted that “the substitution of Love for Necessity” forms “one of the greatest differences” between Prometheus Unbound and Queen Mab. There is, however no substitution; Necessity plays the same role in Prometheus Unbound as it does in Queen Mab but in the later work it is assisted by Love. Demogorgon's statement that Love is not subject to “Fate, Time, Occasion, Chance and Change” (ii. iv. 118–120) does not mean that Love rules over these entities, but only that they and Love belong to two different spheres of existence. Cf. Epipsychidion, ll. 160–189.

⁶¹ See the discussion of Shelley's use of snake symbols in my article, “A Major Source of The Revolt of Islam,” PMLA, lvi, 201–205.

⁶² Works, vi, 48–49.

⁶³ On Life, Works, vi, 197.

⁶⁴ Queen Mab, vi. 214 ff.

⁶⁵ Works, i, 145–146.

⁶⁶ See, for instance, the Appendix to Ethics 1. Shelley's interest in Spinoza was lifelong. He once began a translation of the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, but it has apparently been lost except for one fragment. (Works, vii, 273–274.)

⁶⁷ The second of these lyrics symbolizes the future union of Love and the spiritual leaders of mankind, the Poets, for the “Voice in the Air,” the third and fourth lines indicate, is that of Prometheus.

⁶⁸ Works, iii, 10.

⁶⁹ Timaeus, xiv. Shelley perhaps also had in mind Childe Harold's Pilgrimage, iv. clxxxiii on the sea:

Thetis was a sea goddess and hence part of this mirror of the sky (Eternity).

⁷⁰ White (op. cit., ii, 119), following Todhunter and Scudder, thinks that Demogorgon himself is the “fatal child” whom Jupiter has created: “When Demogorgon arrives in the Car of the Hour, Jupiter hails him gladly as his expected offspring.” But this is not so. Jupiter, hearing the approach of Demogorgon, rejoices, thinking that it is the “fatal child” arriving; when he sees Demogorgon, however, he does not, at all, “hail him gladly,” but starts back in consternation: “Awful shape, what art thou? Speak!” Cf. Grabo, The Magic Plant, p. 279: “He [Jupiter] has created a monster to supplant the might of Demogorgon, personification of Fate.” The child exists in spirit only and is to receive body from Demogorgon: i.e., take the place of Necessity.

⁷¹ Works, vi, 79. My italics.

⁷² The Mask of Anarchy, xviii.

⁷³ See A Philosophical View of Reform, Works, vii, 53 f.

⁷⁴ Prologue to Hellas, 1. 156 ff.; see also 1. 80 ff.

⁷⁵ Works, i, 160–162.

⁷⁶ Works, i, 144.

⁷⁷ Fragments on Reform, Works, vi, 295.

⁷⁸ As White (op. cit., ii, 118, 119), Rossetti, and others believe.

⁷⁹ Henry G. Lotspeich, “Shelley's Eternity and Demogorgon,” Philological Quarterly, xiii (1934), 311.

⁸⁰ Note on Prometheus Unbound, Works, ii, 269. Mary's comments, though too brief and general, have the virtue of treating the poem primarily as a representation of an action; but Shelley apparently did not discuss with her the more specific meanings of his symbols and she seems to have interpreted the poem only in the light of her general knowledge of his social philosophy.

⁸¹ Works, vii, 42–55.

⁸² See Edward B. Hungerford, Shores of Darkness (New York, 1941), pp. 194–202.

⁸³ Works, vii, 42–43: “Equality in possessions must be the last result of the utmost refinements of civilization; it is one of the conditions of that system of society, towards which with whatever hope of ultimate success, it is our duty to tend. We may and ought to advert to it as the elementary principle, as to the goal, unattainable, perhaps, by us, but which, as it were, we revive in our posterity to pursue. We derive tranquillity and courage and grandeur of soul from contemplating an object which is, because we will it, and may be, because we hope and desire it, and must be if succeeding generations of the enlightened sincerely and earnestly seek it.” (My italics.)

⁸⁴ See Preface to Hellas, Works, iii, 9: “But a new race has arisen throughout Europe, nursed in the abhorrence of the opinions which are its chains, and she will continue to produce fresh generations to accomplish that destiny which tyrants foresee and dread.”

⁸⁵ See A Newton among Poets, pp. 118–200.

⁸⁶ Works, vii, 41.

⁸⁷ Cf. A Philosophical View of Reform, Works, vii, 53, on civil war: “There is a secret sympathy between Destruction and Power, between Monarchy and War.”