No CrossRef data available.
We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 23 February 2021
A few years ago, in a series of articles on the theory of the natural goodness of man in the writings of Rousseau, Professor George R. Havens defended the startling thesis that, after all, Jean-Jacques was not the rebel against tradition that the world has long considered him. Professor Havens claims that Rousseau's theory of natural goodness, when properly understood, is not necessarily related to that doctrine of an “effortless morality” which is so often associated with Rousseau. Each of the three different conceptions of la bonté naturelle which he distinguishes in the works of the great Jean-Jacques, (1) primitive goodness, (2) instinctive goodness, and (3) virtue (or, “goodness as harmony with man's higher nature,”) he finds not fundamentally incompatible with the humanistic or traditional attitude toward life and toward morals.
page 1010 note 1 “Theory of Natural Goodness in Rousseau's Nouvelle Héloise,” M. L. N. XXXVI (1921), 385-94; “Theory of Natural Goodness in Rousseau's Confessions,” M. L. N. XXXVIII, 257-66; “La Théorie de la Bonté naturelle chez J.-J. Rousseau, Rev. d'Hist. littér. de la France, oct. 1924-juin 1925.
page 1010 note 2 See M. L. N. XXXVI, 386.
page 1011 note 3 Ibid., p. 393.
page 1011 note 4 Professor Havens insists that Rousseau “wished to react against the fatalism of predestination and the damnation of the non-elect.” M. L. N. XXXVII, 265.
page 1011 note 5 Rousseau, according to Professor Havens, said: “It is true that man is evil, it is true that he has fallen; but this was not in accordance with any decree from God. However, man can escape from his present degradation if he attempts to regain his true nature and if, by struggling persistently against all the artificial alterations (in his nature) he makes every effort to return to it.” See Revue d'Hist. littér, de l Fr., XXXI, 634-5.
page 1012 note 6 This view of life is called humanism to distinguish it from the religious view of life which relies, in greater or in leaser degree, upon divine guidance in the moral struggle. However, humanism is in no sense antagonistic to religion. For instance, Dante is generally considered one of the greatest of religious mystics. Yet, according to a certain interpretation of the Divine Comedy, the Inferno and Purgatory may be regarded as an eloquent expression of the humanistic ideal. There Dante shows the human individual gaining control over his desires and impulses, and then, under the guidance of human reason alone, effecting the purification of his nature and at last achieving self-mastery. (“Per ch'io te sopra te corono e mitrio.” Virgil to Dante, Purgatorio, XXVII). Self-mastery, or rather, self-guidance, for it cannot be too emphatically stated that the positive element in humanism is by no means less important than the negative, is the goal of humanistic ethical endeavor. Now Dante considers this but the preparation for that beatific vision which can come from God alone, since in the realm of the divine, human reason is impotent. In Dante, then, it is clear that humanism and religion complement each other. On the human level Dante is a good humanist, but to his humanism he adds religious mysticism.
page 1013 note 7 Apparently Professor Havens is inclined to regard this recognition of the reality of evil as a “neglected aspect of Rousseau's doctrines,” and to see in such phrases as Mr. More's “innate goodness” when applied to Rousseau an assertion that Rousseau was blind to the fact of evil. See, however, Mr. More's statement “. . . . evil to Rousseau . . . . was . . . . a power to be feared and spurned. As embodied in society . . . . etc.” (Shelburne Essays, VI, 225-6.) So Professor Babbitt in his chapter on “Rousseau and the Romantic Imagination” (Rousseau and Romanticism, pp. 77 ff.) and M. Lasserre in his treatment of Rousseau and “La Ruine de l'Individu” (Le Romantisme français, pp. 33 ff.) both show that Rousseau's dissatisfaction with reality, his hatred for society and its evils is the source from which came his romantic dream of an ideal state of nature; and M. Lanson (Hist. de la Litt. fr., pp. 786-791) goes further, even, in stating that this perception of evil as it is inherent in society is the source of Rousseau's ideas.
page 1013 note 8 See, for instance, Rousseau, Œuvres (Hachette): I, 112-3, 123, 149, 192; II, 4, 60, 68n., 184; IX, 197-8, 185, etc.
page 1014 note 9 Ibid., II, 249.
page 1015 note 10 Revue d'Hist. littér, de la Fr. XXXI, 631.
page 1015 note 11 Ibid., XXXII, 225.
page 1018 note 20 Ibid., II, 264; XII, 143.
page 1018 note 21 Ibid., II, 122, 237, 257, 260, 262, 264, 267, 307, 353; IX, 118, 350, 357; XII, 143-4.
page 1019 note 22 In Emile Rousseau tries to bring together these two ideals, to make of the boy a natural man and a social being. First Emile is bon; then, because he must live in society, he must learn the way of vertu (see Ibid., II, 226). The latter contingency is forced upon him by the fact of the existence of society.
page 1019 note 23 See Ibid., II, 445: Natural man, “né dans le fond d'un bois . . . . eût vécu plus heureux et plus libre; mais n'ayant rien a combattre pour suivre ses penchants, il eût été bon sans mérite, il n'eût point été vertueux et maintenant il sait l'être malgré ses passions.” Cf. Social Contract, Part I, ch. 8.
page 1019 note 24 Ibid., IX, 199.
page 1020 note 25 Ibid., p. 210.
page 1021 note 26 Revue d'Hist. littér. de la Fr. XXXII, 225.
page 1023 note 27 See Confessions, Bks. I and II, especially.
page 1025 note 28 For an excellent treatment of the general contradiction between the radical and the conservative Rousseau see the article by M. Gustave Lanson, Annales de la Soc. J.-J. Rousseau, VIII, pp. 1-31.
page 1025 note 29 A large part of the material for this paper is drawn from a thesis presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts at Reed College (1926). The writer is happy to have this opportunity to thank Professor Barry Cerf of Reed College and Professor Irving Babbitt of Harvard University for the many helpful criticisms and the sympathetic encouragement received from them. Professors C. H. Grandgent and J. L. Lowes also have read the article in manuscript. Without in any way rendering them responsible for the errors it may still contain, it is a great pleasure to be able to acknowledge here my indebtedness to their judgment and learning.