¹ For valuable suggestions on certain aspects of this study, I am indebted to Professors A. O. Lovejoy of the Johns Hopkins University and George R. Havens of Ohio State University. They are of course not responsible for whatever imperfections the study may still contain.

² All references to the Lettres Persanes are to the edition of E. Carcassonne (Paris: F. Roches, 1929), 2 v.

³ For a definition of the various possible states of nature, see A. O. Lovejoy and George Boas, Primitivism and Related Ideas in Antiquity in A Documentary History of Primitivism and Related Ideas (Baltimore, 1935), i, 14–15.

⁴ Cf. Judges, xvii, 6: “In those days there was no king in Israel, but every man did that which was right in his own eyes.”

⁵ Cf. “Letter 83,” where Montesquieu holds that by nature justice is absolute and immutable, and “ne dépend point des conventions humaines.” This is an unmistakable allusion to Hobbes, whom he openly criticizes in Pensées et fragments, i, 395 and in Defense de l'Esprit des lois, Œuvres complètes, ed. Laboulaye, vi, 144.

⁶ Cf. Leviathan, Pt. i, chap. xiii-xv; Philosophical Rudiments concerning Government and Society, chap. i, sec. 14; chap. ii, sec. 2–3; chap. xii, sec. 1.

⁷ Cudworth, in Jean Le Clerc's extract of his True Intellectual System of the Universe which Montesquieu had read (cf. Dissertation sur la politique des Romains dans la religion, Œuvres complètes, ed. Laboulaye, ii, 368, where he refers to Cudworth), says against Hobbes: “Un accord & une alliance, sans Justice naturelle, ne sont que des paroles, comme ces mêmes Politiques le disent, conformément à leurs hypothèses; & par conséquent, on n'est point obligé de les tenir,” (Bibliothèque choisie, ix [1706], 90). Shaftesbury objects as follows: “Tis ridiculous to say there is any obligation on man to act sociably or honestly in a formed government and not in that which is called the state of nature…. The civil union or confederacy could never make right or wrong, if they subsisted not before. He who was free to any villainy before his contract will and ought to make as free with his contract when he thinks fit” (“Essay on the Freedom of Wit and Humour,” Characteristics, ed. Robertson [New York, 1900], i, 73–74). For Clarke's objection, see A Discourse concerning the Being and Attributes of God, the Obligations of Natural Religion, and the Truth and Certainty of the Christian Revelation, 6th ed. (London, 1725), p. 84.

⁸ Hesiod, Works and Days, verses 115 ff. Passage quoted as translated in A. O. Lovejoy and George Boas, op. cit., i, 97.

⁹ History, iv, 19–21, in A. O. Lovejoy and George Boas, op. cit., i, 347. Montesquieu knew Polybus well and utilized him for his Considérations. Cf. the Introduction and Notes to Jullian's ed. of this work.

¹⁰ Pensées et fragments, i, 223, 228.

¹¹ Les Aventures de Télémaque, ed. A. Cahen, Les Grands Ecrivains de la France(Paris, 1927), i, 81.

¹² Camille Jullian, Montesquieu. Extraits de l'Esprit des lois et des Œuvres diverses, 13th ed. (Hachette), p. 295; Albert Chérel, Fénelon au XVIIIe siècle en France (1715–1820) (Paris, 1917), 322–326.

¹³ One example of their generosity is almost identical. Just as the people of Bétique offer wool to strangers, so the Troglodytes offer to give wool to the neighboring people who wish to invade their land.

¹⁴ M. Chinard has pointed out how closely the people of Bétique resemble the contemporary savages described by travelers and missionaries in America. In this respect, therefore, the Troglodytes and the people of Bétique have a common background. Cf. Gilbert Chinard, L'Amérique et le rêve exotique dans la littérature française au XVIIe et au XVIIIe siècle (Paris, 1913), pp. 216–219.

¹⁵ See Chérel, op. cit., p. 326, and his article, “Le Lyrisme du Président de Montesquieu,” Revue politique et littéraire, lxxi (1933), 99–103.

¹⁶ See Gilbert Chinard, op. cit., especially pp. 49, 110, 147, 156.

¹⁷ Baron de Lahontan, Dialogues curieux entre l'auteur et un sauvage de bon sens qui a voyagé et Mémoire de l'Amérique Septentrionale publiés par Gilbert Chinard (Baltimore, 1931), p. 188. Cf. also p. 181. As M. Chinard points out (p. 64), there are several general resemblances between the Dialogues and the Lettres Persanes, but there is no proof that Montesquieu read the work.

¹⁸ For a statement of these principles see Cicero, De Officiis, Book i, iv, vii, xvii, and for Montesquieu's admiration of the Stoic sect, Esprit des lois, Book xxiv, chap. x.

¹⁹ On the Stoic background of Shaftesbury's moral system, see especially Esther A. Tiffany, “Shaftesbury as Stoic,” PMLA, xxxviii (1923), 642–684.

²⁰ A Letter concerning Enthusiasm was translated in 1709, and the Essay on the Freedom of Wit and Humour twice in 1710. Shaftesbury's contacts with French men of letters and the accounts which his works received in French language periodicals have been fully studied by Ennemond Casati in “Quelques correspondants français de Shaftesbury,” and in “Hérauts et commentateurs de Shaftesbury en France,” Revue de littérature comparée, xi (1931), 219–236, and xiv (1934), 615–645.

²¹ In the Pensées et fragments, ii, 490, he calls Shaftesbury one of the four great poets. Other possible points of contact between the two (cf. my article, “Parallels to Ideas in the Lettres Persanes,” PMLA, lii [1937], 773–777) tend to show, if nothing else, a remarkable affinity in their moral and social ideas. This of course was to some extent natural, considering their common Stoic background.

²² “An Inquiry concerning Virtue and Merit,” Characteristics, ed. Robertson (New York, 1900), i, 258–259. Cf. Jean Le Clerc's account of the “Inquiry,” Bibliothèque Choisie, sec. ed. (La Haye, 1738), xxiii (1711), 101 and passim. Le Clerc was the journalist who devoted the most space to Shaftesbury.

²³ Ibid., i, 274. Le Clerc, loc. cit., p. 123.

²⁴ Ibid., i, 282. Le Clerc translates the conclusion of the “Inquiry” thus: “Ainsi la Sagesse, qui conduit toutes choses les a faites pour le bien particulier de chacun, afin qu'il contribue au bien géneral de tous; que personne ne peut cesser de procurer, sans négliger son propre bonheur. Il est, à cet égard son propre ennemi, & ne peut être utile à soi-même, qu'autant qu'il l'est à la Société, ou au Tout, dont il n'est qu'une partie. La Vertu donc … qui conserve les Communautez; qui entretient l'union & l'amitié, parmi les hommes … cette qualité si avantageuse à toute la Societé & au Genre Humain en géneral, fait en même tems le bonheur de chaque homme en particulier. Il s'ensuit de tout cela que LA VERTU EST LE BIEN DE L'HOMME, ET LE VICE SON MAL.” (Loc. cit., xxiii [1711], 143–144.) The same idea had been expressed by Cudworth. Cf. Le Clerc's account of the True Intellectual System of the Universe in Bibliothèque Choisie, ix (1706), 99–100.

²⁵ Ibid., i, 280. Le Clerc reproduces the idea as follows: “On a prouvé qu'une Créature raisonnable, pour mériter le nom de bonne & de vertueuse, doit avoir toutes ses inclinations disposées, en sorte qu'elles soient conformes au bien de toute son Espece; dans laquelle elle est renfermée, & dont elle ne fait qu'une partie. Etre bien disposé non seulement à l‘égard de soi-même, mais encore à l‘égard de la Societé & du Public; c'est ce qu'on appélle Droiture, Integrité, ou Vertu.” (Loc. cit., xxiii [1711], 121.)

²⁶ Ibid., i, 296. Le Clerc summarizes thus: “Entre les plaisirs de l'esprit, il n'y en a point d'égaux à ceux, qui naissent de la disposition d'un homme qui se trouve plein d'amitié, de reconnoissance, de bonté, de génerosité; de pitié, & de tout ce qui sert à entretenir la Societé. Il ne faut pas avoir beaucoup de connoissance de la Nature Humaine, pour savoir quel plaisir l'on ressent dans cette disposition.” (Loc. cit., xxiii [1711], 127 [wrongly numbered 217].)

²⁷ Cf. Gustave Lanson, “Le Rôle de l'expérience dans la formation de la Philosophie du xviiie siècle en France: i. La Transformation des idées morales et la naissance des morales rationnelles de 1680 à 1715,” Revue du Moi, ix (1910), 5–28.

²⁸ Op. cit., i, 256–257, 252–253. Le Clerc summarizes thus: “Cette seule inclination à bien faire à son Espece, qu'on peut appeller douceur & bonté, & qu'on voit dans les bêtes mêmes, n'est pas encore ce que l'on appelle Vertu & Mérite. Il faut outre cela que l'on se fasse un objet des bonnes dispositions, comme la Pitié, l'Amitié, la Reconnoissance, & de leurs contraires; que l'on aime les premieres, & que l'on haïsse les autres…. C'est proprement dans l'amour réfléchi & éclairé du Bien consideré en géneral, & dans la haine refléchie & éclairée du Mal, que consiste ce qu'on appelle la Vertu, comme l'Auteur le montre plus au long.” (Loc. cit., xxiii [1711], 101–102.)

²⁹ On Shaftesbury's distinction between goodness, virtue, and merit, see Martineau, Types o^f Ethical Theory, 3rd ed. revised (Oxford, 1898), ii, 495. On his conflicting position with regard to feeling and reason, Lois Whitney, Primitivism and the Idea of Progress (Baltimore, 1934), p. 33.

³⁰ That Montesquieu, in accepting the idea of man's natural virtue, stresses feeling rather than reason, is clearly shown by other passages in the Lettres Persanes. Speaking of women (“Letter 26”), he says that “elles portent toutes dans leur coeur un certain caractère de vertu qui y est gravé, que la naissance donne, et que l'éducation affoiblit, mais ne détruit pas.” In “Letter 34” somebody says to Rica: “Ces gens lâches [the slaves] affaiblissent en vous les sentimens de la vertu que l'on tient de la Nature….” See also “Letters 50, 83.”

³¹ “D'eux [the innocents] on dit, & est ceste loüange iniureuse, il est bon puisqu'il est bon mesme aux meschans, & cette accusation vraie, comment seroit-il bon, puis qu'il n'est pas mauuais aux meschans, il f audroit plustost appeler cette telle bonté, innocence, selon qu'on appele les petis enfans, brebis, & autres telles bestes innocentes.” (De la Sagesse, Book ii, chap. iii, sec. 13, dernière éd. [Paris, 1642], p. 365.)

³² These distinctions are thus summarized by Charron: “Par tout cecy se void qu'il y a deux sortes de vraye prud'hommie: l'vne naturelle, douce, aisee, equable dite bonté: l'autre acquise, difficile, penible & laborieuse, dite vertu; mais à bien dire, il y en a encore vne troisieme, qui est comme composée des deux, & ainsi seront trois degrez de perfection. Le plus bas est vne facile nature & débonnaireté; dégoustee par soy mesmes de la débauche & du vice; nous l'auons nommé bonté, innocence: le second plus haut qu'auons appelle vertu est à empescher de vive force le progrés des vices, & s'estant laissé surprendre aux émotions premieres des passions, s'armer & se bander pour arrester leur course & les vaincre: le troisième & souuerain est d'vne haute resolution & d'vne habitude parfaicte, estre si bien formé, que les tentations mesmes n'y puissent naistre, que les semences des vices en soient de tout desracinees, tellement que la vertu leur soit passee en complexion, & en nature. Cestuy dernier se peut appeller perfection: luy & le premier de bonté se ressemblent, & sont differens du second, en ce qu'ils sont sans bruit, sans peine, sans effort: C'est la vraye teinture de l'ame, son train naturel & ordinaire qui ne couste rien: le second est tousiours en cervelle & en contraste.” (Ibid., p. 364.)

³³ Montesquieu's preference and admiration for natural virtue and the stress that he puts on the effortless, instinctive, and inconspicuous manner in which it operates, are evident in “Letter 50” where he declares that he has seen people in whom “la vertu étoit si naturelle qu'elle ne se faisoit pas même sentir: ils s'attachoient à leur devoir sans s'y plier et s'y portoient comme par instinct…. Voilà les gens que j'aime, non pas ces hommes vertueux qui semblent être étonnés de l'être, et qui regardent une bonne action comme un prodige dont le récit doit surprendre.” M. Chérel, op. cit., p. 324, referring to this aspect of Montesquieu's idea of virtue, points out that it is anti-jansenistic and cites it as another point of contact between Montesquieu and Fénelon.

³⁴ Op. cit., Book ii, chap. v, sec. 28, p. 399.

³⁵ See J.-P. Zimmermann, “La morale laïque au commencement du xviiie siècle: Mme de Lambert,” Revue d'histoire littéraire de la France, xxiv (1917), 42–64, 440–466.

³⁶ There he maintains that the first acts of religion are “l'observation des loix, l'amour pour les hommes, la piété envers les parents.” See also “Letter 83.”

³⁷ See E. Casati, “Hérauts et commentateurs de Shaftesbury en France,” Revue de Littérature Comparée, xiv (1934), 615–645.

³⁸ Op. cit., i, 207; cf. also i, 279. Cf. Le Clerc, loc. cit., xxiii (1711), 109. For Samuel Clarke's statement that the moral obligations of the law of nature are independent of religion, see Le Clerc's extract of A Discourse concerning the Unchangeable obligations of Natural Religion, Bibliothèque Choisie, xxvi (1713), 338–339.

³⁹ The criterion of choosing the most virtuous man as king was characteristic of antiquity. Both Plato and Aristotle advocate it. Cf. Republic, Book vi, 499 B; Politics, iii.xiii.1283 b, xvii.1288 a.

⁴⁰ Cf. Saul's behavior after he has been chosen king by Samuel. He could not be found when Samuel had gathered the people who were to choose him by lot because he had hidden himself (i Samuel, viii-x).

⁴¹ The old man, it seems, was one of the many who, according to Aristotle, think it “unnatural that one man should have the entire rule over his fellow citizens when the state consists of equals; for nature requires that the same right, and the same rank, should necessarily exist amongst all those who are equal by nature …” and that it is not “right that one who is good should have rule over those who are good.” (Politics, tr. E. Walford, Book iii.xvi.1287 a, xvii.1288 a.)

⁴² The idea that an ambition for wealth and luxuries led the Troglodytes to give up the natural state, implies the development of mutual rivalry, and in this sense might be considered embryonic of Montesquieu's belief in the Esprit des lois that the state of war begins as soon as men lose their sense of weakness and consequently their equality: “Les particuliers, dans chaque société, commencent à sentir leur force: ils cherchent à tourner en leur faveur les principaux avantages de cette société: ce qui fait entr'eux un état de guerre.” (Book i, chap. iii, Œuvres complètes, ed. Laboulaye, iii, 97.)

⁴³ An Essay concerning the true original Extent and End of civil Government, Book ii, chap. i, sec. 19, Works (London, 1824), iv, 348.

⁴⁴ In the Esprit des lois Montesquieu's conception of the juristic state of nature remains essentially the same in that it is a state of peace opposed to Hobbes's state of war. But there is a shift of emphasis with respect to some of the notions implied or expressed in the story of the good Troglodytes. Man's instincts of sociability and self-preservation, the attraction of the sexes, man's innate idea of a creator and the desire to worship him are considered there as laws of nature. But the feeling of equality in each individual is subordinated to that of his timidity and inferiority, and this state is given as the psychological reason why the first law of nature would be peace. Nothing is said of natural goodness, nor is liberty mentioned, no doubt because it is taken for granted. (See Book i, chap. ii.)

⁴⁵ His attitude, of course, will change in the Esprit des lois. Just as the loss of natural equality is replaced by the equality achieved through laws, so is natural liberty transformed into political liberty by means of laws: “Dans l’état de nature, les hommes naissent bien dans l’égalité; mais ils n'y sauroient rester. La société la leur fait perdre, et ils ne redeviennent égaux que par les lois.” (Book viii, chap. iii, Œuvres complètes, iii, 305.) And: “Dans un état, c'est-à-dire dans une société où il y a des lois, la liberté ne peut consister qu’à pouvoir faire ce que l'on doit vouloir, et à n’être point contraint de faire ce que l'on ne doit pas vouloir.” (Book xi, chap. iii, ibid., iv, 4.)

⁴⁶ Montesquieu's primitivism is slightly reminiscent of Tacitus, since the Troglodytes, in desiring a change to organized government, give up their equality moved by an ambition for wealth resulting perhaps from the economic evolution of society, an ambition which inevitably brought to the fore the selfish side of man's nature and affected his natural goodness. Cf. Annals, Book iii, 26: “The most ancient human beings lived with no evil desires, without guilt or crime, and therefore without penalties or compulsions…. But after equality began to be abandoned and in place of modesty and shame ambition and force appeared, despotisms arose, and among many peoples still persist.” (Passage quoted as translated in A. O. Lovejoy and George Boas, op. cit., i, 97.)

⁴⁷ This was a current idea and constituted an important principle of Shaftesbury's moral philosophy. Among the influences on virtue he includes the case where the natural sense of right and wrong is opposed by natural contrary forces (cf. op. cit., i, 265). The idea is thus summarized by Le Clerc: “Rien ne la [virtue] peut détruire que ce qui ôte aux hommes le sentiment naturel du Juste & de l'Injuste; ou qui leur en donne un sentiment faux; ou qui excite en eux des passions, qui s'opposent à ce droit sentiment.” (Loc. cit., xxiii [1711], 103.) Cf. also Le Clerc's extract from Clarke, loc. cit., xxvi (1713), 330; Bayle, Commentaire philosophique in Œuvres diverses (La Haye, 1737), ii, 368; Malebranche, Traité de morale in Œuvres (1837), i, 401.

⁴⁸ Since even the good Troglodytes in the course of time deteriorated, it is obvious that they were not naturally good in the sense of being essentially inclined to virtue.

⁴⁹ Paris, 1897, 1 v. and Paris, 1913, 2 v.

⁵⁰ Cf. Aristotle: “For this principle [of looking for officers among the wealthy] makes riches of more account than virtue, and causes the state to grow avaricious; for whatever those who have the chief power regard as honourable, the opinion of the citizens necessarily follows in their wake….” (Politics, tr. E. Walford, ii.xi.1273 b.)

⁵¹ The idea that example is an important factor in the preservation of virtue or its destruction is, of course, a very old one. (Cf. Cicero, Tusc.disp., Book iii. 1. 2.) Shaftesbury works the idea into his moral system, maintaining that “it is example which chiefly influences mankind, and forms the character and disposition of a people.” (Op. cit., i, 271.) Custom which is preserved by example, and education which is most effective through example, are such strong influences that they are capable of destroying virtue by creating a wrong sense of right and wrong. (Op. cit., i, 261.) Cf. Le Clerc's statement of the idea: “Rien ne peut donner des sentimens contraires à ceux de la nature, ou de fausses pensées, touchant le Juste & l'Injuste; que la force de la coutume & de l'éducation, qui se trouvent opposées à la Nature; ce que l'on peut remarquer dans les païs, où la coutûme & l'autorité de l'Etat fait qu'il s'y pratique constamment des choses naturellement mauvaises & odieuses avec l'applaudissement des peuples.” (Loc. cit., xxiii [1711], 104.)

⁵² In “Letter 129” he states that “les moeurs font toujours de meilleurs citoyens que les loix.” Cf. also Esprit des lois, Book x, chap. xi; Book xix, chap. xxi; Pensées et fragments, i, 413, ii, 323; Considérations, chap. vi.

⁵³ Cf. Esprit des lois, Book iii, chaps, iii, v; Book v, chaps, ii–vi.

⁵⁴ Esprit des lois, Book iii, chap. vii, Œuvres complètes, iii, 132.

⁵⁵ Ibid., Book iii, chap. v, note, Œuvres completes, iii, 129.